

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Wednesday, March 27, 1985

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.  
The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Lift our eyes, O God, to see the hope and beauty of a better world; open our hearts, O God, to understand the needs of all people; encourage our minds, O God, to seek truth and honor; lead our hands, O God, to do those good works that glorify You and heal the hurt of our world. Amen.

## THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

#### APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 1239, URGENT SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR EMERGENCY FAMINE RELIEF AND RECOVERY IN AFRICA

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 1239) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, for emergency famine relief and recovery in Africa, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PEASE). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi? The Chair hears none and, with out objection, appoints the following conferees: Messrs. WHITTEN, NATCHER, OBEY, TRAXLER, McHUGH, CONTE, KEMP, and Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska.

There was no objection.

#### PERMISSION TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1239, URGENT SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR EMERGENCY FAMINE RELIEF AND RECOVERY IN AFRICA

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report on the bill (H.R. 1239) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, for emergency famine relief and recovery in Africa, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

#### STOP THE USE OF PLASTIC BULLETS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

(Mr. FEIGHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain visited this Chamber in February, she spoke sincerely of her desire and intention to reach a peaceful settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict. We should all applaud that sentiment and support her goal, but there is much that can be done to facilitate that process that Prime Minister Thatcher continues to ignore.

In recent years, violent clashes between British forces in Northern Ireland and angry demonstrators in Belfast and elsewhere have resulted in terrible and unnecessary losses. In seeking to control uneasy mobs or combat a threatening situation, British forces have resorted to the use of plastic and rubber bullets to break up a throng. These bullets, labeled innocuously as "crowd control" can and do maim and sometimes kill innocent people. In recent years, plastic bullets fired by British security forces have killed more than 10 people, some of them children under the age of 15. Some 160 others have been badly injured, some permanently, by these projectiles which can cause brain damage, internal injuries, and easily take out a person's eye.

Many of these civilians have been shot with plastic and rubber bullets in nonriot situations. That is inexcusable. Moreover, the British Home Secretary has described plastic bullets as "lethal." British forces do not use plastic bullets to control riots in England; their use has been exclusive to Northern Ireland. What's more, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of a ban on the use of these bullets against civilians. Why do the British authorities continue to be intransigent on this issue?

The use in Northern Ireland of methods to control a situation that would be unacceptable in England may have many causes; it could be that the British security forces have a lower tolerance for or understanding of disturbances or volatile situations in foreign areas of the British Commonwealth. But it is untenable, when

other means are at a security forces disposal for dealing with a riot situation, that the British police should continue to have these weapons as a first resort. It is too easy, Mr. Speaker, for plastic bullets to be used before a crowd becomes a riot, as the most effective way of dispersing what may be an orderly crowd.

The Congress has spoken out before on this issue, and yesterday I introduced a resolution calling on the Government of the United Kingdom to ban the use of plastic and rubber bullets against civilians. This is no more than a confirmation of what has been said by this Congress time and time again: That we abhor the use of excessive force against civilians, that we object to the indiscriminate use of lethal weapons by a government against its people, and that plastic and rubber bullets constitute an irresponsible and unnecessary use of lethal force in Northern Ireland.

I urge my colleagues to join me in this effort, to send a strong message to our oldest and most faithful ally, that because of our friendship and because of our common commitment to peace and peaceful coexistence, we hold them to the very highest standards of conduct. That conduct must not include using these weapons against the civilians of Northern Ireland. Peace cannot come from without until peace is the standard within.

#### INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION TO GRANT LORI BURR, OF EL PASO, FULL U.S. CITIZENSHIP

(Mr. COLEMAN of Texas asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to grant Lori Burr, of El Paso, full U.S. citizenship.

Lori Burr was born in Mexico on April 30, 1966, and was abandoned by her natural mother. She was adopted immediately by a missionary, Mr. William Burr, and his wife, in May 1966, and Lori has been their daughter ever since. They believed that they had legally adopted Lori, and, until this time, there had never been any question about the legality of the adoption.

When Lori applied for a Social Security card, the Immigration and Naturalization Service challenged her citizenship and is now preparing to deport

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

her to Mexico despite the fact that she has no other family and is without any relatives in Mexico.

Mr. Speaker, is it justice to tear apart the Burr family by deporting Lori, who grew up in the United States, was raised since infancy by American parents, and who has never known anything except the American way of life?

Surely, we cannot let bureaucratic redtape stand in the way of justice. Let us see if we can make the wheels of government turn on behalf of those who need its help the most.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues in the House and in the Judiciary Committee to support this bill.

#### U.S. COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO PURCHASE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN JAPAN

(Mr. REGULA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, in the Saturday past Washington Post, the following headline appeared: "Japanese phone negotiations seen making little progress."

The article goes on to point out that an internal U.S. document notes "few aims achieved."

I think it is outrageous that there is even a question about the right of the U.S. companies to bid and participate in the sale of telecommunications equipment in Japan. In the past year, 30 percent of the total trade deficit of almost \$37 billion, the United States was incurred with Japan.

□ 1210

Japanese manufacturers sold about 1.8 million automobiles in the United States, to say nothing of millions and millions of dollars worth of electronics, and yet they want to deny U.S. firms even a minuscule right to participate in the telecommunications market.

These are examples of nontariff barriers that are constantly erected against the companies that would sell into the Japanese market. I think it is very typical of agreeing to do nothing or agreeing to do something and then erecting barriers to make it impossible to achieve the objectives.

It is about time that we no longer tolerate this kind of conduct. We should either say to the Japanese open up your markets or risk being closed out of ours. Free trade must be fair trade.

#### REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 885

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Congressman GERRY SIKORSKI's name be withdrawn

as a cosponsor of the bill, H.R. 885, the Professional Franchise Community Sports Team Protection Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

#### PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS

(Ms. MIKULSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the House's attention that today is the funeral of a very gallant woman: Former Secretary of Housing and also Health and Human Services, Patricia Harris.

On behalf of the people of Baltimore, I would like to express to the Harris family our deep and heartfelt sympathy. Mrs. Harris was an example of what the American dream was all about. The daughter of a railroad porter, she pulled herself up by her own bootstraps, pursuing an academic career, and then obtaining a law degree from Howard University to go on and be the dean of law at Howard University, and also to become an ambassador and then as Secretary of not one, but two, Cabinet posts.

In the process of self-help and self-reliance, she wanted to institutionalize those concepts, and we in Baltimore thank her for the kind of administration she provided, whether through the tools that she developed that enabled a great city like Baltimore to renew itself and revitalize ourselves.

We thank Mrs. Harris for her contribution which will be long lasting.

#### THE COMFORTS OF INDOOR PLUMBING

(Mr. MARLENEE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARLENEE. Mr. Speaker, I grew up on the Montana prairie and freeze branded vividly into my mind and elsewhere is the early morning 100 yard dash to a place of repose called an outhouse, so I appreciate first hand the comforts of indoor plumbing.

But all comforts aside, I read with amazement and mortification a story in this morning's paper which indicated the Government is not only considering building Indian housing with no indoor bathrooms, but that these bathrooms cost about \$24,000 per home.

Who's building these things? General Dynamics?

Without question these homes should contain indoor plumbing, but without question it should cost far under \$24,000 to do so.

What's going on here? The Indian Health Service, Health and Human Services Department, and Bureau of

Indian Affairs may suffer from the "Pentagonese" procurement syndrome, which may merit a checkup by the GAO.

Something smells here; and the odor is worse than the privy out back.

#### THE MEDICARE TRUST FUND

(Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I read in this morning's Washington Post that the Medicare trust fund, which has been in a severe nose dive, is now recovered and is flying high. I wonder why this has taken place because I have been told for the past several years that if something was not done, this trust fund, in the most pessimistic views, would be out of money by 1988, and most optimistically, by 1992.

Is this trust fund suddenly pulled out because it is accumulating so much money at the expense of some 30 million senior citizens in this country and those who are disabled by increasing their copayments and their deductible? Or is it because we now have prospective reimbursement? Or is it because we have a freeze on physician fees? Or is it because it is being done at the expense of the private sector now?

It really looks good to have this trust fund have so much money. What kind of economic assumptions are being used to say that this is actually what is going to be taking place?

I recall in 1977 that we were told after increasing the Social Security tax that that system would be solvent until the year 2030. Mr. Speaker, I really question and will look forward to seeing what the trustees are going to tell us about this when we receive their report, which I believe will be some time in the month of April.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY

(Mr. CLINGER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Speaker, last week the Senate Budget Committee approved a budget that requires senior citizens to share in the task of reducing the Federal deficit by forgoing next year's cost-of-living adjustment. Such an action would save about \$5 billion in the first year and more in succeeding years, however, we would be losing far more in terms of sacrificing the security and health of the majority of our seniors.

The Social Security COLA was enacted in 1972 to protect the purchasing power of benefits. It is the only means that retirees have to compen-



sate for the rising medical and general living expenses that eat away more and more of their income every year. With these expenses as well as high utility and heating bills, senior citizens in my district are at times barely able to maintain a decent standard of living; denying them next year's COLA will push many into poverty.

The American Association of Retired Persons provides some staggering statistics on the economic status of older Americans which merit close attention and further prove my point. For example, the median elderly household income is only half that of the non-elderly and over 2 million older persons or 8 percent of the elderly population are in the near poverty category, placing them in an extremely precarious financial situation.

Mr. Speaker, if the deficit is to be reduced, those factors which are actually causing the deficit must be addressed and Social Security is not one of those factors. My constituents have suffered enough through previous budget cuts—why intensify their hardship by unfairly forcing them to solve the deficit?

#### STUDENT AID CUTS MUST BE REJECTED

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, the administration's proposals to gut our Federal student aid programs takes a direct hit at educational opportunity for hundreds of thousands of students.

To demonstrate the real life impact of these proposals upon students and the schools they attend—consider what happens at just one school—Mercy College in New York:

The proposal to eliminate loans for those with incomes above \$32,500 would deny loans to 720 students, 24 percent of enrollment, totaling \$1.2 million;

The proposed \$4,000 megacap on all aid would affect 200 students, 4 percent of total enrollment, totaling \$150,000;

Zero funding of campus-based programs would hit 100 students, 2 percent of enrollment, for a total of \$125,000;

Denying Pell grants, NDSL's and college work-study to those above \$25,000 affects 1,600 students—with a loss of \$1.6 million; and

Failure to pay the full amount authorized for Pell grants by Congress last year hits 5,000 students, 66 percent of enrollment, for a total loss of \$1 million.

The budget resolution adopted by the House should reject these proposals—the impact on one campus would be intolerable—the impact on all schools would spell the death knell for educational opportunity.

#### MEDICARE AREA WAGE INDEX

(Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues in the House, I have served in this body going on 11 years and during that time I have had my share of disagreements and confrontations with the Federal bureaucracy. But I do not remember when a department has so flagrantly demonstrated its arrogance and disregard for congressional intent than what we have witnessed in past months over the Department of Health and Human Services' refusal to correct inequities in the Medicare prospective payment formula.

The inequities in the formula—specifically the indexes used to adjust for differences in area wages—have resulted in rural hospitals being shorted millions of dollars in Medicare reimbursements. The situation threatens to close the doors of many rural hospitals, leaving rural Medicare beneficiaries without access to community-based hospital services and endangering the overall availability of quality health care in rural America.

We have lots of serious problems out in farm and ranch country right now, and there is no excuse for letting one problem go uncorrected when the means is there to set it right—and when Congress has mandated that it be set right!

In the Deficit Reduction Act enacted last July, Congress recognized the serious flaws in the wages indexes and directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop revised indexes, and we mandated she report back to use within 30 days. Well, that deadline came and went months ago, and since then we have had nothing more than lame excuses, broken promises, and missed deadlines.

HHS has put the blame on Congress, on the hospitals, on unreliable data. We've listened to excuse after excuse about the need to verify data. Well, that data has been checked, double-checked, and checked again. Now we are supposed to buy the argument that separate rulemaking to implement the revised indexes as soon as possible is unreasonable and would compromise the public's right to offer informed comment on the revised indexes. HHS says sorry, you'll have to wait until October 1, 1985.

I say enough is enough. We in Congress have been patient, we have been accommodating, and we have been cooperative. It is time for HHS to produce the goods. I ask for the support of my colleagues in demanding HHS immediately issue the revised wage index report and put in progress the rulemaking process that will result in rural hospitals being reimbursed fairly from Medicare.

Thank you.

□ 1220

#### FREEDOM DOES NOT COME FREE

(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, the President won a tough vote on the MX yesterday. It passed because our chief arms negotiator reminded us of the realities of dealing with the Soviet Union. Do not deal from weakness, he said. Do not give up something without getting something in return, he said.

These arguments were good enough to win, but barely. Frankly, a problem facing and hurting defense support is the hypocrisy in the administration's position that while we need a strong, expensive national defense, we do not have to pay for it.

Let me say to the President again that he cannot keep offering the Pentagon a blank check. A \$300 billion defense bill demands better management, demands multibid contracts, demands a unified chain of command, demands weapons built on time at a price and performance advertised, demands consideration of a peacetime draft, demands a sense of priorities, demands the full support of our allies.

As we cut back on all Federal spending, the best we ought to do for the Pentagon is a freeze. If the President wants to spend more, he should ask the American people to pay for it.

Mr. President, if there is no such thing as a free lunch, then surely there is no such thing as a free army. Freedom does not come free. Let us stop pretending that it does.

#### WORLD AWAITS GORBACHEV REACTION TO KILLING OF AMERICAN SOLDIER

(Mr. COURTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, a new, younger generation has taken over in the Soviet Union now that Mikhail Gorbachev is the head of the Communist Party.

The whole world is watching now to see if it will mean a change in Soviet goals, attitudes, philosophy, and behavior.

A few days ago, an American soldier, Maj. Arthur Nicholson, was murdered in cold blood by the Soviets in East Germany.

He was left to bleed to death from his gunshot wounds, and the Soviets prevented another American from administering first aid to the dying officer.

What is Gorbachev's reaction?

What does the new generation of Soviet leadership have to say about this crime?

The whole world is watching to see whether Mr. Gorbachev will call this action a crime, or whether he believes it was just.

To date, all the talk about the new generation of Soviet leadership has been speculation. There is no evidence that Gorbachev favors free speech, that he opposes invasion of Afghanistan, or that he protested when KAL 007 was shot down.

The world awaits his reaction to this atrocity. So far, he has done nothing to distinguish himself from his Stalinist predecessors, and there is regrettably no evidence that he has any plans to do so in the near future.

#### FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF UNITED STATES AS DEBTOR NATION

(Mr. ALEXANDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, there will be another anniversary this year, a first anniversary, the first anniversary of the year when the United States becomes a debtor nation.

The United States trade deficit has tripled in the last 3 years and is forecast to be, at the end of the current year, \$135 billion—\$135 billion which hangs over America like a poisonous cloud of noxious fumes that many are unable to see, a cloud that affects our economy, that puts farmers out of business, that closes down shoe factories and textile mills. While it is invisible to some people, there is an inextricable connection between our trade deficits and our economic depression, especially in the farm community.

Today, in response to the trade crisis and the mounting crisis, the gentleman from Washington, DON BONKER, will be leading a series of special orders on the subject of the coming trade crisis in America. I invite all Members to join in those special orders beginning today.

#### POLL CLOSING LEGISLATION

(Mr. BATES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, we are all aware that the time difference between the coasts has prejudiced voting in the West.

The networks' agreement of last year is a valuable first step, but we cannot stop there.

A number of my colleagues have introduced legislation to set a national

poll closing time, and I commend them for their efforts.

Mr. Speaker, I have reviewed these proposals, and today I am introducing legislation, with my colleagues, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. MARTINEZ, which is comprised of the best elements of all of them. Our bill simply requires all polls in the continental United States to close at 10:30 p.m. eastern standard time.

This allows the States the flexibility to set their own opening time.

This provides the networks with postelection prime time coverage in all regions.

This provides hours that will maximize voter turnout.

And this treats all regions of the country equally.

I urge my colleagues to join in the bipartisan approach to fair and flexible election reform.

□ 1230

#### NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT

(Mr. YOUNG of Missouri asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Public Works Committee today in introducing the National Infrastructure Act. This important legislation is an innovative, practical, long-term investment in the future of our country. For years, we have pursued a policy of ignoring the maintenance of our highways, bridges, sewage, and water supply systems. Only the periodic crises—bridge or tunnel collapses, overloaded sewer systems which cause raw sewage to run directly into rivers, water supply systems which collapse due to age and excessive demand—make headlines. The continuing crises, the leaking pipes which cause the loss of 15 percent of the water supply in St. Louis and 25 percent in Boston, receive little public notice. Similarly, renovation and extension of sewer facilities is often ignored until a locality discovers that it can no longer attract new industry or build new homes because of outdated facilities which are at or above capacity.

Recently, I received a letter from a constituent which stated the situation very well. She said:

I would suggest that some national program for repairing the infrastructure is long overdue. You and all other national legislative representatives and the administration need to be doing some long-range planning as well as immediate short-term planning which too often turns out to be a Band-Aid/tinkering approach that does not recognize and treat the interrelatedness of persons and institutions in our country. It would give me great pleasure to see the congressional Representatives from Missouri take

the lead in such long range national planning.

Mr. Speaker, I could not put the challenge better than Ms. Hudzinski did. I am proud to represent constituents who are concerned about our future and express that concern so eloquently. And I am particularly pleased to fulfill her request by joining Chairman HOWARD today in the introduction of the National Infrastructure Act.

#### WISDOM IS KEY TO TOMORROW'S MX VOTE

(Mr. WEISS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Speaker, the vote coming up tomorrow on releasing the funding for the production of the 21 MX missiles presents the perfect opportunity for this House to extricate the President from the trap he has dug for himself and the American negotiators in Geneva.

Mr. Kempelman has now gone back to Geneva with the demonstration of resolve he sought from the Congress. There is no need to appropriate or spend the money. Let us keep it fenced in. In that way, having demonstrated resolve, we can now demonstrate wisdom.

All of humanity may ultimately be grateful for such an action. Having survived 40 years in the nuclear era, we have no guarantee that we will continue to be as lucky.

Mr. Speaker, I implore my colleagues who voted to authorize MX funding yesterday to vote against releasing the MX funds in the vote we take tomorrow.

#### YESTERDAY'S VOTE WAS ON GENEVA, TOMORROW'S ON MX

(Mr. MARKEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MARKEY. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, we voted to authorize 21 additional MX missiles. We voted to give Max Kempelman \$1.5 billion to put on the table at Geneva to serve as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union. We have authorized the money for him. We have to decide now whether we are going to actually appropriate the money and produce the missiles after we have given him the bargaining chip of money on the table.

We have given the President the bargaining chip. Let us not fuel the arms race now by producing the MX missiles. We have got another vote tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, yesterday we voted on Geneva. Tomorrow we vote on the MX.



# AMERICA NEEDS PROGRAMS FOR BOTH UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND JOB TRAINING

(Mr. LEVIN of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, as the Members know so well, over 300,000 American workers are threatened with the loss of unemployment benefits just next week, and last week the President expressed his opposition to extending FSC benefits because, as he said, the place now for people who are having problems is our job training program.

What the President did not say last week is that he has proposed cutting in half that program, one-half for this year and one-half for next year.

Mr. Speaker, we need both a decent unemployment compensation program and an effective job training program, and the sad fact is that under the President's approach we will have neither.

## WHO PAYS THE BILL FOR NEWLY AUTHORIZED MX MISSILES?

(Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, the President now has his MX missiles authorized. I guess the question I would like to ask the President is: "How are you going to pay for them?"

We have a country in which, when you buy something, you are normally expected to pay the bill. My guess is that the President will once again say, "Well, we'll charge this. We'll charge it to our kids or our grandkids."

Mr. Speaker, I would say this to the President: "Mr. President, you have added about \$600 billion to the Federal debt with your proposals. The Congress hasn't had the courage to resist your proposals for deficits, but at some point somebody has to pay the bill. You ask for a missile we don't need and you want us to spend money we don't have. You weaken the American economy with these kinds of proposals, Mr. President. We ask you to rethink your policies that ask us to spend money we don't have on something we don't need."

## UNEMPLOYED AMERICANS MAY BE VICTIMS OF CRUEL APRIL FOOLS' DAY JOKE

(Mr. PEASE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, next Monday is April 1, April Fools' Day.

We will be playing a cruel joke next April 1 on 340,000 unemployed Americans who are currently collecting Federal supplemental compensation and who will be cut off immediately. They will wake up and find they are entirely without benefits.

These are people who are not unemployed by choice. These are people who have had jobs for many years, often for 20 or 30 years for the same employer. These are people who desperately want jobs but must seek them in communities where the unemployment rate is 8, 10, 12, or 14 percent.

Mr. Speaker, we must not break faith with these people. There is a last-minute effort being made in the Unemployment Compensation Subcommittee to mark up a bill and have it ready for us so that we can continue the eligibility of these unemployed workers. I ask my colleagues to join us in that effort.

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 181) to approve the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles, and that I may be permitted to include certain tables and extraneous material.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LEVIN of Michigan). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

## MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE MX MISSILE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Public Law 98-473, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 181) to approve the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

The motion was agreed to.

□ 1237

## IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 181, with Mr. KILDEE in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the first reading of the joint resolution is dispensed with.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 101(h), Public Law 98-473, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE] will be recognized for 5 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues may wonder why we have to continue to debate a matter we have debated for the last 2 days concerning the MX missile. Today's measure is completely different from what we have debated during these last 2 days.

□ 1240

Yesterday we voted on the question of authorizing the release of the fencing of funds for the procurement of 21 MX missiles at a cost of \$1.5 billion.

The question of the MX being a bargaining chip and the question of its effect on the Geneva talks was fully debated, so yesterday by a close margin of 219 yeas to 213 nays we voted to release the authorization of that \$1.5 billion for the 21 missiles.

Today and tomorrow we will be debating the question whether it is absolutely necessary to appropriate the money at this time to commence the procurement of those missiles. As I pointed out yesterday and I will again go into it in greater detail, the actual expenditure of that \$1.5 billion at this time is not necessary, because it cannot be spent and it will not be spent and missiles funded in fiscal year 1984 will be delivered out through May 1987 so the production line will remain open.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to House Joint Resolution 181, which is the actual funding of the 21 MX missiles in unobligated balances of \$1.5 billion.

I am sure everyone in this distinguished body is in favor of a strong national defense, but I believe there are many different opinions as to what constitutes a strong national defense.

The preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity . . .

Et cetera.

The preamble states that we should "provide for the common defense" and "promote the general welfare." Our forefathers felt it was equally important to maintain a needed defense and to adequately support the needs of the people of this great Nation. If our

people are not properly educated, our farmers not assisted in producing needed commodities, our financial matters not properly balanced, and our senior citizens not properly taken care of, we will have no strong national defense. The people and the economy of our Nation provide as much for our national defense as do more tanks, guns, and missiles. I personally believe that spending \$25 billion for vulnerable MX missiles does not contribute to our national defense. This money could be better used to further the needs of our youths, farmers, senior citizens, and the American people in general.

Let me point out to my colleagues that 2 years ago when we were considering the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1983 on the floor of this same House of Representatives, we, the Congress, overwhelmingly rejected funds for the initial procurement of the first five MX missiles. The administration had requested \$1.5 billion for the procurement of nine MX missiles; however Congress only authorized \$988 million for the procurement of five missiles. When the Defense appropriations bill was on the floor, I offered an amendment to delete all the funds for the procurement of MX missiles, and it was approved by a record vote of 245 yeas to 176 nays. The basic reason for this denial of procurement funds for the MX was that a basing mode had not been approved. The arguments at that time were that placing the MX in Minuteman silos was a nonoption because of their vulnerability. That has not changed. That is the exact situation today. No appropriate basing mode has been selected, and we should again reject the release of procurement funds overwhelmingly.

Last year we were told we had to build the MX because the Russians had broken off the talks in Geneva. Now we are told we must build the MX because the Russians have come back to Geneva.

Previously we were told that we had to build the MX because Minuteman silos were vulnerable. Now we are told we must build the MX to put it in Minuteman silos.

Previously we were told that we had to build the MX because there was a "window of vulnerability." Now we are told we must build the MX even though that "window" never existed.

Previously we were told that we had to build the MX because it could be used as a bargaining chip. Now we are told we must build it because it is not a bargaining chip.

The President has submitted a report which repeats the same old arguments, but which fails to answer the same old questions, and therefore fails to make the case that we need these procurement funds for the MX missile at this time.

How does buying more MX missiles and putting them in Minuteman silos solve the old vulnerability problem? The answer is that it does not. The President says so in his report when he admits that MX vulnerability, and I quote, "will be roughly equivalent to the Minuteman."

The reason for starting the MX in the first place, the claimed vulnerability of Minuteman silos, remains undressed. Buying more MX missiles changes nothing.

How does buying more MX missiles solve the old "attractive target" problem? The answer is that it does not. The President fails to address this question in his report. He fails to note that a 10-warhead MX in a vulnerable silo is a far more attractive target than a three warhead Minuteman in the same silo. He fails to do so even though General Scowcroft has admitted this in testimony before the Appropriations Committee.

How does buying more MX missiles solve the old problem of making the world safe? The answer is that it does not. The President believes that peace will be strengthened by adding 1,000 more nuclear warheads to our stockpile. Well, we already have 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads. Adding to a stockpile already beyond reason makes the world less, not more, safe from the threat of annihilation.

How does buying MX missiles address the old question of overall balance of forces? Again the answer is that it does not. The President says that he wants more MX missiles because "the asymmetry in ICBM's between the United States and Soviet strategic forces remains very much in their favor." The President is silent on SLBM's, sea launched ballistic missiles, because the asymmetry there is very much in our favor. The fact remains that there is approximate parity overall in strategic nuclear forces.

Mr. Chairman, the basic and overriding concern remains arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons. Building more MX missiles takes us in the opposite direction. It keeps us locked in the same old trap of move and countermove, of build and build even more. It is the same discredited strategy that has brought us to the sorry state that we are in today.

The President says that building and deploying 100 MX missiles is consistent with U.S. arms control policy; but what is that policy? How can we say we are controlling arms by building more of them? In this Member's opinion, the way to control arms is to control them and the first step in reducing nuclear weapons is to stop building more of them.

The President says that we need to build and deploy 100 MX missiles to induce the Soviets to negotiate. There is nothing sacred about the number

100. The Scowcroft Commission spoke of deploying "on the order of 100 MX missiles," implying thereby that the number was not fixed.

I would point out that it was not too long ago that the Pentagon was telling us how vital it was to deploy 200 MX missiles. Mr. Chairman, we have already funded 21 missiles which are on contract and are to be delivered between May 1986 and May 1987. In other words, we already have 21 bargaining chips—bargaining chips which are not actually in our inventory until between 1 and 2 years from now. We need no more. If 21 MX missiles do not induce the Soviets to negotiate, by what logic will 42 MX missiles make them do so?

Also, keep in mind that during the last 3 or 4 years, Congress has provided research and development funding which has allowed the procurement of 20 research MX missiles. Seven of these missiles have been expended, but 13 of those missiles remain which could be used for deployment. In fact, in the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1983 defense appropriation bill, the following language was included:

The conferees note that the MX research and development program includes the acquisition of missiles. When both the House and Senate have approved a permanent basing mode, missiles which have been acquired under the research and development program may be deployed in the approved permanent basing mode. The conferees intend by this action to emphasize their firm commitment to modernization of our strategic nuclear forces.

□ 1250

My colleagues, I would like to call your attention to this chart. In 1983 and other years, as I have stated before, we appropriated funds for 20 research and development missiles, of which 13 missiles remain to be delivered in the next 3 years. In calendar 1985, we will only receive four of those R&D missiles.

We will receive in calendar year 1986, six more missiles. The balance of those missiles, three will not be delivered until May 1987. That is the missiles which we have funded back in 1983 and other years.

In fiscal year 1984, we appropriated \$2.1 billion for 21 missiles. None of them, none of them are going to be produced in calendar year 1985.

In calendar 1986, we get the first one in May, and we get a total of 12 missiles for the entire year. We do not get the balance of the fiscal year 1984 funded missiles until May 1987.

So how can we say if we do not free this \$1.5 billion we are cancelling the MX? The funds are there. The line is open until May 1987. At any given time in view of the fact that we have authorized the release of the funds yesterday, we can appropriate the



funds for these missiles. We do not have to appropriate the funds at this point in time.

There has been a question as to whether we are committed to the modernization of our strategic forces, and there can be no doubt that sufficient bargaining chips are already funded to convince the Soviet Union that the United States means business. To further this commitment, the Congress is supporting, and has funded, as I have just pointed out, the MX missile, the Midgetman missile, the air-launched cruise missile, the sea-launched cruise missile, the ground-launched cruise missile, the Poseidon, the Trident I and Trident II missiles, the Pershing II missile, the B-1 bomber, the advanced technology bomber, the Trident submarine, warhead and nuclear devices for the various systems, and modernization of the Minuteman missile force.

Congress has supported the President in most of his strategic programs and the Soviet Union is aware of this increased and continuing support.

The President says that each Member of Congress should join him in a bipartisan, united effort to approve funds for additional MX missile procurement, but this is the same President who says his budget deficits are entirely the fault of the Congress. This is the same President who says it is up to the Congress to cut irresponsible spending. He is the same President who demands that Congress "rein in the budget monster."

Mr. Chairman, we have already spent far too much of our Treasury on a vulnerable weapon of questionable military value. Do we have an extra \$25 billion lying around to finance this complete missile system when the deficit will exceed \$200 billion this current fiscal year and will continue to mount in the years to come?

We have already funded enough MX missiles to induce the Soviets to negotiate. And we were told last year when this House passed the fencing amendment that if the Russians come back to negotiate we do not have to unfence the money, but those same people now are saying that we have to make the funds available.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, on yesterday the House voted to allow the authorization of \$1.5 billion to fund the procurement of 21 additional operational MX missiles. Today and tomorrow the House will be considering House Joint Resolution 181 which actually makes available the \$1.5 billion in unobligated balances for the procurement of these missiles.

I contend these funds should not be released at this time. The House has shown its resolve in supporting the President on this issue by approving the authorization yesterday. The actual funds to carry the additional MX procurement forward should be

held up as we watch the progress of the arms negotiations in Geneva.

If there is no progress made, these funds could be made available later because these funds will not be spent. They cannot be spent until 1986 or 1987.

The unobligated balances are fenced and cannot be used for any other purpose except for these 21 missiles. Why not wait to see what results from the Geneva negotiations before committing the American taxpayers to the expenditure of additional billions of dollars for a missile of questionable value when there are so many unquestionable needs in our society?

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 14 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say at the outset that I believe the House yesterday conducted a debate that was in the highest traditions of this body. Members on both sides of the aisle, with deeply felt emotions and feelings, addressed the merits of unfencing the money for the MX missile. And the House worked its will in the finest tradition after a long, lengthy discussion.

It is my own view that we do not need 10 hours once again to replot that ground. I hope that as we work through the day that perhaps some agreement can be made and Members can be given previous advice about what might happen in order that we do not redo the entire area that was done yesterday.

Let me take a moment to pay my compliments to my colleague from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA], who I thought spoke eloquently yesterday in this House, and very movingly, and who was a cosponsor of this resolution with me that is before us today. I am very grateful to him.

I want to address myself to one question, and that is this argument which seems to be surfacing from some place that since we authorized the money yesterday we do not need to approve it today. Well, I think I can point out initially that the people making that argument to you today are the very same people who yesterday said we do not need to authorize the MX missile, period. The very same faces that are aligned to try to prevent the appropriation were aligned to prevent the authorization.

Do not undo the good and hard effort that was made yesterday to make sure that our colleagues at the negotiating table understand where this Congress is. We started to send a message yesterday. Today we deliver the goods. This is when we appropriate the dollars.

May I say to my friends, this is the day when we follow the will of the House as expressed yesterday when it authorized money for this purpose.

So I want to urge my colleagues not to be dissuaded by that, to see who is making the argument, to recognize

that they are the same people who would like to stop the MX period.

I need to address myself as well to some comments that were made by my distinguished chairman, my good friend from New York, Mr. ADDABBO, who conducts this subcommittee with great skill, and that is the chart that he put up and the argument that he made that we had funded a series of MX missiles through a given calendar year and, therefore, we did not need to appropriate money in this bill.

My friends, nothing could be further from the facts. The facts are that while it is accurate to say that there will be delivery of MX's into the future, as indeed there ought to be, it takes 3 years to build an MX. If you do not appropriate the money today, the front end of the production line for the MX is dead next month.

□ 1300

The brains of the MX missile is the guidance system. Any missile without a guidance system is not a missile, it is nothing.

If you fail to appropriate the money today the contractor who makes the guidance system is out of business next month. Let me say to you once again it is an effort and a skillful one by those who are opposed to the missile to undo what you did yesterday. Yesterday you voted to produce 21 additional MX missiles. If you stop the production line, you do not end up with an additional 21 missiles, you end up back with 21 and some R&D missiles. It is a little bit technical but, my colleagues, you need to know that if you stop this line of production you have stopped what you voted to do yesterday and you are back to square one with an uninterrupted line, with contractors and vendors and people working all over this country contributing their best efforts to build an MX missile which results in delivery 3 years subsequent to the date of order to the people who are ordering, in this case the Department of Defense.

So I would ask you please to focus on that issue and to recognize the importance of appropriating this money to carry out what you did yesterday and to keep the production of the MX at 21 additional for our negotiators in Geneva.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield, when he concludes? Would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. McDADE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I only wanted to respond, once the gentleman had concluded his remarks, but I appreciate the gentleman yielding at this time. I only want to comment with respect to his earlier remarks with respect to the lack of ne-

cessity for going forward with 10 hours of debate on the appropriations process. I would not challenge the gentleman's assertion that on the last 2 days this body debated in the finest tradition of this House. But I do believe that we were not in a position, given the 10 hours' time constraint when Members are asking for an allocation of 2 minutes, 3 minutes, 4 minutes, 5 minutes. It does not lend itself to an open and honest and free exchange of debate. What it does is create a procession of speeches. It may be a pro speech and a con speech, a Republican speech and a Democratic speech, but nevertheless certainly this gentleman found himself in the incredible position of not being able to yield to one of my distinguished colleagues on his side of the aisle who serves on the Armed Services Committee with me. We do not tend to agree politically but we have always yielded to each other in the hope that we could achieve a level of intellectual honesty.

Mr. McDADE. Let me say to my friend that I was not aware of individuals who were denied time yesterday or could not get time under the 10-hour rule. Let me say that we would be glad to cooperate and facilitate their appearance on the floor today to debate. It is my feeling that a full 10-hour rerun, so to speak, of all the issues involving the MX were laid out in front of the body by Members on both sides; I am not aware of many issues or any issues, this Member is not aware of any issues that were not discussed.

If individual Members want to express themselves, I think perhaps we can work something out to try to make sure that happens today. If the gentleman will let me know who did not get time, we will try to see that they get time.

My point is, may I say to my colleague, that the issues were addressed, the body made an informed judgment and it is now time to move on. I do not think we need to go back to all of those same issues.

Mr. DELLUMS. Would the gentleman yield again?

Mr. McDADE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

But this gentleman is making a little different point. It is not that the issues were not presented but that we did not have the possibility, given the structure of the discussion, to allow each other to challenge the assertions that we made. We were able to present our argument but we did not have time to expose our argument to critical analysis and critical debate and free exchange.

This, as the gentleman points out, is an incredibly important marketplace of ideas and when we cannot challenge

each other in the marketplace of ideas and it is simply a procession of points of view that never get a chance to be debated, where critical analysis can be applied, then I am not sure it is a debate. Maybe it is more speech making than it is a debate.

This gentleman likes the intellectual and political challenge of debate. I am saying that perhaps these 2 days gives us an opportunity to actually exchange with each other.

For example, I would like to debate LES ASPIN on the MX missile. I did not have an opportunity to do that, because he spoke, we spoke, someone else spoke. So that is the problem.

Mr. McDADE. Let me say to my colleague that I am sure he and his chairman have had a lot of debates in their committee and here on the floor. I encourage them to have as many as they wish.

I believe that the body performed in a way that is consistent with what it is supposed to do; that is, namely, address the issues, put forward those issues as strongly as we can, and then work our will. That is I believe what we did.

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman has been very generous and very kind and I appreciate and respect my colleague.

Mr. McDADE. I am delighted to at any time yield to my colleague—almost any time.

Mr. Chairman, the need for the MX militarily has been documented, in my judgment, for some time. It has been documented because the Soviets have seen fit to deploy over 600 MX class missiles which have prompt hard target kill capability. We do not. That means that our entire LCBM force, a critical part of our triad, is put at a risk which we do not present to the Soviet Union.

That, my friends, is a term that some people call a symmetrical, it is a term that people call destabilizing. What it means to me is that it puts at risk a triad which has kept the peace, a system that thoughtful people have worried over for almost half a century and that has kept peace in the world. And the stakes are that if we lose any one of those legs of that triad to an advantage on the Soviets' behalf, then we risk the kind of destabilizing conditions that will lead to nuclear war, because the premise of deterrence is parity or equality. Neither side, if deterrence is to be effective, can have an overwhelming advantage over the other. And today our land-based missiles are at risk, our command and control is at risk; theirs is not.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McDADE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I listened very carefully to words of the very distin-

guished subcommittee chairman from New York and he said something that struck me as very important. He said the way to control nuclear weaponry is to stop building them; the way to reduce nuclear missiles is to stop building them.

That had a great plausible ring to it. It really clutched my innermost soul.

But then I thought that yesterday I heard some other speaker say that the Soviet Union has 308 intercontinental ballistic missiles called SS-18. Somebody said they are twice the size of the MX. They have a range of 6,000 nautical miles. They are MIRV'd warheads. Then they have got another array called the SS-17. Then they have got one so-called SS-19.

Then I read a little bit more and I found that they have two new missiles they are testing, the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25.

I could not help but wonder about the logic that says the way to get reduction of missiles is to stop building them.

Now, a great effort is being made on the part of some Members of this body to get us to stop building missiles. I wonder what leverage we are going to have with our adversaries who have continued to build and build and build and build.

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense under the previous administration, said "When we build, they build; and when we stop building, they build."

Now, how do we persuade them to stop building, to get in line with the marvelous thought that the gentleman from New York had?

I am going to wait and I am going to listen to every minute of the debate today and maybe I will get a hint of how we can stop them from building, especially if we stop building and modernizing our antique intercontinental ballistic missile system.

□ 1310

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield on that very point?

Mr. McDADE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the major points made by the Scowcroft Commission. I do not think there is any doubt that in their analysis of our strategic posture, they were troubled about some of the issues surrounding MX and the difficulty of finding a survivable basing mode.

But one thing they said very clearly:

It has been, 12 years since we last deployed a new land based ICBM. We have been struggling with this issue since then.

During that same timeframe, the Soviets have deployed seven new ICBM's, 648 heavy ICBM's, SS-18's and SS-19's, which have an aggregate of 5,000 MX-quality warheads aimed at this



country, at our ICBM's, our command and control, and our leadership.

Now at some point we have to demonstrate national resolve that a program that we have started and debated, can finally be completed. I will just tell the gentleman in the well. He knows this very well. The very people who were saying we do not need this because we will be for Midgetman, we will be for improving our submarine leg, we will be for new bombers; they are going to turn around the moment this program is dead and lead the fight against these systems. They will say "Well, we didn't know Midgetman was going to be quite that expensive." And, "Oh, no, we didn't really want those accurate missiles on submarines, either." And "We can't afford the B-1."

So at some point I think those of us in this Congress who are concerned about defense and national security have to stand up and level with the American people. It is not good policy to keep spending \$10 billion of their money without putting something of significance into the field.

In my view, getting this 21 missiles for a total of 42 will give us what I consider a very substantial and significant military force to deploy. I happen to think that 21 missiles—that is all we have in the procurement stage now, represents a token force.

Now the administration in 1981 talked about 40 missiles, to be deployed in existing silos.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. McDADE. I yield myself an additional 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for an additional 3 minutes.

Mr. McDADE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. The administration talked about a program of about 40 missiles to be deployed in existing silos in 1981, and that we should examine how to get increased survivability for additional missiles.

Yesterday I heard all my friends here who talk about survivability saying, "We don't want this missile because it's vulnerable in existing silos." I disagree with this assertion because of synergism—there is no one foolish enough that he is going to attack our land-based ICBM's when we have 50 percent of our retaliatory force in submarines and 25 percent in bombers; no Soviet would be so foolish to launch a first strike.

My friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELUMS], I consider the father of synergism, talked about this in 1979. He and my colleague, Tom DOWNEY said it would be outrageous for a Soviet war planner to think about trying to strike our ICBM's.

Yesterday we heard it again, "But wait a minute now. If you are talking seriously about survivability and you

want to spend \$20 billion for the hardening of those silos, we're not for that."

So on the one hand they say we want survivability and this missile is flawed because of a lack of it, and then when we propose a way to make it survivable they say, no, that is too expensive and it is outrageous; we do not need it.

Now, I do not think you can have it both ways. I think if you want survivability, you are going to have to pay for it and we can do it. I happen to believe that about 3 years from now, we will have the technology in place to increase by about tenfold the hardening of these silos, and we can produce about a 50-percent rate of survivability. When ICBM's are viewed in isolation.

We are going to have to make a judgment at that point, whether we are prepared to invest that kind of resources. We may say that there are other priorities within the strategic budget; the Stealth bomber, the D-5, cruise missiles and advanced cruise missiles, that may have a higher priority, because we are all faced with the reality that the defense budget is going to be cut.

But since we have spent \$10 billion, let us at least get a force in the field that has military significance. I happen to believe that once these 21 missiles are paid for—this is fiscal year 1985 money—once it is released, then we will have reached the threshold of a significant force.

I went to Geneva as an observer. I sat there for a week, I watched our negotiators, and I must tell you I am convinced that these people are serious about getting an arms control agreement. When we are only weeks into these negotiations—how can we pull the rug out from underneath the negotiators, out from underneath the President of the United States, out from underneath our NATO allies? We are facing the most unbelievable pressure from the Soviet Union in Europe and adverse public opinion about the NATO INF deployments.

How can we pull the rug out from under the entire alliance? I just happen to think it would be a serious mistake. I happen to believe that these missiles in existing silos, through perhaps not the best approach, is the only one that is viable. I think the best part of the Scowcroft conclusions, in my judgment, was that they threw out this notion of a window of vulnerability. They agreed with Mr. DELUMS, they agreed with Mr. DOWNEY; they said "That's preposterous."

And it was a blow to the President and the Committee of the Present Danger who had talked about this before. And so, I think they put us on an intelligent, rational course.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman had expired.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield me just a couple more minutes.

Mr. McDADE. I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. McDADE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, what has worried me about this whole issue from the start is, how do we make some progress? How do we move from a position of not having an arms control agreement ratified in the last 10 years?

I happen to believe the only way we are going to get there is through bipartisanship, where sensible people work together for the national interest.

I must tell you when this President came to office, I was concerned about his track record on arms control. I was concerned about some of the people that he had in high official positions in this administration and their record on arms control. That is why I thought the recommendations in the Scowcroft report gave us the basis to move ahead and make some progress in this, the most important area of activity.

Mr. McDADE. I want to just interrupt my friend to tell him that that word, "bipartisanship" is a word that is important to all of us, and I want to offer my compliments to him because he has conducted himself through this entire matter in a very expert way; he is an expert member of the Defense Subcommittee; and in a thoroughly bipartisan way.

He has advanced the peace process that is taking place in Geneva, and may I say to my friend and colleague were he not a Member of this body, that may not be the case.

So I just want to compliment you for what you have done, and commend you on your statement.

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's remarks and his continuing to yield to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say I still believe that the President, when he made the agreement to go along with the Scowcroft recommendations, he had to eat a little crow, because they did debunk the "window of vulnerability."

He said he would do two things: That he would pursue arms control vigorously and he would develop the small, single-warhead missile because the experts believe that is a more stable system down the road.

He said to us, and we have some reluctance about this—"Would you support the strategic modernization, the MX"—and we agreed to a certain extent to go along with some deploy-

ment of those MX missiles. We thought that was a good bargain, and give us the chance, hopefully, to make some progress.

I was not convinced in the first 2 years of this administration about their seriousness in arms control. I am convinced that the team they have in Geneva today wants to get an agreement, will fight for an agreement. I am convinced that the President is serious about arms control and wants to get an agreement; I think he can get an agreement through the Senate.

So in a sense we are faced with the same historic opportunity that was had during the Nixon administration, when we got most of the major arms control agreements enacted. Then we had a conservative President who had the faith of the American people in terms of his commitment to defense and national security. He presented agreements to the Senate that were ratified and are the basis for our whole arms control program today.

I believe the President has delivered on his part of Scowcroft. I think it is the responsibility, of those of us who believe in national defense, to help him at the start of these negotiations by going ahead with these 21 missiles.

I recognize that it is a very difficult choice for some because priorities are an issue, and the budget problems are serious. The deficit is a question that troubles many Members.

I just believe that supporting his position, hanging tough, is the way to get the arms control agreement that every American wants.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. McDADE. I yield myself an additional 2 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. McDADE. I thank my colleague for the contribution that he had made, and I want to reference back, in concluding my statement to my colleague from Illinois who indicated that there had been such tremendous growth in the Soviet ICBM force and the question of how we get some kind of handle on what they are doing in putting the world at risk.

The answer to that is the second major reason that I believe that we need to vote to appropriate this money today, and that is to advance the peace process which is taking place in Geneva.

Everyone in the Scowcroft Commission, representing many Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries of State, Directors of the CIA, were unanimous in their comment that there was no way to get a arms agreement with the Russians unless we built this missile; that there was no other candidate missile available in this decade to try to achieve arms control in Geneva except for the MX. Therefore without it, they said it was illusory—that is their

word—to believe that we could ever achieve any kind of progress with the Soviets at Geneva.

They are right. I share that concern. I attended the meeting at the White House, as many of you did, when we heard our chief negotiator say, we have got to go ahead, or we are going to see ourselves delayed in Geneva; we are going to give something unilaterally to the Soviet Union which they will misinterpret as a lack of resolve, and we will see the peace process delayed, at the very least.

□ 1320

So I say to my colleague that the way for us to advance that process is to show our resolution, appropriate this money, and let our negotiators in Geneva know that as part of their bargaining process, right in the middle of it is this weapon that the U.S. Congress stands behind, appropriating the money for, putting on the table in Geneva, and noticing the Soviets that they will no longer possess a hard-target kill monopoly, that the United States of America is going to redress that imbalance.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes, just to clarify a couple of points.

Number one, the ICBM, the land-based missile, as presently configured, especially in the Minuteman silo, will never be our first-line defense. It may be our first-strike weapon because it is so vulnerable, but we know that land-based missiles are vulnerable, and that is why we have funded the Midgetman, the air-launched cruise missiles, the sea-launched cruise missiles, the ground-launched missiles, the Poseidon missiles, the Trident I missiles, the Trident II missiles, the Pershing missiles, the B-1 bombers, and others. We know that the ICBM, the land-based missile, is the weakest link and it cannot be made strong by putting a 10-warhead missile in existing silos.

We have heard about the "antique" Minuteman III. Let me tell my colleagues and the gentleman from Illinois, how antique our Minuteman III's are. We are today funding and have funded for the last several years and will continue to fund very expensive programs at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the Minuteman III current. Those programs include replacing the motor propellants, modernization of the guidance system, and upgrading the command and control system. The result is a more accurate and reliable system. It is so reliable that even the Air Force has admitted we will have a system life past the year 2000.

So I do not believe our Minuteman III is antique. It has the strike capability and it is a viable weapon which the Russians must contend with.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GREEN].

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the House voted 219 to 213 to authorize the release of \$1.5 billion to procure 21 more MX missiles. I was on the losing side of that vote. But I acknowledge the fact that the majority of the Members of this House evidently felt it was important, in view of the start of the Geneva talks, not to deauthorize those funds.

The purpose of my remarks today is to suggest to those who are in the majority that it is entirely consistent for them and entirely prudent for them now to vote no on this vote with respect to the appropriation of those funds.

The fact of the matter is that those funds are now on the bargaining table at Geneva, for whatever that is worth. Those 21 missiles are there at Geneva. But it makes no sense at all, from an appropriations point of view, from the point of view of the testing and the production of this missile, now to obligate the funds to purchase missiles Nos. 22 to 42.

We should understand that those missiles are not due to go into production until 1987 and 1988. They can readily be appropriated in this year's fiscal year 1986 defense appropriation bill or next year's fiscal year 1987 appropriations bill as needed. And if those of you who are in the majority are right that this is an effective bargaining chip, and if indeed we are able to bargain the MX for a Soviet concession of equal worth, then by not appropriating the funds at this time we will have saved ourselves the enormous termination costs which we would otherwise incur if these funds are appropriated and obligated, as the administration will surely obligate them if we appropriate them.

I would also suggest to you that, from the point of view of prudence, the testing status of the MX does not justify entering into procurement contracts for these missiles at this time. My information on the testing comes from testimony in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the other body by the General Accounting Office. Their testimony informs us that only 7 of the 20 tests, only 35 percent of the tests, have been completed. They further testify that major changes in the system will occur prior to flights 9 through 11, including the stage 4 propellant storage assembly tank, the ground and flight software, the warhead fuse, an item that is particularly important on the accuracy issue, the reentry vehicle substructure, and indeed that fully operational configuration guidance and control system will not be flown until flight test No. 14 in the third quarter of 1986.



GAO further testified that—

Retention of the current range capability is dependent upon successful repair of the stage 3 extendable nozzle exit cone which failed in the third and seventh test flight.

In other words, it has failed two of seven times, 29 percent of the time, and that includes the most recent test.

So I would simply say to those of my colleagues who voted yes yesterday that you have now accomplished what you set out to accomplish by that vote, you have seen to it that these missiles will remain authorized, that the President and his negotiators can brandish them at Geneva and extract for them whatever concession they can get, and that authorization will remain on the books and we will make it available for us to appropriate these funds if needed in the future.

But I would suggest to you it makes no sense, it does not undercut the President's position not to appropriate these funds today. The state of the testing of the missile does not justify it. The time when this procurement must actually occur does not justify it. If you are successful in what you set out to accomplish by voting yes yesterday, you will simply saddle our Government with unnecessary termination costs if you vote yes instead of no today.

So I strongly urge my colleagues who voted yes yesterday to vote no today or tomorrow when this vote occurs, in order to keep the bargaining chip but to save us some money while doing so.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, nobody believes that the MX missile will by itself force the Soviet Union to bargain seriously in Geneva, and nobody believes or asserts that the MX missile will by itself deter the Soviet Union should it decide to launch some new aggression.

The MX missile works no miracles. No submarine, no rifle, no artillery shell, no fighter plane will by itself deter aggression, and none of them by themselves will force the Soviet Union to sign an agreement to reduce the number of weapons in the world.

But the MX missile is an absolutely essential part of the combined force which both keeps the peace and enhances the prospects for a new arms reduction agreement.

Destroy the effectiveness of the triad, let our missiles grow both old and obsolete—and they do grow both old and obsolete, no matter how many times we try to do a quick overhaul of them—take away from our negotiating team the systems that the Soviets most want to limit and most fear, and we encourage Soviet intransigence at the bargaining table and we increase the possibility of war.

In yesterday's debate, the majority leader, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT] said correctly that this investment in weapons to protect us against the Soviet Union has gone on now for 40 years. It has. And 40 years ago the general wisdom, the accepted knowledge was that the United States and the Soviet Union would be at war with each other in less than a decade.

□ 1330

American strength, the American deterrence has prevented that war. We do live in a perpetual fear of war. But living in fear of war is better than dying in the reality of war. It is the triad that keeps nuclear war a horrible prospect rather than a fatal reality. It is American strength that can lead the Soviet Union to an agreement that can ultimately remove the fear of nuclear war.

We have an obligation to preserve both peace and liberty. If we are weak, we may or may not preserve the peace; we will almost certainly lose our liberties. Only if we are strong can we preserve both peace and liberty. If we build the MX unnecessarily, then we spend unnecessarily an amount equal to a small part of what we spend each year on foreign aid. But if we do not build the MX, and if that decision is wrong, then we may leave our children a legacy not of higher taxes and bigger deficits, but of nuclear war, and that is too great a risk to take.

I urge my colleagues to vote today to appropriate the funds to build this system. I very strongly disagree with my colleague from New York [Mr. GREEN]. Fail to appropriate the funds, and you take the MX off the bargaining table. The Soviets are not stupid, and if they see that we have not appropriated the funds, they will understand that they have no incentive and no need to negotiate seriously.

Yesterday, we voted to strengthen not only our national deterrence capability, but to strengthen the hands of Max Kampelman and our negotiators. Today, by appropriating the funds, we can keep the commitment we made yesterday so Mr. Kampelman can try to force the Soviet Union to understand that it is in the best interests of the Russians, as well as the Americans, to remove nuclear weapons from our arsenals.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made a very interesting comment. He said, "Living in the fear of war is better than dying in the reality of it."

It is a very interesting phrase; I would like to go beyond it for a moment, and with all due respect to my colleague. Every single study that

this gentleman has seen indicates that when you ask children in this country whether they will live to be adults, the overwhelming majority of them believe that they will not achieve adulthood because they believe sincerely, in their tiny, little hearts, that they will be killed in thermonuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the phrase, "Living in the fear of death," also means dying, because I believe that when you kill children's hopes and dreams and futures, you are indeed destroying those children; you are indeed killing those children.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. If I may respond to the gentleman, 30 years ago I was a teenager, and 30 years ago I was afraid of war. Thirty years ago I knew that there was a danger of war with the Soviet Union and I knew there was a possibility that my friends and myself might die in that war. But the people who were teenagers 30 years ago and were afraid of war and were afraid they would never live to be adults, have lived to be adults. They have lived to be adults because we remained strong.

I would tell the gentleman it is not as bad for a teenager to be afraid that something might happen and there might be a war, that is not as bad as the teenagers who died in World War II. It is not as bad as the teenagers who have lived in war.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Teachers and psychologists and scientists today have observed a behavior pattern that they have never seen in the history of this country. It is called "futurelessness." This is where our young people are beginning to act out in behavior patterns that we have never seen before, with a sense that they will not achieve adulthood. They are starting to act this out, many of them in adverse and negative ways.

The point this gentleman is making is that living with the fear of war is not something that this gentleman can feel comfortable with. It seems to me the way we remove it is to go to the table and negotiate hard; not come to the floor of Congress building new weapons systems whose only objective is ultimately to destroy human life on

this planet. That is the argument that this gentleman is making.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. I would say to the gentleman that the reason that some of those young people are alive today is because their parents were not killed in war because we maintained a deterrent capability. It is a better to be a youngster in this country, aware that there is a prospect of war, than it is to be a youngster in Afghanistan dying because of it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. What we are talking about in this debate with MX missiles, which are strategic nuclear weapons, if we talk about war, we are not talking about war as World War II or war as war took place in Vietnam; we are talking about war with the potential of destroying all life on this planet. That is a very different concept.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has again expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I thank the gentleman for the additional time.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say to the gentleman in response that if the gentleman wishes to stand here on the House floor and say that it is not better to fear war than to die in the reality of war, then I think I am beginning to understand the basic argument that his side is making.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. This gentleman would never fire that kind of a shot at the gentleman because I respect the gentleman. I know the gentleman realizes that that is not the assertion that I am making.

What I am saying here is that we have a responsibility not only to remove the reality of war, but I am saying to remove the symptoms of the fear of war as well, because the fear of war is also killing our children. That is the point the gentleman makes.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I will say to the gentleman that I agree with that, and that is why it is necessary to be strong enough to force the Soviets to bargain because they respect strength.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RITTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think what is being missed here is that there is a real difference between a gun in the hand of an officer of the law, and a gun in the

hand of a known criminal. I think that is really what we are talking about in arms negotiations with the Soviets.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURPHY].

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, two issues preying on the minds of the American people are the massive deficits plaguing our economy, and the needs of our national defense.

It is essential that this Congress act to provide a strong defense. A defense capable of deterring Soviet aggression in areas vital to U.S. security, and more importantly capable of protecting our Nation and in the event of war, winning.

However, with \$200 billion deficits in the administration's projections for the foreseeable future it is also essential that we ensure that we are providing a strong defense without wasting our resources.

Throughout my career in this body I have continually supported defense requests that truly increased our national security. Increased funding for our conventional forces, which will be called upon to prevent Soviet incursions into areas vital to our security; increased funding for air- and sea-launched missiles which have been determined to be highly accurate, but difficult for the Soviets to locate; and other weapons designed for situations expected in modern warfare.

The MX missile does not increase our security. The President has stated that MX is necessary for agreement at the arms talks in Geneva. However, the Soviets came back to the bargaining table after Congress had delayed funding for the MX, and they have never shown much interest in discussing MX at previous talks. They would greatly prefer to discuss items such as the Trident and B-1, which they consider true threats to their own security.

Almost all of the Nation's defense experts have agreed that the Minuteman missiles are extremely vulnerable to attack. However, following the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission this administration is recommending placing the MX in those same Minuteman silos which they insist are vulnerable. Their rationale is that by hardening the silos the missiles will no longer be vulnerable. A Soviet missile that can destroy a city however, would be expected to destroy a missile silo regardless of what steps were taken to harden the silo. And missiles destroyed while sitting in the silos are of no deterrent value to the United States.

It is important that the United States use the money and resources available to it to provide for the best defense of our Nation and our inter-

ests. That requires that we evaluate our needs, what systems contribute to our defense, and how we will react to events that may arise.

The United States and the Soviet Union each possess the ability to destroy the world, to end life as we know. This capability has fortunately made each reluctant to engage the other in serious conflict. Hopefully, this will continue to be the case. However, if it is necessary to use our nuclear arsenal it is imperative that we be able to rely on an arsenal that will be effective. Again, missiles which cannot get out of their silos, regardless of how accurate they may be are of no use to our defense.

At a time when Congress has been asked to make very real and difficult choices on where to spend and where not to spend Federal money the President has asked for a weapons system that could cost over \$40 billion, not counting ever-present cost overruns. That is \$40 billion for a system of highly questionable value. Not only is the MX an expensive weapons system, it is also a flawed weapons system.

This administration has never presented a comprehensive defense plan to Congress. They have never fully defined what the needs and purpose are of not only MX, but of many of the other systems they have asked us to allocate billions of dollars on.

I will oppose the MX because it will not strengthen our strategic readiness nor enhance our national security. It is nothing but another means of wasting precious Federal resources on a vulnerable and ill-conceived desire of the Department of Defense.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday and the day before, because of the nature of the process, we all had to make our speeches. It seems to me today we now have an opportunity to go beyond our speeches and begin to explore the intellectual credibility of the assertions that each of us make on the floor of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of my remarks, I wish to challenge one of my colleagues on our side of the aisle with respect to the need for the MX missile. But since the gentleman has walked off for a moment, let me make this initial point.

On yesterday, I tried to respond to the argument that the MX missile is terribly important to the negotiations in Geneva. This gentleman would assert that that is an incredible overstatement of the reality and the significance of the MX missile. I tried to assert yesterday that on the public record this President of the United States has said, "The objective is deep



reduction in our nuclear arsenal." The Soviet Union has also publicly responded by saying, "It is equally our objective to engage in deep reductions in our nuclear arsenal."

Now, we have in our present arsenal over 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons, over 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons; some of them more powerful than the bombs we dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So at this very moment, as this debate goes forward, let the record show that we have in excess of 25,000 nuclear weapons in our arsenal. The Soviet Union has similar numbers.

Now, if the leaders of both nations have stated that it is their objective to engage in deep reductions in our nuclear arsenals to move us back from the brink of thermonuclear war, then clearly there is great incentive to stay in Geneva and stay at the table.

□ 1340

I would assert that to make the argument that the MX missile is the factor upon which this conference will turn is at best an absurd argument.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington on that point.

Mr. DICKS. I would say to the gentleman that I think it is easy for each of us to put ourselves in the position of deciding this, as if we were in fact the Commander in Chief and the President of the United States. But the fact is that Ronald Reagan is the President of the United States and Ronald Reagan named a very distinguished commission called the Scowcroft Commission to evaluate how we coordinate arms control efforts and strategic modernization at the same time.

In my judgment, when you are looking at a situation like this, you have to look at what is possible, what can be achieved in the political world.

The President of the United States came to office convinced that our strategic forces had not been modernized and that there needed to be an improvement in those strategic forces before he could get the Soviets to agree to the kind of reductions that are necessary to reduce the threat and enhance stability. This goal was to get down to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads, on each side as a first step. I am sure the gentleman from California and I could agree this would be a good objective, assuming it is done in a stabilizing way.

It is the President who, by adopting all the recommendations of Scowcroft, committed himself to arms control if we in the Congress in turn would support his modernization program. So for those of us, the so-called group of moderates, this was a difficult choice. Not all of us were thrilled about the MX missile. But we were interested in

getting Ronald Reagan, the Commander in Chief, the President, who now has been reelected, onto an arms control path and off of what we saw as a very dangerous confrontational path with the Soviet Union that might lead to war.

We only have one President at a time. We have to do what is possible with the individual who is the Commander in Chief, and we felt, although it was a difficult choice, that the responsible effort was to get the President committed to arms control, and I believe he is now committed to arms control, and I believe Mr. Kampelman is a serious negotiator.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, let me respond to that, and then the gentleman and I will go on to our discussion of synergism.

Let me respond to the gentleman by saying that the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, was indeed elected President of the United States. He was not coronated King. We have a triumvirate form of government. The gentleman and I were also elected to exercise our intellectual prerogatives to engage in making our own independent, political judgment. The founding persons of this country decided to engage in a careful check and balance, and so for us, as Members of the Congress of the United States, to walk in lock step with the President as if we have no capacity to exercise judgment in these matters, are in my estimation derelict in our responsibilities and not assuming our duties. The President is not the King.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the gentleman and I led the fight against dense pack, of 200 missiles closely spaced, because we thought that basing mode was not going to work. It was very expensive, and we together fought and voted against that. So we did exercise judgment. And then the President put together a group of distinguished former Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries of State, the best minds available, and they came up with a course for modernization which appeared to be plausible.

The most important point in that whole exercise was when Ronald Reagan said that he would get personally serious about arms control. The gentleman from California knows, I think, because of his chairmanship on military construction and his travels around the world in meeting with foreign leaders, that there was a great doubt around the world whether this President would ever be serious about arms control. I happen to believe that getting him committed to that was worth going ahead with some deployments of these missiles which, in fact, do give us some additional military capability.

In the late 1970's, I even think before that, there was discussion whether we had to have a mobile system. I supported that system as a prudent approach to the question of survivability. But the gentleman from California and the gentleman from New York stood up here and explained to the House at that time a very fundamental point still relevant today. This was all before Scowcroft. They argued that there was a synergistic relationship between the submarines, the bombers, and the land-based leg; that you could not view these missiles in isolation, you could not attack them in isolation, and no fool would because you would be devastated, it would wreak havoc on the Soviet Union and totally destroy it.

What I would argue with the gentleman from California is that that synergism still exists today and no rational nation is going to attack, so why are these missiles now vulnerable? All I hear is this vulnerable, vulnerable, vulnerable, but they are not vulnerable when viewed in the context of the triad. The gentleman was right.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, If I may reclaim my time, let us set up the argument.

In April of 1977, to be more precise, this gentleman offered an amendment on the floor to strike the MX missile, castigated very strongly, this is some way-out, fringe argument. What we tried to do in 1977 was to explode the absurd notion of the window of vulnerability.

Let us set up the argument. The way the argument flowed was as follows: One leg of our nuclear triad; namely, our fixed-based missiles, would be in the mid-1980's vulnerable to a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. This gentleman, and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Downey], argued the synergistic argument. What we said was, it is absurd to assume that the Soviet planner, looking at one leg of our nuclear triad, would attack that knowing that we have two additional legs of our triad that could inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield, there was 75 percent of our warheads and our capability in those 2 remaining legs.

Mr. DELLUMS. Exactly. Therefore, we said, "Look, this notion of the window of vulnerability at worst is a fraudulent argument and at best an argument that lacks intellectual competence."

All right. But we were considered the radical extreme people on the floor in 1977. We argued that we were trying to solve a problem that does not exist. All right? But they did not buy that argument in 1977.

A fantastic thing happened a couple years ago when the President of the

United States commissioned Scowcroft. Scowcroft then came forward and said, "Let us put 100 MX missiles in the same Minuteman-III silos." That is why we are here today. Some people stood up and said, "Wait a minute. Are you placing MX missiles in the same hole that you considered vulnerable a few years ago, that you argued against the Dellums-Downey assertion a few years ago?"

The Scowcroft Commission came back and said, "But these holes are not vulnerable. The Soviet planners would have to look at the entire aggregate of our nuclear triad and realize that we were not indeed vulnerable."

Here is my point that I do not think the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] is really fully dealing with: Once Scowcroft accepted the efficacy of our argument with respect to synergism, they not only closed the window vulnerability, it vanished, and with it the need for the MX missile. That is the point this gentleman is not dealing with.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield further, this is where we get down to it. This is where I think the major argument exists that we have to focus on.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me argue with this gentleman, and then you and I can have at it. I love it.

Mr. DICKS. We will yield in a minute.

Mr. Chairman, what the Scowcroft Commission said was this: That one, after 12 years of arguing about this, there was a question of our national resolve and commitment to be able to finish a program that we had started, and a question of whether the Soviets would view it as weakness if we did not proceed.

Second, there is the military utility argument that everybody has been trying to get to. Scowcroft said this program provides important leverage in the arms control talks, but most importantly, important leverage in getting the Soviets to recognize that their land-based missiles are vulnerable as well, and that they would be well served to move away from their heavy ICBM's toward mobile missiles which are more survivable. Survivability on their side is important because we do not want to have a destabilizing situation.

At the same time they argued that we should only deploy 100 of these, not 200, as Mr. Carter had recommended, and Mr. Ford, but 100, and they said we should start the develop-

ment of a single warhead missile which would be probably mobile in order to give us a more survivable system and an increased stability on both sides.

□ 1350

So the key point is leveraging them out of their vulnerable silos so they are not subject to a first strike, just as we move toward Midgetman, and on both sides have enhanced ability. Hans Mark, former Secretary of the Air Force, said once that the best thing we could have is 500 single-warhead missiles on each side; then there would be no incentive by either side to strike first, and on both sides you would have survivability and that would be the most stabilizing, because in a crisis we would not put ourselves into a hair-trigger situation.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time now, we have wafted this far, and what the gentleman has asserted was that the window of vulnerability was a fraudulent argument and—

Mr. DICKS. I did not use that language.

Mr. DELLUMS. All right, you did not use that language. Let us say it was a flawed argument.

Mr. DICKS. Yes, I agree with that.

Mr. DELLUMS. It was at best a flawed argument. And this gentleman is saying that once Scowcroft accepted the efficacy of that assertion, then not only did the window of vulnerability disappear but the need for the equipment disappeared.

Now, you argue in response to that, but there was need to finish the program and there was need to develop important leverage in negotiating with the Soviet Union. Let us start with your first point.

Mr. DICKS. And leveraging them out of their vulnerable silos toward a more survivable mode.

Mr. DELLUMS. All right. Let us start with the first argument, to finish the program.

Here is what the gentleman is saying. The program was started on the basis of a flawed argument at best. What this gentleman was asserting all along was that they knew there was no window of vulnerability, and what we really did want was a first-strike nuclear weapon.

Mr. DICKS. No, that is wrong. That is not correct.

Mr. DELLUMS. They wanted a hard-target, time-urgent silo-killer. That is exactly what it was.

Mr. DICKS. That was for window-of-vulnerability reasons, not for first-strike reasons. The gentleman knows very well that we do not have a first-strike policy. It is not our intention to strike first.

What this does in a crisis, in a sense, is it would give us some capability against their silos, their command and

control, and their leadership that we presently do not have that the Soviets have to take into account in deciding whether they would attack us. They have a sanctuary now, and they get enormous political benefit from that. What we want to have is some of that similar capability, but not enough to constitute a destabilizing first strike.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have let the gentleman finish his argument. You said, "Let's finish the program." What I am saying to my colleagues and the American taxpayers is that that is the game that got run on them.

The MX missile was a game at first, and then we said, "Let's finish the program" when there was never any need for the program, and that is the very basis of the argument that we make. Once there was no vulnerability, there was no need for it. If there was no need, why are we going forward with the MX missile? To build a time-urgent, hard-target silo-killer weapon, which takes us beyond the principle of nuclear deterrence, which takes us into a very destabilizing and dangerous situation.

Mr. DICKS. I would argue with the gentleman that if we do not develop so much that it presents a first-strike potential against all 1,300 of the Soviet missiles—and this does not; this level of deployment we are talking about does not—it does not present a first-strike threat and, therefore, is not destabilizing. But it also gives us some military capability against the weapons systems that the Soviets hold closest and dearest to their hearts.

I think in that respect, by getting more equality in that one area that we do not have, hard-target capability, that it strengthens deterrence. It does not weaken deterrence. It makes the Soviets less likely to strike first, and that is what we are attempting to achieve with this system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask, how can we maintain a commitment to the concept of deterrence which means we would not strike first, that we would only respond? Why do we need a hard-target silo-killer if we are not talking about striking first? Because if we are talking about striking second, those silos are empty. Why do we need a hard-target capability when the silos are empty?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, not all of them may be empty. As I said to the gentleman, if the Soviets recognize that we have some of that capability, they are going to move out of their silos to



mobile forces which are more secure and, therefore, more survivable, as well as less accurate. And that is what you want.

Not everything is done in an arms control agreement, by the way. Some things can be achieved indirectly, and in my view this is one area where, by deploying some MX, it will convince the Soviets to move toward a more stable force structure.

Mr. DELLUMS. All right. And your second argument is—

Mr. DICKS. Hopefully they will agree to make deep cuts in those large offensive weapons, recognizing that they are in a sense vulnerable, too. And their force structure is different than ours. Seventy percent of theirs is land-based missiles.

Mr. DELLUMS. Exactly.

Mr. DICKS. So they will move toward a more synergistic relationship in their triad, which will make them have a more secure deterrent, as we will do the same thing. That winds up making it a more stable situation.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let us accept that. But you assert that under this second argument, to provide important leverage. Now, you have not suggested that the MX missile is not a weapon capable of first strike. What you argue then is the numbers you have to put forward to do it.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield—

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me finish. The President, as per the Scowcroft Commission, is asking us to deploy 100 missiles. Now, there are some Democrats in the other body and, I think, this gentleman as well who does not want the 100. You want to cap it at 50.

Now, if I ask you, "Why do you want to cap it at 50?" you will say very honestly, because the gentleman is a man of integrity, that you do not want to go forward developing a force that appears to threaten the Soviet Union with first strike. That was the argument this gentleman made yesterday.

Once you accept that 100 missiles are not sacrosanct and you are willing to talk about the 50, then this gentleman is saying that you already have 21 and you cannot argue competently that 50 missiles at the negotiating table is going to do something magically that what we already have is not going to do. That is the bottom line.

Mr. DICKS. Let us assume the gentleman's hypothetical situation of 50 missiles.

Mr. DELLUMS. All right.

Mr. DICKS. I think, No. 1, those who recognize political reality know that the defense budget is going to be cut, and I happen to have other areas in the strategic budget that are more important—the stealth bomber, cruise missiles, and things of that nature. We have to prioritize within defense. I would favor that over going further in expenditures on this.

But, most importantly, I believe a force of 21 would not be taken seriously. A force of 40 to 50 of these missiles once was recommended by the Air Force in 1981 as an interim program until they came up with a more survivable basing mode, which they have not yet been able to do, and in my judgment a limit along those lines gives us a chance to look at progress in the arms control talks and it gives us a chance to look at hardening, to see if we want to go back and harden those first 40 or 50 missiles.

Plus it gives us the leverage at this important point when we are starting into these negotiations, and it keeps the production line warm. So I think there is a rational basis for making a judgment on 40 to 50 missiles.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, and if I have enough time, I will yield back to the gentleman, let me respond to the two arguments the gentleman makes.

You said the 21 missiles they presently have may not be taken as seriously as the 40 or 50 you would be willing to cap. I think the gentleman would agree that is at best a judgment call. That is the gentleman's judgment.

Mr. DICKS. Certainly.

Mr. DELLUMS. There are some of us who do not agree that the difference between 21 and 40 is that big or that the difference between 21 and 50 is that big a thing, except it means spending billions of taxpayers' dollars.

Let me make the final argument. The final point you made is that we must accept the political realities. Once you make that assertion, then we get away from this high-falutin' military strategy and we get away from this high-falutin' tactical strategy. We come down to the "political realities," and again political realities are judgment calls.

This gentleman is perfectly correct in asserting a political reality in opposition to the gentleman and is not un-American as a result of it.

Mr. DICKS. No, no one is suggesting that. I have the greatest confidence in the chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House on authorizations.

I just want to say one thing. There is one thing we are agreed on. The President has said we will not develop a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. What we have to make sure of, as we look at MX, D-5, and Midgetman, is that we do not develop so much prompt hard-target capability that it poses that threat. I think that is where the gentleman and I will be in agreement as we go down the road looking at these modernization programs, making sure that we cap each one of them so in the aggregate we do not develop that capability. And there is a report coming in on April 15 where the President is going to have to tell

us how he is going to avoid developing a first-strike capability.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has again expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for this time. The gentleman has been very generous with allowing me more time. My distinguished colleague and I have appreciated the opportunity to have some exchange, even within the confines of the limitations we find ourselves in. This gentleman has been willing to expose his arguments, and the other gentleman has been willing to expose his. Hopefully, people out there listening to this debate will make up their minds one way or the other.

I would just like to close with this comment: I think what this exchange has demonstrated to this gentleman and, I hope, to others is that what we are really down to is judgment calls here—40 or 50 missiles against 21 missiles. And so banging the table about resolve and strategic capability, those things fly out the window. The Soviet Union is not about to attack the United States. They know what our capability is. I think the hope for the future of this country, for the future of the world, for the future of our children, and for the future of humankind does not rest on building more and more MX missiles and spending bigger and bigger dollars on larger and larger military budgets, but it is in sitting down at the negotiating table and developing a negotiating strategy that backs us significantly away from the brink of nuclear war.

In conclusion, as I said yesterday, nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as military weapons because, I say to my brother, they can never be used. Once you start down that road, exploding nuclear weapons, we will destroy all life on this planet.

We are not now talking about war in World War II terms; we are talking about war that will annihilate the entire planet, and this gentleman is not arrogant enough or presumptuous enough to believe that it is within my right and my privilege and my prerogative to destroy all life on this planet.

□ 1400

When you start talking about moving in that direction, then we ought to be understanding what the American people and the world want and they do not want nuclear war and I do not believe they want the MX missile.

Mr. DICKS. What both of us agree on is that we are trying to achieve deterrence, to avoid war, to maintain the

peace. I will just argue that I believe the approach that we are on is the way to achieve that.

Mr. DELLUMS. I respect the gentleman and I thank the gentleman very much for the opportunity for this exchange.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. FRANK] having assumed the chair, Mr. KILDEE, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 181) to approve the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balance made available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles, had come to no resolution thereon.

#### PROVIDING SCHEDULE OF TIME FOR FURTHER DEBATE ON HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 181

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further debate on House Joint Resolution 181 be limited to not to exceed 3 hours, the time to be equally controlled by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE] and myself; 2 hours of such debate to be consumed today and 1 hour to be consumed tomorrow.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. McDADE. Reserving the right to object and, Mr. Speaker, I shall not, of course, object. I do think that it would be useful for the Members of the House to know that it is the intention to come in tomorrow at 11 o'clock, as the House has been set to come in, not have 1 minutes, have the half hour on either side then in vogue at noon. I think the Members of the House would be inconvenienced, all of us, knowing that we are looking at a vote certain at 12 o'clock tomorrow noon.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, this is my understanding from the leadership.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman and I withdraw my objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO]?

There was no objection.

#### MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE MX MISSILE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the joint resolution

(H.J. Res. 181) to approve the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

The motion was agreed to.

□ 1402

#### IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 181, with Mr. KILDEE in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 101(h) of Public Law 98-473 and the unanimous-consent agreement agreed to earlier today, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] will be recognized for 1 hour today and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE] will be recognized for 1 hour today.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 13 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. I thank the chairman of the subcommittee for yielding to me. I want to express my admiration for the job he has done.

Mr. Chairman, the MX question is a very complex one, not so much because of the missile itself, but because of the maneuvering that accompanies it. I would like to touch on a couple points in the debate. One has to do with survivability.

There has been a lot of argument about survivability. I want to concede that the MX has had a survivability capacity that far exceeds anything that I have seen in what is becoming an increasingly political life. The MX missile has survived a 180-degree change in its justification. We originally needed a new missile because the existing missile was fixed in place and we needed a mobile one, so the MX missile then survived 35 changes in where to put it.

Then the Scowcroft Commission decided that we really could not do anything about the fact that it was immobile, except to proclaim that was not as bad as we said it was, but that it was an important test of our resolve to have it, so we switched the justification. It survived all those changes in basing mode and then we decided we would have it.

Then last year we were told by several people, including the gentleman who now chairs the Armed Services Committee, that we needed the MX missile because we were not having

talks with the Russians; so a majority voted for the MX missile because we were not having talks with the Russians.

Then we were told if we were having talks with the Russians, then we would not need it; so we began to have talks with the Russians.

Once again the MX showed that incredible capacity for survival, because having been put forward as something we needed because we were not having talks with the Russians, it then became something we needed because we are having talks with the Russians.

I will make one prediction, Mr. Chairman. You can be wrong about things here. I agree with what one of the gentlemen said yesterday, we should not have such certainty. I will certainly admit that I have been wrong in this. I was wrong when I voted for the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in January. I will admit the fallibility, but I can make a prediction right now very confidently that we were told last year we needed this because we were not having any talks with the Russians and we need it this year because we are having talks with the Russians and if the talks break down, we will be told next year that we need the MX missile because we used to be having talks with the Russians.

The MX missile survives. There are Members in this body who have an attachment to it that defies any specific set of reasons and there is no want of ingenuity in this body. There is no change in circumstances, no feat of engineering, no fact of physics, no question of international strategy so stark that people cannot weave it into a justification for the MX missile, so it will continue to survive.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. I will be glad to yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding.

You know, in listening to our negotiators and in looking at the background of the MX missile, I think there are some compelling reasons to have it and I think you have gone over the fact that the Russians are back at the table and implied that somehow that is because of the MX missile. Of course, I think the consensus is that it is probably because of the SDI.

Mr. FRANK. Well, I will take back my time. No, I did not imply for a minute that the Russians are back at the table because of the MX missile. That is the people on the gentleman's side, their argument. I do not think the Russians care much about the MX missile. I see no signs that is one of the things they worry about. They worry about the SDI. They worry



about Pershing. I do not think they worry about the MX missile; so I would never suggest that it has anything to do with their being back at the table.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield back for my question?

Mr. FRANK. Yes, in a minute. We have got a lot of time to kill. The gentleman does not have to worry. We are just eating up the time here because we do not want to vote until tomorrow, so there will be no problem. We all know that. The gentleman from New York will give me some more time. In fact, if the gentleman from Oregon takes over, he will give me 15 or 20 minutes, so do not worry about it. Let us get to these things one at a time.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield.

Mr. FRANK. Yes. I just want to finish.

The point is the MX missile has nothing to do, in my judgment, with whether or not we come back. My point was there were people, mostly on our side—the gentleman has been for the MX missile. He was for it a long time ago. It is an old missile. I am not sure who is older, the gentleman or the missile, but I am sure that since that time they both have existed simultaneously and will continue to be and I respect that consistency.

What I was talking about here were the people on my side who have to keep thinking of new reasons why they are for it. Last year their reason was that we were not having talks and if we were to have talks, we would not need it any more. Now that we are having talks, they threw that out, so I was referring to only two people there.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Let me just make a statement, or read a statement, that was made by Soviet physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Andrei Sakharov, and ask my friend if he agrees with the basic thrust of this argument. He says:

It seems very important to me to strive for the abolition of powerful silo based missiles at the talks on nuclear disarmament. While the USSR is the leader in this field, there is very little chance of its easily relinquishing that lead. If it is necessary to spend a few dollars on MX missiles to alter this situation, then perhaps this is what the West must do.

So I would ask the gentleman, does he not agree there is an argument beyond simply saying that we are at the table and we are always going to be at the table for the next couple years.

Mr. Sakharov says basically that you cannot negotiate with the Soviets. You should not negotiate with the Soviets for reductions in their heavy missiles if you do not have something else to

counterbalance that and to give the full faith and credit of the U.S. Congress behind that position if necessary.

Mr. FRANK. I would say to my friend, he said will I not admit there is an argument. As long as there is an MX missile, there will be an argument. I do not know what the argument will be. It may be a direct contradiction of the last argument.

Mr. HUNTER. Does the gentleman agree with Mr. Sakharov, is my point.

Mr. FRANK. I will take back my time. It is my turn and then it will be the gentleman's turn. I will give him plenty of time. His side has some time, too, so we will not run out of time.

The point is this. There will always be an argument. I do not agree with Mr. Sakharov on this particular point and I do not think the gentleman from California does, either, because as he read that statement, Mr. Sakharov said that we should be negotiating for the abolition, as I understood it, of silo based missiles. I do not know that anyone thinks that it is realistic to expect the Soviet Union to agree to give up all its silo based missiles. I am afraid that Mr. Sakharov, a distinguished physicist, a martyr, a victim of terrible and brutal Soviet persecution, greatly to be condemned, his family has been victimized, denied medical treatment, all those things are savage facts that confront the Soviets and are an eternal shame to them; but on this particular point, I think he is wrong and I do not think the gentleman from California thinks, Ronald Reagan does not think, Max Kampelman does not think, no one thinks that abolishing the silo based missile is a goal for negotiation.

□ 1410

So Mr. Sakharov simply makes a mistake on that. That is not what we are trying to do. It is not achievable. No one thinks it can be done and therefore I have to disagree with him.

I just want to get to this point: The gentleman said the good faith and credit of the Congress, because there is this thing that disturbs me. My friend from Washington—I do not see him here and I hope that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], who has been a very valiant advocate here will return because I had some questions for him—but one of the things several people said is we have one President. We have one President and therefore we must do what he thinks.

I agree we have one President. I had hoped that we would also have at least one Congress. I do not think the question about whether or not we have one President is at issue. The question is will we have no Congress because the one President, whom we undeniably have, has his responsibility. But I had thought that the one Congress, to which people were at a minimum entitled, had an independent function.

The question is not whether we have a President. We stipulate to that. He is the President. He appoints negotiators. He brings them on planes so that they can fly back here.

Why, one of the greatest surprises of this past week, apparently, was that the man that Ronald Reagan appointed to be this chief negotiator happened to agree with him on this particular issue. You know, maybe because of the problems they have had with Mr. Nitze and General Rowney they are unused to having this kind of an agreement among themselves, and it was a cause for celebration that Mr. Kampelman agreed with his boss, and it was worth bringing him back here to tell us that he thought his boss was right.

I worry about people who say we only have one President. In the first place, the fact that we have one President, it seems to me, is substantially irrelevant to what the Congress should do. The Congress has an independent function.

What people are saying is this, and they have said it in so many words, that once the President has made a proposal the Congress has to accept it. That I think is nonsense. It is bad constitutional law. It is terrible political theory.

Then we are told that the President was elected. Well, nobody appointed is sitting in here. Everybody here also got elected.

The fact is that Congress has that responsibility.

And I have to ask my friend from Washington, because one of the things we have heard is that we are going to vote—one of the things we get with the MX missile, I hear people talk about the MX missile and they sound like I used to do and my friend from California before we must have resolved to diet, and I congratulate my friend from California because he and I and some others have dieted. But we remember the old days when we had the "gonnas" and we were "gonna" diet the next day.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my friend for not having the before and after pictures as exhibits.

Mr. FRANK. I think that they would have been not in order, and we would not want to have our pictures taken down.

The issue is that the people have the "gonnas." They are "gonna" do that, they are "gonna" stop eating, they are "gonna" do this. Well, people with the "gonnas," they are "gonna" stop voting for MX's and one of the things, of a variety of things, is first you have some Members of the other party in the other body—I got that right under

the parliamentary rules, I got all of the others—it is the Republican Senators, I will say once, but I will go back to say other Members of the other body of the other party. And it is very, very interesting what happens. Some of them now are against the MX missiles. And there are some people who are not, and they never met a weapon that they did not like, and that is okay. They are entitled, and that is an honest argument to make, that we think it is a tough world and we need to do everything we can.

Go right ahead. But there are other people who will tell you that it is not a good weapon and we do not really need it; we cannot afford it. And they are not going to vote for any more next time. But they vote for it each time it comes up, then they read in the paper that the President says that he is not going to campaign, on them and they say they do not care that he won't campaign. We have people on the other side that say "I am not going to be intimidated by the President who says he is not going to campaign for me, and I am not going to be intimidated." Then everyone who has announced that he is not going to be intimidated gave up, so one thing that I would note as a symbol, any time you hear a Member of the other party announce he cannot be intimidated by the President, look for a cave in.

Now we have the people who say, "Well, I am going to vote for these 21, but I am not going to vote for the next 48." I have to ask them—I do not think the 21 makes sense. We are told by many people privately and publicly on both sides from both parties that "I will vote for the next 21, but no more."

Now, the gentleman from Washington, my good friend, says we have to do this now because we are in negotiations and we have only one President. If he has to vote for the 21 now because we only have one President, does he not then have to vote for 48? I have to ask those who say they are going to vote for 21 but not for the next 48, and they have said it, you heard them, "We only have one President," a simple, fact. Question: How many Presidents will we have in June? Will we have four Presidents, seven Presidents? If the fact that we only have one President now means they are going to vote with him, why does the fact we will still only have one President in June mean that they will not have to vote with him?

Is Max Kampelman going to be the President? Is John Tower also going to be the President? I do not understand this.

So what we are getting again, I think, is another round of "gonnas." They cannot justify voting for the MX.

I think it is extraordinary that they justify voting for this weapon not be-

cause it is a needed weapon but because the President told them to, and they are not going to vote for it the next time, and that is justification for all of this.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. If the gentleman would get more time, and he can do it, because I am running out of time and your side has some time, too.

The point I think we have is this: If we need to spend for our national security so that it will not be begrudged—the gentleman from New York read a very impressive list of weapons, some of which I support, a few of which I do not, most of which I support, nuclear submarines all over the globe, air-launched cruise missiles, the Stealth bomber which I support and I hope we will get. No one is talking about being vulnerable to the Soviets. No one thinks we are vulnerable to the Soviets.

I will tell you the decision that we are making today. Are we serious about the deficit? We are told by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, "Do not worry about it," that that is \$1.5 billion in this year's deficit. Tell that to the people who are about to lose their supplemental unemployment compensation. We have several hundred thousand Americans who are now unemployed through no fault of their own because of imports, and a high dollar and other problems. They are about to be thrown off the unemployment compensation, thrown on to the rocks of fiscal disaster, personally for themselves and their children because we are told we cannot afford \$1.5 billion for the rest of this fiscal year. But we can afford it because some people think if we only have one President and national security, we have to do everything he says.

This would have its comic aspects to me if we were not talking about \$1.5 billion now, and a lot more later.

I would at this point insert in the RECORD an editorial by JOHN GLENN as support material in which he points out that it is going to cost us a great deal more than this. And he says that superhardening this, all that cement, is going to cost another \$180 million per silo, three times as much as it already costs. So we are talking about vast expenditures to which you are committing people.

The article referred to follows:

INSTEAD OF THE MX  
(By John Glenn)

We've had far too much jumbled rhetoric, conflicting testimony and macho political posturing on the MX. But administration lobbying efforts notwithstanding, the only way to truly increase deterrence is to modernize our strategic systems so that we can ensure an effective retaliatory capability in the event of a Soviet first strike. These new systems will include the Trident submarine

with the D5 missile, the B1B bomber and a replacement for our aging Minuteman ICBM force. But in my judgment—and despite the outcome of the Senate's first vote on this issue yesterday—the Minuteman replacement should not be the MX.

The administration has bullied Congress, implying that opposition to the MX is unpatriotic and that failure to fund the missile would "knock the legs out from under the bargaining table" in Geneva. But Soviet planners are less interested in rhetoric than they are in reality. And the reality is that placing MXs in the same old silos that the Soviets have had targeted for more than 20 years would simply perpetuate the existing vulnerability of our ICBMs.

The only effective way to reduce that vulnerability is to make our missiles mobile, so that Soviet planners will not know where to shoot. Mobility, of course, is the key concept behind our submarine-based missiles, which make up over 50 percent of our nuclear forces. Not surprisingly, the Soviets fully recognize this principle and are now starting to deploy their own mobile ICBMs, the new SS24s and 25s.

The time has come to make America's ICBM force mobile as well. The mobile missile—already well on the road to development by the U.S. Air Force—would be a much less attractive target than the MIRVed MX and, more important, would be nearly impossible to locate for a preemptive strike. Nor would accuracy be a problem, since the mobile missile could equal the MX's accuracy.

Cost, of course, is another important factor, and a small mobile system might actually be cheaper than the MX. The administration wants us to believe otherwise, but its cost figures deal only with the price of the missiles themselves, ignoring the additional basing expenses. In congressional testimony two weeks ago, for instance, the administration put the cost of each MX missile at \$74 million. But that is far less than what they would actually cost. The reason is that sticking MX missiles into the same old vulnerable Minuteman silos makes sense only if we "super-harden" those silos, so they could withstand a Soviet attack. The only alternatives would be a "launch-on-warning" or a "launch-under-attack" strategy, both of which are unacceptably dangerous.

But here's the kicker: super-hardening would cost at least \$180 million per silo, bringing the actual cost of each MX missile to at least \$254 million—and that doesn't even include the additional costs of research and development or program support. And let me add that I'm not making those figures up; they were given to the Senate Armed Service Committee last week by the U.S. Air Force. Furthermore, silo hardening won't work if Soviet missiles become more accurate, as they assuredly will.

Finally, we should consider the effects of the MX on the Geneva arms talks. I don't deny that we should proceed with building new strategic systems that will bolster deterrence and stabilize the nuclear balance. But we must show the Soviets that we are willing to negotiate seriously in the area of arms control.

Lately, administration supporters have been touting the MX as a "bargaining chip." Indeed, Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote to me on March 14 explicitly stating that "every aspect of our modernization program, including MX, is on the bargaining table, [emphasis added]. Yet as Gerard Smith, Clark Clifford and Paul Warnke



pointed out in a recent letter to The Post [Free for All, March 16], "the MX, if approved, will be a weapon with tens of billions spent, entrenched constituencies pressing for its continuation, if not expansion, and a bargaining chip that will have lost its ability to bargain." Exactly so. In the area of weaponry, there is a long history of supposed "bargaining chips" suddenly becoming nonnegotiable once they are approved. There is no reason to think the MX will be different.

In sum, the small mobile ICBM is superior to the MX by almost every measure; it is less vulnerable and costly; more stabilizing and amenable to arms control. For all these reasons, I will oppose MX missile appropriations and support the small, mobile alternative. It would give us a deterrent that is stronger, not weaker, than the one proposed by the Reagan administration.

Mr. FRANK. Tell the old people that they have to pay more when they get sick, and throw them off unemployment, and vote for this, and you make a mockery of deficit concerns.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to my good friend from Florida [Mr. YOUNG], an able member of our subcommittee.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, the debate that I have listened to today indicates to me that there are no further arguments from the opponents, and they have resorted to humor, which is fine because I enjoyed it as well, and fast talking that was so fast that I could not quite keep up with some of it. But I think it indicates that the debate has run long enough. We have listened to this debate for hours, weeks, months, and years.

And throughout the debate I would like to compliment the leader of my committee, the gentleman from New York, Chairman ADDABBO, and the Republican leader, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE], and those who have taken part in the debate, because while there have been obvious disagreements, Members have conducted themselves with distinction.

Mr. FRANK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I am happy to yield.

Mr. FRANK. I apologize. I was slightly distracted and I did not hear the point that the gentleman said that he had trouble following. If he will get me more time from his side I will say it again slower.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I did hear the gentleman's remark where he indicated that all he was doing was using up time anyway. So, I do not think that that will be necessary, because I plan to use up some time now, and it will balance out.

What I was saying was that the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE], and those who have played a major role in this debate for days and weeks and months have conducted themselves with distinction

and with honor. The differences have been strong but they have been very genuine.

I do not detect on the part of a proponent or an opponent a desire to weaken the United States. To the contrary, I detect a strong desire that the United States be a strong Nation.

But I also detect some inconsistencies. I was interested in the comments of my distinguished chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO], when he said that what we ought to do is take the additional 13 missiles that we have scheduled for the testing program and go ahead and deploy them.

□ 1420

And I assume he suggests that we do that because the testing program is going so well that we can afford to take the 13 test missiles and deploy them. But one of those who supports his same position, our colleague from Pennsylvania [Mr. GREEN], was complaining because we had only tested seven missiles. So I am not sure whether the opponents want to test more missiles or do not want to test any more missiles.

I think it is important that we find where the consistent line here is.

The debate has suggested that we are being asked to appropriate \$1.5 billion for these 21 MX missiles. If anybody would pay attention to what the debate actually is about, today it is House Joint Resolution 181, and House Joint Resolution 181 says that the Congress approves the obligation and availability of prior-year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985. It is not a new appropriation. We are not asking for any additional money.

What we are doing is asking to release the funds that have already been appropriated by this Congress for those 21 additional MX missiles.

It has been suggested that the arms talks in Geneva have been a show and that President Reagan led us to that negotiating table strictly so that he could get the MX missile. It has been indicated that President Reagan is not sincere.

One of my colleagues in debate yesterday said that President Reagan came to the White House opposed to arms control and will leave the White House opposed to arms control. I say nothing could be further from the truth. Anyone who will take a lesson from history as our friend from Pennsylvania suggested yesterday should recognize the fact that from November 1981 to August 1984 the United States under President Reagan made 11 separate formal negotiating proposals dealing with arms control. Four of these were START proposals. Arms reduction, not limitation, but actually reduction. Four were INF proposals. There were one each in the areas of

conventional land forces, chemical weapons, and confidence-building measures.

Also during this same period the U.S. administration under the leadership of Ronald Reagan has called for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on at least 21 separate occasions for the purposes of reducing or limiting nuclear weapons; on three separate occasions with regard to space weapons and on three separate occasions with regard to nuclear test limitations.

Mr. Chairman, while the House was in the House I asked unanimous consent to insert additional material, and at this point I would like to have that material inserted into the RECORD, because this outlines by date the specific proposal that President, Ronald Reagan, has sincerely made in an attempt to free the world from the threat of nuclear confrontation.

#### A CHRONOLOGY OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND SUBSTANTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, NOVEMBER 1981-AUGUST 1984

From November 1981 to August 1984 the United States made eleven separate formal negotiating proposals in various arms control fora. Four of these were START proposals, four were INF proposals, and there were one each in the areas of conventional land forces, chemical weapons, and confidence building measures.

Also, during this same period, the U.S. Administration has called for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on at least twenty-one separate occasions for the purposes of reducing or limiting nuclear weapons; on three separate occasions with regard to space weapons; and on three separate occasions with regard to nuclear test limitations.

A summary of these proposals and communications follows:

#### START

##### 1. November 18, 1981

President Reagan announced at the National Press Club that he has proposed to President Brezhnev to open negotiation on strategic arms as soon as possible next year.

##### 2. May 9, 1982

President Reagan announced in a speech at Eureka College the US START proposal. It called for: reductions in deployed ballistic missile warheads to a level of 5000 for each side, of which no more than 2500 would have been on ICBMs; a limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles, roughly one-half the current US inventory; sub-limits of 210 medium-sized missiles, of which no more than 110 would have been heavy missiles; and equal levels of heavy bombers, including the Soviet Backfire bomber. In a second phase, the US sought equal ceilings on other elements of US and Soviet strategic forces including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current US levels. Significant progress towards throw-weight equality was to be accomplished in phase one.

##### 3. May 31, 1982

The US and the USSR jointly announced agreement to begin formal negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic

arms on June 29, 1982 in Geneva, Switzerland.

#### 4. June 8, 1983

At Round IV of START, the US proposed: A relaxing of the proposal to limit the total number of ballistic missiles on each side to 850;

A shift from an approach which envisioned two phases of negotiation, with the initial emphasis on ballistic missiles, to an approach embodied in a single phase agreement, with everything on the table;

The proposal of limits on the number of bombers on each side and limits on the number of cruise missiles permitted to be carried on each bomber which are below SALT II levels;

An offer to explore alternative approaches to limiting the destructive capability of ballistic missiles.

#### 5. October 4, 1983

At Round V of START the US tabled the build-down proposal:

A provision which links reductions to modernization using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed;

A provision calling for a guaranteed annual percentage build-down (an approximately 5% mandatory build-down per year); A provision that ensures that the reductions would be paced by whichever above rule produces the greatest reductions.

In addition, the US delegation proposed:

A concurrent build-down of bombers;

To discuss additional limitations on the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by US bombers;

To negotiate trade-offs, taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and US advantages in bombers, in ways that provide each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces; and,

The establishment of a working group in START to discuss the US build-down initiative in Round V.

#### 6. December 8, 1983

US START Delegation proposed resuming negotiation at Round VI beginning on February 1, 1984.

#### INF

##### 1. US Proposal, November 1981

The US INF Delegation, headed by Ambassador Paul Nitze, opened negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva in November 1981, shortly after the main elements of the US negotiating approach were set forth by President Reagan in his speech of November 18. The President made a far-reaching proposal for the mutual elimination and renunciation of longer-range land-based INF missile systems on a worldwide basis. Specifically, the US offered to cancel deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s—the zero/zero proposal. Although the US subsequently proposed an interim solution as described below, the zero/zero proposal represents the most desirable outcome. By eliminating the Soviet threat, it would make the NATO response to it superfluous.

##### 2. The "Walk-in-the-Woods"

In July 1982, during the so-called "walk in the woods," Ambassador Nitze and his Soviet counterpart discussed ideas for an agreement on an informal, exploratory basis. As developed by the negotiations for consideration in their respective capitals, the formula contained the following main

elements: The US and USSR would each be limited to 75 LRINF missile launchers in Europe. The USSR could deploy only ballistic missile launchers, containing no more than one missile each with three warheads. The US could deploy only GLCM launchers carrying four missiles with one warhead apiece. In addition, the Soviet Union would be limited to 90 LRINF missile launchers in the eastern USSR. Specified US and Soviet nuclear capable aircraft would be limited to equal levels in Europe, and their shorter-range INF missiles would be limited to existing levels. Finally, verification measures were to be negotiated within three months.

Although the US had several problems with the proposal as it stood, we were interested in keeping this informal channel open. The Soviet reaction, on the other hand, was completely negative, both as regards the proposal itself and further use of this informal channel.

##### 3. The US Interim Proposal, March 1983

In an effort to break the stalemate and after intense consultations with our Allies, the President on March 30, 1983 presented an interim proposal under which the US would agree to substantial reductions in the number of warheads on planned deployments of longer-range INF missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of warheads on its longer-range INF missiles to an equal number on a global basis. He instructed Ambassador Nitze to indicate to the Soviet side that while our zero/zero proposal remained on the table as our ultimate goal, we would consider any number between zero and 572 the Soviets might propose which would result in an agreement at substantially reduced equal global levels.

##### 4. The New U.S. Initiative, September 1983

Determined to achieve a sound, equitable and verifiable agreement, the US made a third major effort designed to move the talks forward. President Reagan announced in his September 26, 1983 speech to the UN a US initiative in Geneva which authorized Ambassador Nitze to put forward a package of steps designed to advance the negotiations as rapidly as possible. These initiatives built on the interim proposal and addressed concerns that the Soviets have raised:

First, the United States proposed a new initiative on equal global limits. If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States will consider a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through US deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere.

Second, the United States would be prepared to consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.

Third, the United States would address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. In the context of reductions to equal levels, we would be prepared to apportion the reductions in deployments appropriately between Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

##### 5. 420 Warhead Proposal, November 1983

After consultation with its Allies, the US decided to elaborate on the September initiatives by indicating that we would be prepared to accept an interim equal global ceiling of 420 warheads on LRINF missiles. This would equate to the global limit of 140 Soviet SS-20 missile systems, a number the Soviets proposed in October for SS-20 levels in Europe. This proposal was made in an at-

tempt to be responsive to the Soviets and to show continued flexibility in reaching an agreement.

#### 6. November 23, 1983

At the end of Round VI, Ambassador Nitze made the following statement (excerpts): "The US profoundly regrets the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union to discontinue the present round of the INF negotiations without setting a date for resumption. This decision is as unjustified as it is unfortunate. . . . The US remains committed to reaching a negotiated solution which meets the legitimate security needs of all concerned. The US Delegation has sought, both formally and informally, to explore all opportunities for reconciling the differences between the two sides. The US proposals are flexible and designed to meet expressed Soviet concerns."

The United States stands ready to halt or reverse its deployments if an equitable agreement to reduce and limit or eliminate US and Soviet INF missiles can be achieved.

For its part, the US remains prepared to continue the INF negotiations until an agreement has been reached and our two countries have thus fulfilled their responsibility to contribute to the cause of Peace."

During the press conference held on the same day, Ambassador Nitze stated "As far as this delegation is concerned, part of our delegation is permanently stationed here in Geneva. Some of the rest of us may go back to Washington for consultation. But the entire delegation is prepared to return here to Geneva at any time that the Soviets are prepared to continue or resume the discussions with us." In response to the question "Do you think they'll come back?", the Ambassador said "All I can say is I hope they come back. We're ready for them to come back; they should come back."

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION ON START AND INF

1. November 29, 1983: North Atlantic Council Press Release (excerpt) stated "Ambassador Nitze reported on the latest session of the current round of negotiations, and on the unilateral Soviet decision to discontinue this round without setting a date for resumption. . . . The Council discussed and deplored the Soviet decision and confirmed its belief that there is no justification for this decision. The Allies hope that the suspension will be temporary."

2. December, 1983: President Reagan reportedly sent a letter to Andropov suggesting that the U.S. was ready to move forward in START by discussing frameworks and possible tradeoffs, and a possible summit meeting on those issues.

3. January 16, 1984: In a major public address, President Reagan stated "our negotiators are ready to work toward agreements in INF, START, and on MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway."

4. February 14, 1984: Vice President Bush stated the following during a press conference in Moscow following the meeting with the new General Secretary Chernenko. "I delivered a letter from President Reagan to the General Secretary. . . . It conveyed the President's determination to move forward in all areas of our relationship with the Soviets, and our readiness for concrete, productive discussions in every one of them. . . . I (Vice President Bush) stressed the particular importance of real results in reducing nuclear weapons. . . . Let me direct a few parting words to the Soviet people and the



Soviet leadership . . . we are dedicated to arms reduction . . ."

5. February 29, 1984: In an interview, Secretary of State Shultz said the U.S. is engaged in "private diplomatic efforts" or "quiet diplomacy" to explore areas of agreement on arms control and other issues. Contacts included his regular meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and meetings between U.S. Ambassador Hartman and Soviet officials.

6. March 8, 1984: Ambassador Rowny stated the following in a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council: "The United States is prepared to return to the START negotiations immediately, with no preconditions or reservations. I would therefore challenge the Soviets to respond positively to this proposal and indicate their readiness to return to the START talks in Geneva."

7. March 16, 1984: President Reagan, in a statement on the resumption of MBFR, stated "I also urge the Soviet Union to return to the INF and START negotiations, where very important work in the cause of building a more secure and peaceful world has been suspended by them. . . . It is in the interest of all mankind that these vital efforts be resumed now."

8. March 27, 1984: NATO Special Consultative Group Chairman's Press Statement—"We wish to reiterate our own readiness to return to Geneva at any time. The Soviet Union should match this spirit."

9. April 5, 1984: Presidential News Conference on US draft CW Treaty and announcement of Vice President's trip to the CD: "The US and many other countries have urged repeatedly that the Soviets return to these talks (START and INF) . . . I hope that the Soviet leadership will respond to our new initiative, not only by negotiating seriously on chemical weapons but also by joining us in the urgent task of achieving real reduction in nuclear arms."

10. April 18, 1984: In a speech at the CD in Geneva, Vice President Bush stated: "Here today, I again invite the Soviet Union to return to the two nuclear arms negotiations it suspended five months ago and to resume with us the crucial task of reducing nuclear arms. The US remains ready to explore all ideas, without preconditions, at a time the Soviet Union chooses, to renew the dialogue."

11. April 26, 1984: Ambassador Rowny stated in a speech in Dallas, ". . . the United States has made it clear to the Soviets, both in public statements and through diplomatic channels, that we remain ready to return to the negotiations at any time, without preconditions. . . . President Reagan raised this issue yet again in his most recent press conference when he said the Soviets 'have ignored the will of the world' by refusing to resume negotiations. He once again called for the Soviet Union to 'join us in the urgent task of achieving real reductions in nuclear arms.'"

12. May 2, 1984: ACDA Director Adelman stated in a public address "We remain prepared to return to the negotiating table without preconditions at the earliest possible time."

13. May 5, 1984: President Reagan stated the following on the occasion of the resumption of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe: "The opportunity for meaningful progress in arms control exists. The Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. Our representatives are ready to return to the two negotiating tables on nuclear arms, and we will negotiate in good faith. As

I have said before, whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway."

14. June 1, 1984: In an address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Ambassador Nitze stated "We are ready to return to the negotiating table on 24-hour's notice. Part of our INF delegation is in Geneva at the present time. The rest of us are prepared to return on a moment's notice."

15. June 13, 1984: In an address to the Leningrad UN Conference on World Disarmament Campaign, ACDA Deputy Director said "We remain prepared to renew the talks at anytime."

16. June 29, 1984: White House Statement regarding the Soviet proposal for talks in Vienna on outer space: ". . . the United States Government has informed the Government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet with the Soviet Union in September, . . . to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed."

17. July 27, 1984: White House Statement regarding the Vienna talks on outer space: ". . . we simply point out that we wish to restore exchanges on the subject of offensive nuclear arms."

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

On April 18, 1984 Vice President Bush presented to the 40-Nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) a U.S. draft treaty for a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The treaty would prohibit development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons.

Verification measures include a system of regular international on-site inspection for checking declarations, monitoring stocks and facilities prior to destruction, confirming destruction, and monitoring permitted activities such as commercial production of specified chemicals which pose a particular risk. A special mechanism, involving challenge on-site inspection any time, anywhere, for military and government-owned or controlled facilities would be established to deal with suspected violations.

When the Vice President presented the U.S. draft CW treaty, he indicated that the U.S. looked forward to serious negotiations and steady progress. Obviously multilateral progress is dependent upon U.S.-USSR progress toward agreement. The Soviet Union is a member of the CD. To this end, we have indicated to the Soviets our willingness to meet bilaterally with a view to facilitating the multilateral treaty negotiations. Although the Soviets have been openly critical of the U.S. draft treaty, they have indicated their willingness to conduct such consultations in Geneva.

#### THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

The Administration has been examining steps it might take in its efforts to strengthen significantly the verification provisions in the signed but not ratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, to which the United States and the Soviet Union are parties.

We have approached the Soviets on the three occasions since early 1983 to discuss our concerns, but so far they have refused to meet with us on this issue.

#### ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS AND COMMUNICATIONS

##### CSCE (COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE)

In February 1981, in one of his first major foreign policy decisions, President Reagan endorsed the proposal that a European Conference on Disarmament (CDE) be organized to discuss first confidence building measures and later general disarmament issues. Meeting in Madrid, the 35 CSCE states finally agreed on a CSCE conference document which contained a mandate for the CDE as well as new human rights proposals. The meeting closed in September, 1983.

##### MBFR (MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS)

The U.S. developed a new approach to the Vienna talks based on President Reagan's stated arms control criteria: substantial, verifiable, and militarily-significant reductions to equal ceilings. Concluding that the establishment of military manpower parity in Central Europe would enhance stability and security in the region, the U.S. introduced this approach in NATO in May 1982 in the form of a draft treaty; after intensive Allied consultations, it was tabled in Vienna on July 8, 1982.

Following a thorough U.S. review of MBFR policy and of extensive consultation within the NATO alliance, in an effort to move the stalled talks a new Western proposal was tabled in Vienna on April 19, 1984. This proposal amended the West's 1982 draft treaty by showing greater flexibility and reducing our previous demands. This proposal calls for limiting initial data exchange to combat and combat support forces, which are the most easily identifiable.

##### CDE (CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE)

The United States, together with its NATO allies, tabled a proposed package of confidence and security-building measures at the Stockholm CDE on January 24, 1984. This was the first day of regular business for this new conference. The Western package calls for information exchange on ground and air forces in the CDE zone; forecasts and notifications of military activities in the zone; mandatory invitations to observers at these activities; verification provisions including inspections; and provisions for improved communication between participants.

On June 4, 1984, in an effort to advance the CDE negotiations, President Reagan, in a speech in Dublin, offered to enter into discussions on Soviet non-use of force proposal if the Soviets would negotiate on measures to give concrete meaning to that principle.

##### COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON OUTER SPACE

###### 1. June 29, 1984

The US informed the USSR that it was prepared to meet with the Soviet Union in September at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union, to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on ASAT weapons, and to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be resumed.

###### 2. August 1, 1984

The White House issued a public statement that the United States has made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal, and is pre-

pared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions on the Vienna agenda.

In response to the Soviet proposal of a mutual moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, the United States expressed a readiness to have our negotiators consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations. However, any joint Soviet-American statement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks should not pre-judge the outcome of the negotiations.

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES

1. May 14, 1984: Secretary of State Schultz stated the following in an address before the League of Women Voters. "Shortly after the President announced the initiative (SDI) last year, the Soviets proposed that scientists from the two countries meet to discuss the implications of these new technologies. We proposed, in turn, that experts of our two governments—including scientific experts—meeting in the context of appropriate arms control forums would be a more appropriate and effective vehicle for such discussion. We have recently renewed our offer, and it still stands."

Mr. Chairman, opponents have also suggested throughout this debate, that if we build the MX missile or build too many MX missiles, we are creating a first-strike capability. That is not so. We are building a deterrence. We are improving the deterrent capability that has kept us out of a nuclear war or a world war since the nuclear weapon was first created.

We want to make sure that there are no more Pearl Harbors, we want to make sure that no other nation ever again believes that the United States is so weak that they can attack, wipe us out, or eliminate our ability to respond.

We want to make sure that never happens again.

And as was so aptly pointed out in an earlier debate, times are different now than they were at the time of Pearl Harbor. We would not have months to rebuild, or prepare our defense as we did in 1941. In the missile age we would have only minutes.

Should the Soviets begin an activity that convinced us that they were leading up to a nuclear strike, we would not have time to start to produce our weapons then. It is too late.

We have also heard the argument that to build the MX missile is destabilizing and it is always the U.S. missile, the Peacekeeper, the MX, call it whatever you like, that is the destabilizing weapon. The Soviets have built the SS-18, the Soviets have built the SS-19, why does not somebody say that they are destabilizing? They are building SS-24's and SS-25's. Why in the world does not somebody stand up here and say that these Soviet weapons are destabilizing?

I do not think we are destabilizing when we upgrade our capability to defend ourselves and to defend freedom.

Look at the history of the United States. Our history is not a first-strike history. Our history is not one of destabilizing the peace of the world. Our history is not one of threatening the peace of the world.

At the end of World War II the United States had the only real credible military force left. The rest of the world had been pretty badly beaten.

At the end of World War II the United States had the only nuclear capability anywhere on the face of the planet.

Despite that, the Soviets have expanded their control of formerly free people far beyond their own borders. The people of the Baltic States no longer have a national identity; Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia no longer exist.

The freedom fighters of Hungary were trampled by the Soviet tanks. So were the people of Poland and Czechoslovakia. We have never done anything like that. We have not created any surrogate hoodlums to roam the world as the Soviets have done with Cuba in Angola and other parts of Africa or with Vietnam, in Southeast Asia. We have never done that.

Despite that, look where the Soviet control has expanded in the world. Despite the fact that we had the nuclear weapon, and that we had the military force left, what do you think the map of the world would look like today had it been the Soviet Union that had the only military power left after World War II? What would the map of the world look like today if it had been the Soviet Union that had the only nuclear capability in the world?

I would ask you, and listen carefully, pay attention to history, listen to the voices of those freedom fighters from Hungary, listen to the voices of those people from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia who no longer have a country; listen to the people of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; listen to the people of Cuba who came to the United States en masse in the Mariel boatlift to escape the Soviet kind of communism.

Listen to these people and learn what it means to be weak while the Soviet Union is strong. We have a sincere effort under way in Geneva today and I would like to believe that the Soviets are sincere as well. We need to make sure that our negotiators in Geneva who are trying to remove the world from a possible confrontation, nuclear or otherwise, that we give them every opportunity that we can to be successful in limiting or reducing the number of devastating arms that are available in this world.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Downey].

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that the Soviet Union has built a destabilizing missile with the SS-18, and shame on them for building it.

The question is whether or not because they have done something stupid we should do something stupid. It is the question of building not what they have built, but building what we need.

Let us deal for a minute if we can with the history of the triad. The United States of America invented the triad. When we put weapons at sea we recognized that, at some point, weapons on land would be vulnerable, and we decided to hide our weapons.

That was a wise decision. I do not think anybody disputes that decision.

I want to deal with another question. How many times do you have to repeat, and I say this with all due sincerity to my Republican friends, over and over again the notion that we were at rest during the period of 1970 to 1980 while the Soviets were building up their forces?

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No one is disputing the fact that the Soviets built up their forces; that is a matter of fact. But please, please concede the argument that in 1970 this country had 4,000 warheads aimed at the Soviet Union in 1970 and in 1980 it had 9,200 aimed at the Soviet Union.

That is not a nation at rest; we modernized every single aspect of the triad during the 1970's. The fact that we did not go ahead and build new weapons systems is testimony to the fact that we're not stupid. We did not, every time we wanted a 25-percent increase in accuracy, decide to build a new weapons system; we improved the very fine weapons systems we have.

Now, let me deal with this question of Geneva, because I know my colleagues over here are dying to be little arms negotiators and tell us what we should be doing and what we should not be doing with respect to Geneva.

It is important for us to remember that it is Ambassador Kampelman and not President Reagan who believes that there may be some fiddling at the margin of the talks; the President of the United States believes they will be ended; that they cannot go on.

Let us be honest with the American people and say to them that our responsibility here is to determine what is in the best interests of national security policy. So when we structure our arsenal, let us do so with our security interests in mind.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding, because I think his last statement that we should leave,



we should trust the negotiators in Geneva, we should not try to be 435 would-be Secretaries of State or arms negotiators, is well taken by the President and by the Members who voted for the MX missile yesterday.

Essentially, Mr. Kampelman said this: The message I got was, "I need your trust. I am asking you for something." He did say clearly that he wanted us, if anybody comes away from the White House saying Mr. Kampelman did not really want us to go with the MX missile then they are not being fair.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I am not suggesting that.

Mr. HUNTER. OK, that is why he came forth, and I would ask the gentleman if that was not the thrust of his statement; he said "trust us," and I am telling you that this is what we need to present, a united foreign policy to the Soviet Union.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Well, let me just say that I do not quarrel that Mr. Kampelman advocated for the MX missile at his White House meeting. He did that. I would not want to mislead anybody into thinking that that was not the certain purpose for his visit back here.

Mr. HUNTER. I agree with that point.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I think it is instructive that what Ambassador Kampelman did not say was as important as what he did say. He did not say, as President Reagan said, that this would be the end of the arms talks, and the people of the United States spend more time listening to President Reagan than they do to Ambassador Kampelman, because he is the President.

The President and Caspar Weinberger have repeated over and over and over again that this is the end of the road; if this missile is not there, things are finished. That is clearly not the case.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman earlier stated something that I would like to bring the colloquy back to, and that was his statement that this is not a Nation that has been at rest, when it comes to providing needed defenses for this great country.

We have modernized, we have built, we have not been unfunding things, and I think when we hear speeches to the contrary, we ought to put that into context. The context is that that is so much hokum.

I would like to ask the gentleman in the well when it comes to what this

Nation has funded, which of the two superpowers funded and built and deployed MIRV'd ICBM's first?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. The United States.

Mr. AuCOIN. And, how many years later did the Soviet Union follow?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Five years, six years. There is some argument as to whether or not they were ready to test right after us, but they certainly deployed multiple, independently retargetable reentry vehicles at least 5 years after we did.

Mr. AuCOIN. That squares with the information I have from the posture statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I think it is an accurate statement.

That is not a nation at rest when it comes to any stretch of the imagination; when it comes to funding systems. We can disagree with them or agree with them, but to say that we have been at rest, we have been disarming, is absolutely absurd.

What about submarine-launched ballistic missiles?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Well, we are talking the Soviets at least 7 or 8 years behind us.

I want to deal with an issue that we have not dealt with; at least I have not heard dealt with here in terms of cost, and that is this preposterous notion that you can protect the MX missile in the hardened silos.

Is my understanding correct from the Appropriations Committee that there is no money in this budget to harden the missiles?

Mr. ADDABBO. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I am happy to yield.

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Does that square with the information?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. There is no money, no money in the budget to harden the silos. Is there money in this budget to do point defense for the Minuteman fields?

Mr. ADDABBO. I believe the gentleman is correct.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. Does the gentleman argue that it is important to do so. If he wants to add the money for hardening or point defense, I would be happy to join him.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Let me ask the gentleman a question. Does the gentleman believe that the missiles can be protected with hardened silos?

Mr. COURTER. The missiles can be protected, and are protected now be-

cause of the fact that we have other legs of the triad. We have gone through this argument.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Does the gentleman believe that in a race with the other side—I take back my time to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. COURTER. Go ahead.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Does the gentleman believe that in a race between hardening and accuracy that we can harden missile silos faster than the Soviets can improve their accuracy? Can the gentleman answer that question?

Mr. COURTER. I would argue that when you have a triad, something that you are arguing against, you have defenses, you can defend yourself because of the strategic or the synergistic effect of three legs of the triad.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I congratulate the gentleman for having read my speeches 5 years ago.

The point that the gentleman has not answered is the fact that you cannot harden silos to protect them.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON], a member of our subcommittee.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. KRAMER. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant support of this resolution, releasing funds for fiscal year 1985 MX procurement.

My reluctance stems from my fervent wish that we could vote today to banish such terrible weapons of mass destruction from the face of the Earth forever.

We do have within sight the prospect of transforming this dream into reality, but we must get there from here. And "here"—the reality with which we are faced—is a massive Soviet advantage in strategic nuclear strike power, an advantage gained despite—perhaps it would be more accurate to say because of—SALT I and SALT II, the arms control agreements that were supposed to give us a nuclear arms freeze.

The Soviets, with their highly accurate, MIRV'd force of SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's now have the ability to launch a devastating first strike against our land-based missile force. Alone, the more than 300 SS-18's now deployed have the capability of knocking out 80 percent of our ICBM silos. The nearly 400 SS-19's currently deployed have virtually the same ability to destroy hardened targets.

Add to this first-strike threat the Soviets' program of superhardening their ICBM launchers and command and control facilities, their comprehensive civil defense program, designed to bring their industrial infrastructure through all-out nuclear war, their violations of the ABM Treaty, which seem to be part of an effort to "break out" with a nationwide antiballistic missile defense, and their clear intent to deploy the SS-X-24 and 25—two new, highly accurate, hard-target-killing ICBM's—with a large proportion of them mounted on mobile launchers.

Add to this the Soviets' continued and blatant attempts—in violation of SALT—to conceal most of their efforts to gain a decisive strategic advantage with which to cow the United States and our allies into submission.

Add to this the fact that our most accurate ICBM's—our Minuteman III's—have neither the accuracy nor the punch to crack the Soviets' superhardened launchers and command and control centers.

Since SALT I was signed in 1972—while the United States stuck to the terms of the SALT I treaties and even of the unratified SALT II Treaty—the Soviets have deployed 28 new or significantly modified strategic weapons systems. And as we debate whether or not to buy 21 more MX's this year, they have at least 8 more systems—including the SS-X-24 and 25—either poised for deployment or under development. Moreover, there is evidence that indicates they may have deployed the SS-16 ICBM—once again, a violation of SALT.

"Here" is a very frightening and dangerous reality indeed.

The comprehensive arms talks now going forward in Geneva offer the shining hope that we may at last achieve real arms control, as opposed to the cosmetic and dangerous arms control we have known to date. They offer the hope that the generation of strategic weapons which we will deploy in this decade—including MX, the Trident D-5, and the B-1B—will be the last of their kind.

Regrettably, because of the arms and arms-control policies of past administrations, this last generation of offensive nuclear weapons systems must be put in place to restore the strategic balance, give us a basis of strength from which to go forward with arms negotiations, and carry us through the period from now until the day we will be able to implement the sort of real arms control I believe is possible and that I believe President Reagan is pursuing in the Geneva talks and with the strategic defense initiative.

Let me take a moment to share some thoughts about real arms control.

The key ingredients of real arms control are: First, substantial and lasting reductions in strategic nuclear weapons; second, the

nonnuclear defensive technologies to ensure that any failure to adhere to arms control accords will not upset the strategic balance; and third, policies that encourage defense over offense.

To be "substantial," reductions in strategic nuclear weapons must reduce stockpiles on both sides below the levels the United States and the Soviet Union believe necessary to achieve "assured retaliation."

The only way it will be possible to begin reducing nuclear arms stockpiles significantly is if the United States and the U.S.S.R. can be reasonably certain they have the means to offset such a reduction with defensive weapons—a "star shield."

This is the promise of President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. This program of intensive research will determine and demonstrate the feasibility of strategic defense technologies. Once these defensive weapons have been proven practical, we will be in a position to begin a step-by-step cutback of nuclear offensive weapons coupled with a symmetrical fielding of nonnuclear defensive weapons—the star shield.

This would introduce a "new look" in strategic arms, a policy new look based on genuine reductions in strategic nuclear weapons backed up by nonnuclear defenses. And reducing stocks of offensive nuclear weapons while putting in place "offsetting" nonnuclear defensive systems maintains the strategic balance—and does so at a less threatening level.

I am convinced that this is an imminently practical approach to achieving real arms control and a safer world. With it, we can change the name of the strategic arms game from offense to defense. With it, we can begin the process of dramatically reducing the danger of nuclear war. With it, we can transform the strategic arms race into a "peace race."

But we cannot get there from here without first going through a difficult and perilous time, a time of negotiations and changing policies and perceptions, a time demanding unity and strength of purpose, a time that will sorely test our courage and creativity and mightily try our patience and resolve.

We now face one such test, my friends and colleagues. I urge you to join me in standing up to it in supporting the resolution now before us and in dedicating yourselves to the support of arms and arms control policies that will make the MX and its terrible sisters the last generation of their kind and give all humankind the precious gift of a world forever free of the threat of nuclear holocaust.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I yield to my friend from Florida.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

In the previous colloquy, I was interested in our colleague from Oregon asking our colleague from New York about how long after the U.S. deployed MIRV'd missiles did it take the Soviets? He was not exactly sure; 5 or 6 years.

I am not exactly sure, either, but it depended on how long it took the Soviets to either buy or steal our technology. That is where the timeframe is established.

Mr. KASICH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from New York did not characterize the President's statement on MX accurate, or the Secretary of Defense's statement on MX.

Secretary Weinberger appeared before the Committee on Armed Services. We have heard numerous briefings from the President and Mr. Weinberger on the need for MX; what the President said was really almost dovetail what Mr. Kampelman said; that if we did not give them the MX it would seriously undermine our negotiating process; he says, as the President said, that if we unilaterally give up the MX, viewing it like an apple that drops off a tree, the Soviets prepared to wait a heck of a long time to see what else we give up unilaterally; that we need strength and resolve and we need strength behind the talk and negotiating position. That is what the President said.

The President did not say that not having an MX means we have no more arms talks; he says in order to have effective arms talks—that is the same thing that Mr. Kampelman says; effective arms talks, we must have something that they want.

So I think it is proper that we clarify what the President's position is on the MX missile.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I appreciate the gentleman's comments.

Mr. Chairman, I might say that Mr. Kampelman also said that act of good will are looked upon as absence of will be the Soviets rather than acts of good will; and I think that that dovetails with what the gentleman said.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of continued funding for the MX missile and against the House appropriations resolution disapproving funding for 21 more MX missiles.

□ 1440

In the last few days there is no doubt we have been rehashing arguments we have heard for years. In fact, over the last 10 years the Congress has voted over 200 times on the MX issue in one form or another here or in the other body. I believe it is safe to say that



had we not gone through these endless fire drills and had we gone ahead and approved the MX during the Carter years when perhaps we should have, we might not be here today; we could very probably be much further along the road in vital arms control negotiations, which of course we all want to succeed.

But indeed we are beginning new negotiations. And I am convinced that that is true primarily because the Soviets have agreed to begin again, only because our Nation has shown some resolve in the last few months, by reelecting President and an administration that is committed to keeping the Nation strong; and an administration which the Soviets now believe that peace can be preserved only by preserving our strength.

Most people agree, including critics of the MX and, most importantly, our bipartisan negotiation team in Geneva, that the Soviets only react to strength.

I might quote former Soviet Maj. Gen. Petrol Grigorenko on September 28, 1983, who said:

The MX program, it is wise. President Reagan understands the world situation better than the liberals in America. He knows the Soviets will not talk until you show them the fist. Pay no attention to what the pacifists say or do.

So this is the time to send a message to Geneva that we are going to be strong. It is not the time to send such a message that we are going to be weak, or that we lack resolve.

As my colleague from Louisiana [Mr. HUCKABY] said just yesterday, timing is everything in politics, whether local, national or world politics.

This is not the time to send a negative message to Geneva. This is not the time to send a negative message to our ally Belgium that has just recently shown resolve by deploying cruise missiles, or to the Netherlands, for that matter, where debate on deployment of cruise missiles is occurring today.

Oddly enough, the debate in the Netherlands on deployment of cruise missiles centers on the number of medium range SS-20's the Soviets plan to deploy in Eastern Europe. This is odd, inasmuch as the critics of the MX missile and of the defense increases in general never seem to concern themselves with Soviet buildups.

But we cannot afford to ignore the Soviet military buildup. In fact, Soviet military strength is much greater than the United States and its NATO allies, as is abundantly illustrated by the comparative trend charts that I have gotten declassified by the Department of Defense. And I show these to my colleagues at this time. A number of these charts have been distributed to the leadership tables on each side of the aisle, and they illustrate that in instance after instance the United States, in a comparative basis to the

Soviet Union, is remarkably inferior in one item of warfare after another. In instance after instance the Warsaw pack exceeds the capabilities of the NATO allies. And I would encourage my colleagues to take a look at these. These are declassified material. I have them available for the Members' inspection.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me now?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman just for a casual remark. I still have comments to make.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding for a casual remark, and I will make one.

I would like to ask the gentleman how it is that he believes that the construction of a vulnerable weapon is a projection of American strength? If this weapon can be taken out, and it will be taken out because there are no plans to harden silos, and there are no plans for a point defense for these missiles so they will be vulnerable. If it is vulnerable, how is it a projection of American strength? How can a vulnerable weapon be a projection of strength?

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, this is a question we have answered four or five times on the floor, and I have not yet seen a contradiction to the answer that has been given, and that is simply that we have three parts to the triad. And in fact if you look at a system in an isolated situation, most of our bombers are vulnerable right now. They could be taken out before they could escape. But it is a fact that if the SS-18 is launched on our ICBM's, our bombers would be able to escape. And if their SLBM's should launch on our bomber fields, our ICBM's should escape. So in a sense if the gentleman speaks of vulnerability, the Minuteman is vulnerable and our bombers are vulnerable, and Bill Perry, who is Secretary for R&D, said that he could not guarantee the invulnerability of our submarines past 1990. That is why the triad is important, and that is why the MX adds a deterrent force to our defensive systems, to our strategic systems, because of the Soviet Union should launch, for example, on our bombers, if they should decide to launch with SLBM's, they would see a much larger number of warheads coming back in our ICBM force that would escape. The triad has been explained many times.

Let me say one last thing that the gentleman raised and the gentleman from New York raised. We did stand still largely during the decade of the

1970's. They built 758 ICBM's between 1972 and today, SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's, they built 38 ballistic submarines. We got a total of five Tritons in the water. They built 200 strategic long-range bombers. We built zero long-range bombers.

Now, if that is not standing still, I do not know what is. And your very argument that the MX missile is vulnerable today basically backs that point up. They have made it vulnerable during the 1970's when we stood still.

I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I appreciate the gentleman's answer. I think he responded to the gentleman's question.

I will be happy to yield to the gentleman for an additional question at the end of my time, if I have any left.

But I would like to just reiterate, in support of the answer of the gentleman from California to the gentleman's eloquent question, that these charts that I have available show the relative strength of the United States versus the Soviet Union, of the NATO allies versus the Warsaw Pact, and show that in such instances as intercontinental supersonic bombers the Soviets are ahead of us by some 4 to 1. In tactical combat aircraft they are ahead of us by 3 to 1.

Mr. AuCOIN. Does the gentleman know that the long-range bomber of the Soviet Union is a propeller driven bomber?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I will be happy to answer that and yield to the gentleman later on, although any bomber can drop a nuclear bomb.

These trend charts clearly show for the first time in an easy-to-read fashion that the Soviets currently hold a clear margin of superiority over the United States in 31 of 36 defense categories. These categories include significant Soviet advantages in nuclear stockpiles, ballistic missile submarines, deployed ICBM's and ICBM warheads.

These trend charts are disturbing, but I believe they are very relevant to the MX debate. They clearly reveal true Soviet intentions, not for defense, but for offensive warfare.

We all hope that Soviet intentions are good. We hope that the Soviets react to our good intentions. But can anyone remember when the Soviets have demonstrated good intentions? Ask our military mission in East Germany about Soviet good intentions.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON] has expired.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Ask our military mission in East Germany about Soviet good intentions. Ask the wife of the soldier who was killed a couple of days ago. Ask the families of the thousands of Afghans killed over the last 5 years.

Ask the families of the men, women, and children who died aboard KAL 007.

When we have not modernized our land-based ICBM's in over a decade, and by so doing have unilaterally weakened our strategic triad during the same period, the good intentions of the Soviets have resulted in at least 5 new and modernized land-based ICBM's alone—the SS-17's, SS-18's, SS-19's, and, most recently, the mobile SS-24's and SS-25's.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot escape the fact that we need to modernize our land-based strategic systems. We cannot escape or ignore the number of weapons the Soviets are deploying. Most importantly, we cannot escape the timing and circumstances of the situation we are in.

We must finally show some resolve and must move ahead today to modernize our land-based strategic forces. We cannot rely on the single warhead Midgetman scheduled to be deployed in the next decade as an excuse not to. As the history of this MX program has shown, and the Soviets clearly realize, the resolve of the United States to actually deploy or even significantly modernize a new land-based strategic system is nonexistent, unless we vote to fund these missiles.

Let us listen to our negotiators in Geneva who have sat face to face with the Soviets over the years. They know the Soviet intentions. Let us listen to them and let us vote to fund 21 more MX missiles.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN.]

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding some time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I have to confess I wonder how some of the folks in this House sleep at night if they really think this country is that weak and the Soviets are that strong. I get a little tired hearing how this country has let its defenses lag and the Soviets are 25 feet tall.

The fact is, the question has been asked—and all of you would answer the same way—would you trade our nuclear strength for the Soviets? Of course you would answer "no, we would not trade for the Soviets' nuclear strength. Of course we would not trade for the Soviet strength because our nuclear strength, with the triad that we have built in this country, is much, much stronger than the Soviets."

□ 1450

Now, let me say as many others have said, I do not trust the Soviets; we need to be vigilant. We need to invest in what is necessary to protect freedom. But, I ask you: If you live in a country that has invested \$1.3 trillion in 5 years in its defenses, are you

really able to make the case that we are not a strong country; that we are not able to compete with the Soviets militarily; that we must fund every single weapons system proposed by the generals and the admirals no matter how illogical that weapons system might be?

Let me ask about some realities. All the debate around here is about perception. We are spending real dollars, not perceived dollars. Incidentally, these are real dollars we do not have. But what we are debating is perception. If we do this, the Soviets perceive that; if we do this, we are perceived not to have that chip; if we do not do that, someone else perceives the other thing. The reality is this: For one thing, we have land-based missiles in my State, we have 300 of them underground; I drive by them every weekend; they are sunk there in the prairies; Minuteman III's with three modern Mark XII-A warheads on each one.

Now, in this case, in North Dakota's case, we have 300 of those missiles underground. You say that we ought to replace those Minuteman III's with something new called the MX. I suppose that if we are going to get to reality, we must ask what strength will that give us? What will it give us when we finish putting this MX missile in the old silo? What will it make the Soviets afraid of?

If the President is accurate in spending 2 years telling us those silos are vulnerable to Soviet attack, and he explained it to us only as the great communicator could, if he is accurate, what does it give us to put a big, new missile in a silo that is vulnerable? Isn't that buying a pig in a poke?

Maybe someone will answer that later, I doubt it.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I said to the gentleman I would be happy to yield to a question when I have completed my address.

Mr. COURTER. You keep posing questions, and I was wondering when you would give us a chance to respond.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I will be glad to give the gentleman an opportunity to answer those questions. In fact, his side has had plenty of time over the last 2 days to address those questions, and unfortunately I have not heard any answers and that is why I am asking them.

Mr. Chairman, what does it give us to put the MX missile in a Minuteman silo that the President says is vulnerable to attack? A greater component of accuracy with the MX missile? Well, maybe that is true. The MX missile does have a greater component of accuracy.

But for what purpose? Well, if the President was wrong, and the Minuteman silo is not vulnerable, ostensibly

you could put the MX missile in there and put at risk the Soviet silos. My guess is you would not want to aim at a Soviet silo that is empty, so you would probably want to put at risk a Soviet silo with a Soviet missile in it. That suggests to me that those who want the MX missile want the opportunity, at least the opportunity, to launch a first strike that this President has said this country will never launch.

Let me conclude by asking this question: There are so many stout-hearted men and women in this House who, whenever we have a public spending question, rush to the well of this House and say, "We cannot afford that. Let us evaluate every period, every comma, every word in that bill, because I think it is going to cost somebody some money and we have the biggest deficit in the history of humankind."

Where are those stout hearts when we talk about defense? I want to invest in the right things for defense, but where are those stout-hearted men and women when it comes to a proposition like the MX which spends money we do not have for something we do not need. Where are they? They want to spend the money and charge it, and I say that is more destabilizing, more detrimental, and riskier to this country than most anything else we can do. We will choke on red ink before we will suffer at the hands of the Soviets, because we are taking this country's economy into a position from which it cannot survive unless we begin understanding that what we spend on the floor of this House we must pay for. I ask you: Where do you get the \$14 billion to pay for a missile we do not need?

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER].

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, a number of questions were posed. I do not want to spend all my time answering them; let me just answer a couple of them right now.

First of all, I regrettably conclude, after having been a member of the Armed Services Committee for 6 years in this body, after having listened to the testimony in the full committee and the subcommittee, that indeed, when it comes to strategic arms and strategic capabilities, there is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union is superior to us, and that the trend line is going in the wrong direction; not the right direction. That they are increasing their capabilities as we are decreasing our capabilities relative to the Soviet Union, No. 1.

No. 2, the gentleman poses the question: "Where are we getting with the MX missile?" Very simply I am sure



the gentleman was here, had the gentleman had an open mind yesterday, he would have realized we would be achieving a credible deterrent which is something we do not now have.

I am sure the gentleman recognizes that what we want to have is parity with the Soviet Union when it comes to strategic capabilities. They can put our command and control centers, our leadership, our military targets at risk by their land-based leg of their triad. We do not have similar capabilities at all. It will be only the MX that will give us those capabilities which will give us a credible deterrent, and that is in fact what we are buying with the deployment of the MX missile.

The real question I have is what are we doing here today? Everybody knows what we are doing here today. We are doing today precisely what we did yesterday and the day before. The vote tomorrow is going to be the same vote as the vote yesterday; precisely the same.

This debate scenario, which was structured last year, gave simply four cracks at the apple; four cracks at the MX. Four times to kill the project. We attempted in the U.S. Senate, the other body, it failed. There was an attempt, obviously, yesterday, and it failed. We are going to have a redundant vote tomorrow.

As a matter of fact, why are we deferring the vote for tomorrow rather than having it today? With the time limitations on the debate, we could have the vote in the very early evening. We could have the vote before dinner. The reason we are going to defer the vote to tomorrow is to give the opposition additional time to work and twist and use whatever persuasive powers they can to turn around some votes, and everybody knows it.

This is precisely the same vote that we had yesterday; precisely the same vote that the Senate had. It is a redundant vote; it is another crack at the apple, and I think that this body can make better use of its time.

Finally, it has been argued that this vote today is an appropriation vote and therefore it is different than the authorization vote. That is not the case whatsoever. If this appropriations vote failed, the MX procurement would end. The Peacekeeper missile production is a 3-year production. Production is divided basically in three parts. The first phase is the purchasing of raw materials, parts, and manufacturing of small assembly items. There is literally hundreds and hundreds of small subcontractors and contractors that are involved. If this vote is a negative vote today, contrary to the vote yesterday, what will happen in the real world? It is not like a light switch, it is not like baking cookies where you can take them out and put them back in if the guests come later.

There are long lead items. There are contractors that will leave. As a matter of fact, all of the testimony before the House Armed Services Committee was the fact that if we do not go ahead and have two affirmative votes in the House of Representatives today, that will kill the production of the MX missile. The only way to bring it back would be at great expense.

It is possible; we did stop B-1, and then we brought it back. But we have to recall that when we did that, we spent \$1 billion more than we otherwise would have had to. The testimony that we have is if we vote no today, which is the identical vote of yesterday, we will have to come up with an additional \$1.3 billion to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. What is the \$1.3 billion going to buy? The old Humpty Dumpty.

We can vote yes today or tomorrow; the \$1.5 billion will permit the construction of the 21 missiles which will increase our deterrent capability which will give it credibility or, if we vote no, we can later on, when we find out that we need it, spend an additional \$1.3 billion for no missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER] has expired.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for the additional time.

We can spend \$1.3 billion which will give us no missile whatsoever, which will mean, if we feel that we need to have it in the future, have to come up with the \$1.5 billion again.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman.

□ 1500

Mr. KASICH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Would the gentleman just for a second enter into a discussion with me concerning the deployment of MX today, as Scowcroft calls for. Scowcroft Commission says deploy that MX today because that modernizes that leg of the triad today, but would the gentleman not agree that it is critical that when we are talking about MX we recognize that MX is just the link to a more stable system that Scowcroft and the supporters of MX want, and that is the deployment in that Midgetman, that low warhead missile that gives us greater stability.

I wonder if the gentleman would comment on that feature of deploying MX today to breathe modernization into that system today with the link to that Midgetman in the future.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman. He brings out a very important point.

The credibility of deterrent, and that is what we have today until we go

to some sort of defensive system, which I think the gentleman wants, as I do, the research and development, depends basically on a couple of things. It depends basically on the invulnerability of the entire defense capability, not to perceive vulnerability with regard to one silo or one leg of the triad, No. 1; and No. 2, a credible threat to the other side to make sure that they recognize that we could render unto them and make certainly unreasonable any type of attack against the United States.

It requires both those things. Therefore, it is essential that we give credibility to our deterrent today by deploying MX, and at the same time move, and this is extremely important, move toward a mobile system. The Soviet Union is moving toward a mobile system. We had the artist's rendering yesterday that it will be moving toward a mobile system this year, in 1985.

The gentleman points out a very good thing. It is important to shore up the credibility today by deploying MX, and then moving to a Midgetman, a single-warhead, mobile missile that will be invulnerable sometime as soon as we can in the early 1990's.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. PURSELL].

Mr. PURSELL. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, the debate on continued production of the MX missile has become so polarized that a central point has been lost. It is that intelligent, well-motivated people on both sides of the issue are seeking the same goal: Reduction of nuclear arms.

I am as sincerely dedicated to that goal as I know the hundreds of people are who have called and written on this issue.

I have decided to support continued, limited production of the MX Peacekeeper missile at the present time.

I believe this course provides the best chance to encourage serious arms reduction negotiations in Geneva and to reduce the overall threat of nuclear war. Those are the fundamental principles that have guided me in making this decision involving the defense of our Nation and the free world.

The most important, and often overlooked, word in this debate is "reduction." It is not enough to control arms, because all we are doing is controlling the growth and expansion of nuclear arsenals. It is not enough to freeze nuclear arms, because that preserves a status quo which is an unacceptable balance of terror.

We must think and negotiate beyond the narrow limits of control and freeze, and achieve at Geneva a mutually advantageous agreement to reduce nuclear arms.

My reading of history indicates that the Soviets will join us in that effort only if they clearly see it is the best alternative open to them. That is why I've supported the consensus of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission, which made the critical link between a careful, measured modernization of U.S. forces—including limited production of the MX—and arms reduction negotiations.

Congress endorsed this critical link last year by passing legislation which I supported, embracing the idea that if the Soviet Union returned to the negotiating table and thereafter sought real reductions in strategic nuclear arms, the United States would not have to build any more MX missiles. That the Soviets have come back to the table is a good sign. In the course of negotiations we shall now learn if they are willing to seek real reductions—similar to those we suggested in our build-down proposal offered in Geneva during the previous negotiations before the Soviets walked out.

We have been successful in generating a resumption of negotiations. Those talks are in their delicate, early stages, with no clear indication of how they will progress. I believe we should continue to follow the guidelines of the Scowcroft blueprint. I sincerely feel that abandoning the MX now would mean the Soviets would retain their current monopoly on MX type missiles—of which they have over 600. Sensing a lack of U.S. resolve in that we would permit such a destabilizing monopoly to exist, the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce the number of their large, accurate, multiple-warhead missiles, which is one of our primary goals in Geneva.

None of us can see the future. I believe the present course offers mankind's best hope for a real, meaningful step toward mutual arms reduction. However, I will not allow that hope for arms reduction to cloud a realistic view of the Soviets. I sincerely believe that the Soviets are shrewd negotiators who will not agree to mutual arms reductions if they think we will reduce ours unilaterally, without requiring an equitable response by them.

It must also be recognized that the Soviet negotiators returned to the bargaining table only when it became obvious that the United States—and the Western Alliance—would not continue to defer strategic modernization if the Soviet Union continued to refuse to respond in kind.

However, in supporting the MX, I do not agree with the belief that maintenance of an adequate defense should not have to take into account budget concerns. My voting record illustrates that I look at new weapons systems in a careful and independent manner. It should be pointed out that the cost of the entire MX program—over half of which has already been spent—is less

than the B-1B bomber program and is almost half that of the F-18 aircraft program, both of which I consistently have opposed.

Let me say, in closing, that as a former Sunday school teacher and military officer, I seek a world at peace. I do not believe that unilateral disarmament will maintain and secure a lasting peace. Bilateral arms reduction is possible at Geneva if both parties are serious.

I will continue to make critical evaluations and independent votes on America's defense needs. I thank the many citizens of the Second District of Michigan who have offered their guidance on both sides of this critical issue for our Nation and the World.

Mr. AVCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I think this has been a very meaningful debate. I think the last couple days has been excellent. So far today it has gone quite well, and it is my understanding we will finish it off tomorrow.

I might answer my dear friend from New Jersey that no matter what debate we do, it has got to be meaningful and healthy because all nations see us as a legislative body willing to take on the hard issues and to talk about them and finally make a decision. I just want to talk about a couple things here this afternoon that we really should touch upon.

I do not think either nation is trying to become superior to the other. So long as we have that deterrent factor, so long as one nation understands that indeed at the time of an attack the other has the capability of raining total destruction on the other nation, I think we have that today. If we want to be candid and honest with ourselves, we have that today.

The MX missile in my judgment, at least my opinion, to those I have talked to, those who have testified, and from what I have read, is not the weapons system that brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. SDI plays a far greater effective role in what brought the Soviet Union back to the table. Let us not kid ourselves. Let us put all the cards on the table. We are all grown people here. It is the SDI Program they are concerned about, not so much the technical aspect of it, but I think the economic aspect of it, because that one really is going to cost an awful lot of money.

We have to make some decisions here pretty soon. Are we willing to make that commitment as a nation, Republicans, Democrats, and we are going to separate those very shortly.

The thing that has bothered me from day one on this issue is the talk that is prevalent on both sides of the

aisle, Democrats and Republicans alike, that feel that they are going to get off very easy on this one, but they are not. Those who feel that, "Well, we are going to give the President 21 more so that he can continue those arms control talks in Geneva because we do not want to cut the legs from under our negotiators," and then in the 1986 budget, and as sure as we are here today it is going to happen, there is going to be a movement from both sides to say to the President, "You have had enough, Mr. President. We are giving you 42 missiles, and maybe 50 if you can find the money for the other 8."

I said yesterday here, and I hope that people do not take it personally, and I do not mean to be disrespectful, but in my judgment that is being intellectually dishonest because either you believe in a program or you do not believe in a program, and this is funny coming from me: To those who truly believe in the MX missile, I am not going to offer any advice, but if you believe in it, give it to the President. Give him 100. Give him the 223 that he is asking for, because that is what we are talking about, 223 missiles. Give it all, because 42 missiles will not do, will not give you the deterrent factor, at least from the point of view of the administration.

So are we wasting our time here today? Have we wasted our time during the last 2 days in this so-called meaningful debate? Are we going to say to the President in about 3 or 4 weeks, or right after the Easter recess, that "You have had enough of your missiles"? What is going to happen to the arms control talks in April should we take that position, perhaps later on in the summer, should we take that position?

Are we being honest with ourselves? That is the question we have to ask. I am not sure we are about ready to answer it. Maybe I am saying that today, and I stated it yesterday, to give those who are thinking in that direction some thought.

I oppose the system. I think it is a waste of money. The MX missile probably would give you more fire power as part of the triad. If you honestly believe that 1,000 warheads on 100 MX missiles is going to take the greatest brunt from the Soviet Union, you are mistaken, because what they are going to do is build more missiles, and they can build them. Let us not kid ourselves. They will build more missiles, and they can aim them right at the MX missiles.

The fact here is this: It is deterrent. Do we have a force? Do they recognize the fact that we can retaliate, and I think they do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES] has expired.



Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I am not here to take anybody on. I think we have all expressed our views. For 6 years I have been hearing the statements on this floor about a balanced budget. Let us talk about it, because this plays a hard part in the economy.

Cut the budget. That is all I keep hearing. When we cut out \$50 million for a particular program, there are those who say, "Well, you have to cut it out because you are adding to the deficit." Let me say this: that of those who have spoken from both sides of the aisle in the last couple days, I can honestly tell you they are not the same people talking about a balanced budget. I want to hear from those who come and take the floor of the House every single day and say no matter what we do we are going to tie that into the budget deficit so we can reduce the budget deficit.

Where have they been? Where are they today? Why are they not calling for budget reductions today, because this is part of the economy? Those are the questions that I think have to be answered and I think we have to be honest with ourselves.

□ 1510

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to take this opportunity to respond, I hope thoughtfully, to some of the things the very distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts has said.

No. 1, on this point of 223 missiles, this, I do not recall, has ever come into a debate before on missile systems, keeping track precisely of all of the surplus missiles that are built to use in the test program. I did a lot of research yesterday because of a thoughtful conversation two of us had on the House floor about this; 150 of the additional 123 missiles will be regularly fired as we have done in the Minuteman or the Titan Program. The Pershing II missile has been averaging 20 test firings a year to ensure the viability of this system, and it had its problems early on, which the peacekeeper MX missile never had. They hold 15 missiles back in reserve generally to take care of that area years from now where a missile system begins to deteriorate, age, or decay.

If we had talked about, say, the Minuteman Program, which had been firing right up until this year an average of seven missiles a year, then in that program of 1,000 missiles, after we had retired the obsolescent Minuteman I missiles, we still would have

averaged hundreds of missiles that we have used in that test program.

I have had a lot of constituents call after watching yesterday's debate on C-SPAN, and they were really confused about the number of missiles. I just wanted to clarify that.

Nobody is ever going to get anything by Aviation Week and Space Technology, let alone your excellent committee or the distinguished gentleman from New York, with two jeweler's eyepieces watching every line of the markup of every subcommittee and committee in the appropriations process, or to ever sneak, as the Soviets may have done it to EURATOM, test missiles into strategic combat-ready holes.

Now, at one point the gentleman made a statement, if I heard the line correctly—and please, I will get more time if I did not hear it correctly—he said that neither country, the Soviet nation or the great United States of America, wants to achieve military superiority. If you listen to what Arkady Shevchenko says or probably what we are going to hear from the Soviet diplomat who defected while jogging in India last week, I think a reasonable case can be made, without making your case to be any less intellectually solid or patriotic, that the Soviet Union, after the missile crisis, when some gentleman in the news media coined an historical phrase, "We were eyeball to eyeball, and they, the Soviets, blinked," made a decision among those old men in that Politburo that never again would they find themselves in a position of 5 to 1 superiority on the U.S. side.

I do not believe they drove to a 5-to-5 perfect standoff. Their Communist plan, their doctrine is to drive for and maintain overwhelming military superiority in biochemical warfare, overwhelming 4 to 1 superiority in conventional, which our bishops want us to address, and overwhelming strategic superiority in land, sea, and air. That is my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCOIN].

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, a great many things have been said about this missile, some of them probably accurate and some of them not accurate.

Just recently in the conversation there was this talk about 123 or 223 missiles. I heard the testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, and my impression is that they do not really expect to use all those additional 123 missiles just for testing. It was left a little bit up in the air about what they were going to be used for.

My own impression is that it will not be very long after we get 100 missiles in 100 sites that we are going to want to build another 100 missile silos.

In the discussion earlier, late last night, about other things that this money can be used for more profitably, discussion was had about conventional weapons, and I would like to refer to some of those facts that I was not able to give specifically within that time element that we had, and then talk about not only conventional weapons but strategic weapons. This program for the future costs about \$32.5 billion, and if we decided to scrap these missiles and go to conventional weapons, which I think is the wise thing to do because of our danger in Europe about having to go to a nuclear war because of not being able to win a conventional war there, we could build, for instance, the following:

Eight hundred and forty M-I Abrams battle tanks for \$2.3 billion; 716 M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles for \$1.2 billion; 144 Apache attack helicopters, \$1.4 billion 44 multiple-launch rocket systems with 72,000 rockets, \$0.6 billion; 180 F-16's, \$3.7 billion; 48 F-15's, \$2.2 billion; 2 DDG-51 guided missile destroyers for \$2.4 billion; 3 CG-47 Aegis cruisers for \$2.8 billion; 4 SSN-688 attack submarines, \$2.8 billion; Army and Marine munitions for 1 year, \$6.4 billion; and annual operations costs for 5 Army infantry divisions for \$3 billion; 8 squadrons of 24 F-15's for \$1 billion; and 6 carrier battle groups for \$2.6 billion; for a total of \$32.4 billion.

Now, after I said that, from similar statistics before the Congress earlier in the debate, some people said, "Well, we do not think you ought to go to conventional war. That would require a draft or something like that." They say they would not like to do that, but they would like to strengthen the so-called triad.

The interesting thing about the triad is that we really have a triad without the ICBM, because if a triad consists of land-based, air-based, and water-based missiles, we have the nuclear cruise missiles as well, and they can be fired from land, sea, or air as well. So we have a triad even without the ICBM, and it is a very good triad, as a matter of fact.

Now, if you wanted to go to nuclear weapons, here is what you could do. The money saved by canceling the MX, \$33 billion, could fund the following nuclear weapon systems:

Twenty Trident submarines at \$33 billion, or the following cruise missile triad: 2,000 ground-launched cruise missiles at \$12 billion; 4,000 submarine-launched cruise missiles at \$11.5 billion; and 3,400 air-launched cruise missiles for use on modified B-52's, \$8.4 billion. That is a total of \$31.9 billion.

Or you can have a combination of nuclear weapons systems adding up to \$33 billion, such as: 1,000 ground-launched cruise missiles, \$6 billion; 4,000 submarine-launched cruise missiles, \$11.5 billion; 1,700 air-launched cruise missiles for use on modified B-52's, \$4.2 billion; and 6 fully equipped Trident submarines, \$11.0 billion.

It is my opinion that this particular missile, the MX, should be canceled because it is not a good weapon. Weapons should be used to do harm to the enemy. This particular weapon has as much chance of doing harm to us as it does to the enemy. It is so very vulnerable that it incites an attack. It incites the possibility of the other side fearing that we have a first-strike possibility. It increases the chances of nuclear war. All of these things added together seem to me to make it a very, very faulted weapon.

We can look at the very people who are now testifying for it and see that a year or so ago, with the same silo, they said, "For heaven's sake, don't do it."

It is a waste of money. The money could be put into conventional weapons or could be put into other nuclear weapons, and that is a much worse thing for the enemy than is projected here with this particular MX missile.

I would like to conclude my remarks by saying that there is a reason for having this debate today. This is not an endless or useless debate we are having today because it is focusing on the next thing, and that is the appropriation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] has expired.

Mr. AUCCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, just to conclude my remarks, I say that this is not a useless debate because the debate yesterday was on authorizing these missiles. They have now been authorized. The money has been fenced, \$1.5 billion for the immediate purchase, and the next thing would be the appropriation. If we turn down the appropriation today, that would be just something that would be hanging over. It would be something we could respond to at the Geneva talks on the basis of what is best for us.

So it is just like any other authorization. The authorization would be there. We do not have to make the appropriation today, and I urge those of us who feel, as I do, that it is a bad missile, that we really ought to postpone the appropriation for this missile until such time as we really know that we need it.

□ 1520

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. ROGERS].

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, the United States has not deployed a new land based strategic missile for 15 years. During that same period of time the Russians have deployed four generations of new missiles and are developing two additional ones as we speak here today, an unprecedented and relentless nuclear buildup across the way.

While the Soviets have been moving ahead, America has been falling behind. I am convinced that in this country and even in this body there are those who had they been here during the continental congressional years would still be saying there is no need to upgrade the muskets we have. They are absolutely effective against whatever enemy may be out there, or if you want to upgrade those muskets you may intimidate or scare or destabilize the world situation and perhaps cause war. That is an archaic and I think moldy opinion of the world situation. We must upgrade. We must modernize. We must keep up with whatever is the threat against us at the moment; but there are those who say, "Oh, but to upgrade our system and to modernize our muskets would cause a destabilizing situation in the world."

How can you say that? How can you say the United States building 21 missiles would destabilize a world where during the past decade the Soviet Union has deployed over 800 Peacekeeper-type missiles.

They have 308 SS-18's, 360 SS-19's, 150 SS-17's, all of which are larger and more powerful than any of the U.S. missiles.

How can they say that us building 21 missiles of equivalent force would be destabilizing? Is it not destabilizing what the Russians have done over the last 15 years? They have deployed 800. We are talking about 21. Of the 1,400 or so Soviet ICBM's, 308 are SS-18's, the most powerful missile on Earth.

Let me make this point clear. The SS-18 is eight times as large, eight times as powerful, as the newest U.S. ICBM, the Minuteman III; yet I am convinced when we decided to make the MX, we made a mistake. We should have called the MX the Minuteman IV. That way we would not be destabilizing the world. That is what the Russians do. They have the SS-14, SS-16, SS-18, and so they say that is not a new missile, that is only an upgrade of an earlier missile.

I think we should call ours Minuteman VII, because that is how many rockets the Russians have deployed since we deployed the Minuteman III.

To build 21 missiles of less power than the Russians is destabilizing? Come on, give me a break.

The Soviets are testing two new ICBM's. Is that destabilizing? I do not hear an answer on the other side.

The multiple warhead Peacekeeper, SS-X-24, and the single warhead SS-X-25, the latest, are directly in violation of the SALT II Treaty. And we are destabilizing to build 21 MX missiles?

The current U.S. ICBM force which consists of 500 Minuteman III's, 450 Minuteman II's, and about 30 old Titan II's, all these missiles were developed before 1971, not too long after we flew to the Moon. That is how old these missiles are, many of them much older than that. The Titans, in fact, were used to launch some of the first satellites the United States ever launched back in the sixties. We are still depending on that old, unreliable rocket even today.

All these missiles were developed before 1971 and since that time the Russians have put out over 800 rockets of the size and power of the MX. Overall, the Soviet ICBM force is three to five times as powerful as the U.S. force. And for us to add 21 missiles to that is destabilizing?

I maintain that whether it be MX missiles or strategic missiles, whether you put trucks or howitzers or airplanes or whatever—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kentucky has expired.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield my colleague 2 additional minutes.

Mr. ROGERS. Whether you put trucks, missiles, planes, or what have you, you have got to modernize, you have got to have a system that is up to date to take advantage of whatever technology there may be.

Finally, let me say this. We have heard it is the MX missile, the building of this small quantity which will, in fact, destabilize the world's strategic balance. We all know that it is not weapons that destabilize the world balance. We have had weapons ever since we have been a nation that hopefully were among the world's best. We have never used any weapon we have had for a first strike or in an aggressive capacity. We have always been defensive. The Russians know that. The world knows that. The United States will never be the aggressor nation; so you cannot say that the United States is building a weapon for aggression or a destabilizing force, because it has never been in our history to do that; but when the Russians build these huge quantities of missiles, they are not called destabilizing, even though the history of the Soviet Union has been of aggression and taking over defenseless countries and those who could not defend themselves. Somehow when they build these huge quantities of destructive weapons, eight times more powerful than ours, they are not destabilizing the world strategic situation.



I really think we need to reexamine whether or not when you say these weapons, these 21 MX missiles are destabilizing the strategic situation in the world, I really think when you examine the numbers and the history of the Soviet Union, the numbers of missiles involved in their buildup, I really doubt you can make that point stick.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, yesterday some Members in this body felt compelled to give a vote for Max. Max Kampelman had returned from Geneva. We wanted to symbolically strengthen his hand by putting \$1.5 billion on the negotiating table that he could use as leverage with the Soviet Union.

Well, yesterday this House cast a vote for Max. We gave him \$1.5 billion. It is on the table now sitting across from his Soviet counterpart negotiator. He can now give it away or retain it and say that it will be converted into missiles, if in fact he determines or recommends to the Congress and to the President that the Soviet Union is not negotiating in good faith, the classic definition of a bargaining chip.

Tomorrow's vote is another vote, though. Tomorrow's vote is on whether or not we have to break our pattern of the past year of keeping this money in the form of a bargaining chip to be given away or retained by our negotiators and convert it into actual missiles.

Now, I ask the Members of this House if they believe it is a wise decision to switch their votes from last year to a new position that takes us into an era of production?

Yesterday's vote was a vote for Max. Yesterday's vote was a vote for Geneva.

Tomorrow's vote is a vote on the production of the MX.

Let us make the distinction between giving him a bargaining chip and actually beginning to produce additional nuclear MX missiles.

For the Members that want to in fact be perceived as consistent on this issue, the only logical choice tomorrow which they can make is to stay with the same position which they have had for the past year, which is to fence this money, give it to the negotiators, but tell them that with great personal reservations, they have done so because they do not want to see this missile go into production unnecessarily because of the economic and strategic questions which they have about it, but they will reserve their right to make that decision pending recommendations which return to this House, to the Senate and to the President, as to the sincerity and good faith of the Soviets in their negotiating positions over the next year in Geneva.

But they will reserve their right to make that decision.

□ 1530

That is the responsible position that Members of this House can take. It is in fact the only position that those that wish to give the President a pure bargaining chip can in fact take.

I would hope Members tomorrow would understand that they are not going to be perceived as being inconsistent if they stick with the position which this House has had for the past year but, rather, they will be perceived to be inconsistent if they move it from the bargaining chip of money to the bargaining chip of missiles which this President is requesting.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RUDD].

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Chairman, yesterday we voted 219 to 213 in support of the authorization for the MX Peacekeeper. I hope we will stand firm in our resolve and vote again for our national security and a strong negotiating position at the bargaining table in Geneva by adopting this resolution.

The MX is needed to enhance our bargaining position, but it should by no means be considered a bargaining chip—something to be given away. Any delay in ICBM modernization will threaten the already weakened ability of our land-based forces to perform their triad mission. We have not deployed a modernized land-based ICBM since the early 1970's. Our Titan II force is being retired, and extensive rehabilitation of Minuteman missiles is already required to keep them operational; 75 percent of U.S. strategic weapons are 15 years old or older. By contrast, 50 percent of the Soviet force is less than 5-years old.

Should we fail to approve funding for the MX—the only system immediately available to redress the imbalance in land-based forces which exists—we will be voting to unilaterally disarm through obsolescence.

We must have a modernized land-based force.

For more than 30 years, our triad of strategic defense forces has successfully maintained the peace, but only because it has been of sufficient strength and credibility to provide effective deterrence. Each leg of the triad has contributed unique capabilities not found in the other two components. The land-based force offers prompt response, alert rates near 100 percent, high accuracy, flexible target coverage, responsive command and control, greater throw weight, and sufficient penetration to counter Soviet ABM defenses.

Sea-based forces remain virtually invulnerable to attack, and possess important accuracy and throw weight characteristics. Air-based, bomber

forces can be recalled; they can penetrate Soviet air defenses.

Together, the three legs of the triad severely diminish the effectiveness of any Soviet attack. Together, they serve as a credible deterrent.

However, the credibility of the triad is significantly reduced if one of its components is allowed to become obsolete. Obsolescence would sacrifice strategic force diversity, flexibility, and military capability, and would reduce overall force survivability by allowing the Soviets to concentrate on the remaining two components.

If we vote down this resolution—if we demonstrate a lack of resolve in ensuring our national security—what incentive do the Soviets have to bargain in good faith in Geneva?

While we demonstrated unilateral restraint by not deploying new ICBM's since the early 1970's, the Soviets built and built and built.

They deployed at least three new types of systems involving over 800 missiles and are already testing at least two more new types, including the SS-X-24, which should achieve initial operational capability in 1985, and the SS-X-25, which is believed to be designed for mobile deployment.

The Soviets haven't given up any systems prior to coming to the bargaining table, and you can bet they won't give anything up at the bargaining table unless they can get something in return.

Let's not determine the outcome of those talks here in this Chamber. Let's give our negotiators the tools they need to negotiate from a position of strength and achieve mutual deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. OLIN].

Mr. OLIN. I am sure that as many people have said today, that just about all has been said here that needs to be said many, many times over. It is very unlikely that anybody who voted yesterday would change his mind or her mind. But there is always the hope that a few will, and that it is well worth speaking out in that maybe unlikely eventuality.

I have followed this debate as everybody has for the last few days, and last year, and the year before. I have listened to all of the intricate arguments about the negotiating strategies and how that ties in with the MX.

It just seems to me that that may be a little bit beside the point and that the real point here is that the MX, if you look at it over a period of time, just has not represented a good value and we all know that it is vulnerable. It never has acquired a basing mode that was worth a darn.

It is a first-strike weapon. We now find that to make use of it at all we

are going to have to harden the silos. I had a general come down and see me 1 week ago and we talked about hardening the silos. And he said we do not even know how to do it. It cannot possibly be done until 1990, because the technology is so foreign to us. I could hardly believe that, but that is what he said.

We heard the Scowcroft Commission report 2 years ago. They basically said the device is a transitional device. It is not the kind of thing that will really do us much good. He did say to build a few, but he said go ahead all out with the Midgetman because that is a mobile missile that will be equally powerful, equally accurate, and it will do us so much good, and I bought that argument. I think it made sense.

The President said to me face to face, 2 years ago, I said:

How many of these missiles will you need to build, Mr. President?

Then he said:

Very few, just don't worry about it. Will you ever build 100?

Never. We will bargain them away.

Well, he did not bargain them away and this year he says we have to have the missile because of negotiations. I do not think that anybody really, really believes that the MX has much to do with the negotiations in Geneva. It is just not conceivable that a missile of this nature that has had a 14-year history as spotty as the MX has had that barely got even a majority in the Congress year by year could possibly in any sense be the reason that the Russians came to the bargaining table.

It is inconceivable that a swing of a couple of votes is going to make the difference in the negotiations. It does not make sense.

Ambassador Kampelman said earlier this week to the question of what will happen if we do not get the MX, and he said: "Well, my negotiations might take a little longer."

For \$30 billion, \$12 billion for the MX's and \$18 billion to harden the silos, and we would not get that done until 1990 when we will have the Midgetman, negotiating a little bit longer in Geneva is a very good, very good thing, and a good bargain as compared to \$30 billion of money that we do not have.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MILLER], a very able member of the Defense Subcommittee.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, it is hard to know what additional points or arguments can be made in this debate. In recent weeks, as the other body and now we in the House consider these resolutions, every conceivable aspect of this difficult problem has been examined—not only on the floor of our two Chambers, but also in the media, and in free and open debate among our citizens. But it is

not only in recent weeks that we have examined this issue. We in this country have been agonizing about the MX for years.

The President appointed the Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission 2 years ago to examine this issue and make recommendations. We all know what those recommendations were. The Commission recommended deploying 100 MX missiles in silos, proceeding with the development of a small, single-warhead missile, and pursuing arms control negotiations. That, of course, did not put a stop to our national debate. As Nicholas Brady, former Senator from New Jersey and a member of the Scowcroft Commission, wrote in a recent Wall Street Journal article, the Commission's recommendation was 2 years and several million words ago.

We have all been deluged with articles and commentary on both sides of this issue. We have heard from our constituents—again, on both sides of this issue. This is all as it should be. That is our free and democratic process in action. We all love and want to preserve this free and open society. And that is exactly the point I want to make now.

Unfortunately, not all the people of the world have the privilege of living in free societies. Was there a great public debate in the Soviet Union, involving citizens and free media, questioning the production and deployment of over 600 SS-18's and SS-19's, both of which carry multiple warheads? Are Soviet citizens writing to the bosses in the Kremlin to express their views, and are these views being taken into consideration in determining Soviet policy? Of course not. It is a tragedy, but the fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union is ruled by a few powerful men, who oppress their own people, and seek to dominate other nations. That is what we are up against in dealing with the other superpower. And that is what makes our decisions so difficult.

We ourselves are peace-loving, and would much rather see our national resources used for purposes other than military might. But we are up against a regime which, every since seizing power, has been willing to deny the domestic needs in its society in order to increase Soviet military might.

There is no one on the floor of this Chamber who is not concerned about the dangers of nuclear weapons. We are all committed to seeing our Nation pursue policies that will prevent nuclear war and will preserve our Nation's freedom and security. The point at which we differ is in determining whether the addition of 21 MX missiles will contribute to the goals we are all seeking to achieve.

I think it is important to bear in mind that we possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent to aggression and

attack. We have not used our nuclear capability to intimidate or blackmail any other nation, even when we had a monopoly on this awesome power. Anyone who thinks that the United States possesses nuclear weapons in order to take an aggressive stance toward other nations does not know this country very well.

The Soviet military buildup, to which I referred earlier, has gone far beyond reasonable defensive needs, and has destabilized the strategic relations between our two nations. The MX is designed to restore the balance between the two superpowers, to give us once again a credible deterrent capability. Deterrence is all we seek, and deterrence helps keep the peace. We will not be promoting the deterrence-based peace if we do not upgrade our strategic missile capability in the face of the Soviet advances in this area.

But another aspect of this equation—and it is a complex equation—is that we are earnestly seeking a mutual, balanced, and verifiable arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. And that is why our negotiators are at Geneva. It makes absolutely no sense for us to negotiate with ourselves, and deny ourselves an improved strategic missile capability, without getting anything from the Soviets in return. As I pointed out earlier, if we unilaterally disarm ourselves, there will not be free editorials, and peace marches, and sit-ins in the Kremlin, urging the Soviet bosses to follow the American lead. Anyone in the U.S.S.R. who tries that gets a one-way ticket to Siberia.

So if we want to see a genuine two-sided arms reduction agreement, we simply must not cut the ground out from under our negotiators in Geneva. They have to bargain from a position of strength if they are to obtain reciprocal reductions with the Soviet Union.

Like everyone else, I wish we did not have to spend the \$1.5 billion on the MX. I doubt there is a Member of this Chamber who is more reluctant to spend the taxpayers' dollars than I. But we can't fall into the trap of thinking that when we spend money for national defense, we are not getting anything for this expenditure. We are buying peace and freedom, which is to the benefit of each and every American. I ask my colleagues: isn't peace worth \$1.5 billion? Isn't the freedom of our Nation worth \$1.5 billion? Isn't improving the chances for a genuine arms reduction agreement worth \$1.5 billion?

I have weighed the issues carefully in my own mind, and have come to the conclusion that the additional 21 MX missiles will, in fact, contribute to these goals, which we all seek. I urge my colleagues to vote to release the funds for the MX.



□ 1540

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. I thank the chairman. I have two quick points which need to be stressed.

First of all, if the 21 missiles are a bargaining chip, or a leverage for Geneva, there is no reason why that bargaining chip has to be played now. A tough bargainer, and we should always be tough bargainers with the Soviets, a tough bargainer would play his bargaining chip at the right moment, not at the beginning of the game. He would put it in his back pocket and he would play it when the right time comes. Why give it away now? Why not hold it and see how the Russians in fact do behave in Geneva and then play it if that is appropriate?

Second, the vote on Thursday is not necessarily slamming the door on those 21 missiles. If that vote goes against the MX on Thursday they can always be brought back later. However, if you vote yes on Thursday you will never de-deploy them.

Finally, on costs, it is not \$1.5 billion as some people say, we are talking about a \$5.3 billion program because of the hardening cost that will greatly increase the amount of money that must be spent. So we are not just talking about \$1.5 billion.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say initially that I think the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. ROGERS] made some very good points in the debate when he talks about the deployment of SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's. Now we are off the drawing board on the SS-24's and SS-25's. I am told that we could see deployment of the mobile 24 or 25 any day. When we take a look at the fact that the Soviets have deployed over 600 MX-type missiles and what we are looking at in this country essentially is 42, an additional 21, but 42, when you see that the Soviets have deployed over 600 of these same MX-type missiles, and the fact that people say "Why do we need this MX when you put it in a vulnerable silo?" We have already heard the arguments about the synergy. We understand the fact that the MX, if we read the Scowcroft Commission report, understand that the MX really is an effort to modernize our forces today, that to not have this leg as a viable leg of our triad is in itself destabilizing; that the Scowcroft Commission says that for the Soviets to be able to place at risk a variety of our targets were thus being unable to place at risk the same number of targets in their nation, that that situation is destabilizing and that the movement to put MX and to deploy

MX today and to modernize that leg of the triad is in fact stabilizing.

Now, let us move on from that because we must all understand that MX is linked to Midgetman. Midgetman, viewed as an effort to try to remove the importance of each individual platform, to try to have more platforms, thus making each target less important. What we hope is by moving toward Midgetman that we encourage the Soviet Union away from the heavy missile dependency and move them in the direction of more mobility, less emphasis on every single platform.

Let it be further pointed out that Scowcroft also said that we do need to continue to modernize our submarine force by moving toward the D-5, by building smaller subs which again is more stabilizing, because then we de-emphasize the importance of each platform and at the same time they advocate the continued development of cruises and B-1.

All this is designed to maintain, to have a modern triad, a deterrent that has kept the peace in the nuclear age.

We also heard from Mr. Kampelman who said: "Please let me go to Geneva," and in fact he was here the day before he went to Geneva and sat down to eyeball the Russians and said:

Let me have it, don't undercut my negotiating position, don't hurt my negotiating posture, don't send me to Geneva and pull the rug from under me. Let me use this as a bargaining chip.

To me I think it will be great if it is a good bargaining chip, if we could not deploy the MX and get the Soviets to reduce some of their 18's and their 19's and their 17's. That would be fantastic but that argument about the bargaining chip goes by the wayside because if we won in Geneva we would still recognize the need to renew America's insurance policy and breathe modernization into this land-based system.

Let me though for a second dwell on one issue that we have been hearing about and I will tell you people on this side of the aisle, and the conservatives are concerned about this is any issue in America, and that is the issue of deficit and of cost.

I want to make it clear that Mr. COURTER of New Jersey and I have been working on programs designed to figure out how we can stop momentum that can be built into a defense budget, how we can start to look at deficit reduction and have defense play a part; what we can do to look at what the President requests and what we think we can do without in terms of modernization or what we can delay or what system may not be needed or try to figure out what we can do to try to slow the deficits and slow the growth in the defense budget.

Now, you must recognize that when you look at strategic programs in the defense budget, when you talk—and

this is very interesting—when you talk about the B-1 bomber, the maintenance and general operations of the B-52, the Trident, the MX, the anti-satellite program, the Midgetman development, the Pershing II, the cruise missile, the Stealth bomber technology, the shuttle cost, the development in command control and communications, add it all up, Trident, MX, B-1 ASAT's, CQ, add them all together and what does it come out to? You add it all together and it comes out to about 10 percent of the entire military budget.

Now, mind you, let me tell you no one is more concerned about nickels and dimes, not even talking billion but nickels and dimes and hammers and wrenches and screws; I have my own legislation to control spare parts, excess property, waste in the military, and not producing systems that do not work. We are going to hear more about all of that. But when you are looking at deficit reduction and a way to stop the momentum that is built into this defense budget you cannot pick on a section of this and claim this is a panacea when it represents about 10 percent of the total defense budget. If you really want to take a look at where the big costs lie, you have got to look at conventional systems, you have to look at munitions, where we are going to go from \$12 to \$20 billion in 3 years or support a command and control which goes from \$23 to \$46 billion, or RDT&E, research, development and testing which increased 100 percent over the last 4 years. There is a variety of areas where we are talking big areas, big possibilities of categories that affect momentums built into the defense budget. We all know that what you authorize today you end up spending tomorrow.

So while we must look at it all, let us not mislead the American public into letting them think that the strategic programs comprise a vast majority of the DOD budget, because it just simply is not true, ladies and gentlemen. In fact it is about 10 percent and at times less.

Now former President John F. Kennedy invested about 50 percent of the budget resources that he had at his command in defense. This President is investing about 26 percent of the resources at his command in defense. I think it is very interesting to look, that when you have a President like John F. Kennedy recognizing the threat that existed to the world and investing 50 percent of the resources and this President recognizing the threat, and the bipartisan commitment, stressing it to the tune of about 26 percent of the budget, I think we must recognize that while defense must play a vital role in deficit reduction, let us not build a house of cards, let us not build a straw man and let us

not mislead the American public into understanding the difficulty of our task and recognizing how each component ought to play, or what its role is in deficit reduction.

Strategic programs, 10 percent of the overall military budget; let us not just look at strategic, let us look at everything and let us recognize the need for modernization.

□ 1550

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I was listening patiently to the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio a minute ago, who made a statement that we should not mislead the American people on cost of our military defense, nor should we mislead the American people on the cost of any parts of that defense.

As a member of the Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee on Military Construction, I suggest that some of the representations made to Members of Congress in the last 48 hours on the cost of the MX missile do not square on figures that I have heard over the last several years.

So I called a man whom I judge to be the Nation's most influential and credible authority on the question of defense, and that is the Senator from Ohio, Mr. GLENN. And Mr. GLENN came over to the House side today and talked with several of us about the MX program. And here is what he had to say:

He said first of all that the cost of the MX program is far beyond the figures that are being represented by the White House. Instead of the \$74 million per missile, the real cost is about \$254 million. The White House has not told Members of Congress that the cost of hardening the silos and modernizing the silos to receive the new missile will run up to \$180 million per silo.

So instead of a \$10 billion program, we have about a \$40 billion program.

Another thing that the Senator from Ohio, Mr. GLENN, stated was that the MX missile actually weakens our Nation rather than strengthening our Nation because it uses up funds unnecessarily to deploy a vulnerable weapon which then crowds out the use of those funds for a Minuteman missile—a mobile and defendable missile and which protects America far better than the MX we authorized yesterday.

I was very impressed with the remarks of Senator GLENN not only because he is a patriotic American but because he is recognized, not only in our great nation, but around the world as an authority on missile defense.

So if there is any one of us who wants to ask a question where he may be in doubt, I say call upon the person who knows the most about the program, and that is Senator JOHN GLENN.

I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. COLEMAN] who was in the meeting with Senator GLENN and I when we discussed these matters.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman whether it is his understanding that each MX missile is to cost approximately \$74 million. That is just for the missile alone; is that your understanding?

Mr. ALEXANDER. That is for the missile itself; that is for the bullet.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. OK.

From the meeting this morning, from what I understood, that the Air Force had testified to in the other body, was that the hardening of the silos if in fact we are going to place these in hardened silos, would cost in excess of—let us use the number of \$180 million per silo.

Is that your understanding?

Mr. ALEXANDER. That is what the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GLENN] said.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. So the total cost for one MX missile comes to approximately \$254 million?

Mr. ALEXANDER. \$254 million per missile, deployed in each silo.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. In other words, your statement was, I believe, that we will receive only four missiles for every \$1 billion that is spent?

Mr. ALEXANDER. That is correct. For each \$1 billion the American people receive four MX missiles deployed in the silo.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. I would only like to comment, if the gentleman from Arkansas will continue to yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for 1 additional minute.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. The comment, I think, that was the most telling of all of that discussion that came from Democrats who were at that meeting, was that there was a total unified statement, the Democrats wanted a stronger defense, not one that was weaker, and the feeling at least voiced by this particular Member, was that the MX was effectually creating us a problem in terms of building and buying the modernization we need for all of the other systems; the D-5, Tridents, the Midgetman and all the rest.

Is that what you gained from that meeting?

Mr. ALEXANDER. My understanding is that because of this enormous cost of the MX missile of the overall effect will be to weaken our defenses. We simply will not be able to buy the kind of defenses that we need in the future to make our Nation strong and to defend us against the Soviet threat.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. Does the gentleman understand that nobody has yet told us how we are going to even pay for the \$1.5 billion much less than the four per billion?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair will announce that there remains 9 minutes on each side.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, in response to the question of the gentleman from Texas, I raised that question yesterday with the President when he called me; the President asked me about my position on the program and I told him that I have supported his defense modernization program and in fact Members of Congress from the South have a tradition of voting for defense programs, and I have carried out that tradition.

I told him that his modernization program, I believe, was defective because there was no plan for payment, and that I felt that the cost of this program which created these enormous deficits was linked to the depression in the farm community, and the closing down of our textile mills, and so on.

We engaged in a conversation of that type, and it went on to the question of the deficit. I said, "By the way, Mr. President, I have heard your speeches about a balanced budget." I said, "There has been a question that I've wanted to ask you now for the 4 years that you have been President." I said, "If you want a balanced budget, Mr. President, why don't you submit one?"

And there was this silence.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Mr. ALEXANDER. There was a silence on the other end of the line; the President obviously had not thought that he would be questioned about his plans for a balanced budget, and he said, "You know, that is the most hypocritical question I've ever heard."

I said, "Mr. President, that is the most reasonable question that could be asked at a time when you are pursuing a credit card defense policy which, by your own definition and figures will leave the American people with an \$185 billion deficit when you leave Washington and return to California."

Defense policy is inextricably linked to deficits and those deficits are



having a devastating impact upon our economy, especially in the farm sector, in the textile mills that are closing down, and in the shoe factories that cannot compete with these foreign products that are subsidized because of the economic policy of the President.

Mr. AuCOIN. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. The gentleman has made an excellent contribution in pointing out how much higher the cost if we have to add hardness to the cost of the system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has made an excellent contribution by indicating how much more expensive this program will be if we have to factor in the cost of hardness in order to try to make these silos that we are placing these missiles in, if we approve them less vulnerable to attack.

Mr. question to the gentleman is, however, how much more expensive would it be, beyond the numbers he has already developed, if the Soviets merely increase their accuracy? Does not it follow that the cost of additional hardness, on top of what he has described, will run the cost up even further.

Would the gentleman agree?

□ 1600

Mr. ALEXANDER. I will agree with the gentleman. And, further, the MX is a vulnerable weapon, no matter how much concrete we put on top of its deployment.

Mr. AuCOIN. Would the gentleman yield for just one further question?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. That gets to another point that I should like to make, and that is that there is nothing in the administration's arms control proposal in Geneva that would in any way limit Soviet accuracy.

Mr. ALEXANDER. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is any doubt that a defeat for MX today would be cause for partying in the Soviet Union tomorrow and that the vodka glasses would not be lifted high, toasting the victors.

Yes, it would have an impact on the talks at Geneva. I do not think anybody doubts that. But what about

beyond Geneva? What is the impact of a defeat for MX on the other parts of the Soviet foreign policy-defense policy continuum? What is the impact of a defeat for MX on Afghanistan, on the war that they back in Southeast Asia, on the war in Ethiopia, on the war in Angola, on the wars in Central America?

The Soviets view defense and foreign policy, the strategic, the tactical, the wars of national liberation together as a continuum.

The defeat of MX in Washington is a victory for the Soviets in Moscow. And I do not think anyone would argue that the Soviets are not unalterably opposed to our production and deployment of MX.

Will this defeat, if it came to pass, embolden the Soviets to put more painful pressure on the people of Afghanistan? Would it embolden them to be more forceful in the conduct of their war in Southeast Asia and their wars in Africa and their wars in Latin America? Would it encourage greater repression against Soviet Jews and nationalities inside the U.S.S.R.? Of course it would. Why? Because they view competition with the West as a whole, where the different parts come together and because one victory is cause for persevering in, and seeking, others.

On behalf of those seeking freedom from Soviet domination, we should deny the Soviets a victory on the MX.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to add some additional comments of mine.

Mr. Chairman, I want to give my children a world in which the threat of nuclear war is reduced. I do not want them to face the threat we face today.

Last year Congress voted to go slow on MX procurement. I supported the Aspin compromise to put a moratorium on these 21 MX's for 6 months. This gave the Soviets time to reconsider their ultimatum when they walked out of last year's arms control talks. The Soviets had time to realize that we would not be bullied into submission.

Since then, Mr. Reagan has been re-elected, showing the Soviets that they must deal with him if they want to deal, and the Soviets have decided to return to the table to talk. Now it's up to us to show them that we're very serious about mutually beneficial arms control.

Some of my colleagues are making it sound as if the entire question today is "the MX or not the MX." Fortunately for us, that is not the choice. What we need to remember is that we are voting to release funding for only 21 MX missiles, less than one quarter of the total requested for deployment. House Members in doubt will have another vote later in the year on the remainder of the administration's MX

missile request, well after the talks in Geneva are underway.

I say to my colleagues: now that we and the Soviets have shown that we want to talk, let's give them something to talk about rather than deciding now to do away with one of our most advanced weapons systems. Many Americans find the technicalities of arms control, such as throw weight, hard-target accuracy, MIRV's, MARV's, and so forth, difficult to swallow. However, we are all familiar with labor negotiations and there is a parallel here. How many union members would support a labor negotiator who, as bargaining talks were getting organized, would promise management that labor would not use one of its more powerful weapons, the right to strike, without similar concessions from management? That may be a reasonable concession later on, after tough, head-to-head negotiations, but certainly not up front.

Mr. Chairman, I support releasing money for 21 MX missiles now, so that both the administration and the Soviets know that we will go ahead, slowly, with putting this weapon into our arsenal, until we can come to a mutually acceptable agreement to reduce them and the over 600 Soviet MX missiles already deployed. Let's go ahead with MX until we can mutually agree to reduce.

I agree with the Scowcroft Commission: The MX is not the best weapon we might have. It's more vulnerable than we would like, but integrated into our total strategic forces, it's the best we have under difficult circumstances. Let's make sure, as we give the President the MX, which he has stated is crucial to his success at Geneva, that we can look with some hope for success at Geneva. The President has promised to do his best in Geneva. We hope for a similar strong commitment from the Soviets in return for our commitment to support mutually acceptable and significant arms reductions. The Soviets should know that we would prefer not to have to build the MX. Their actions at Geneva could make that preference possible.

I say to Mr. Reagan: Mr. President, we will increase these 21 MX's, but we implore you to be creative, be innovative, keep an open mind, and most importantly, press the Soviets for a workable arms reduction package, and bring it back as soon as possible.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds. I think we should give a victory to the American taxpayers by saving this \$1.5 billion, and I think the \$300 billion that we are spending on defense should be enough message to the Soviets that we are sincere in our national defense.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MINETA].

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, yesterday we voted to authorize the release of \$1.5 billion for 21 MX missiles. Tomorrow we will vote on the resolution to appropriate the \$1.5 billion. We now have a few hours to consider more carefully some of the arguments that have been presented in the course of this debate, and to stress again why opposing the missile is so important.

Mr. Chairman, it seems that all the Members of this House are now supporters of arms control, and that is a development that I applaud. But I think that we are fooling ourselves if we think that this \$1.5 billion and these 21 missiles will buy arms control. The President suggests that the expansion of our arsenal of nuclear weapons will cause the Soviets to agree to reduce their arsenal. But common sense and history suggest that the expansion of our arsenal will cause the Soviets to expand their arsenals in turn. And then, Mr. Chairman, we're off the arms race.

Building these missiles is a gamble, if what we are really trying to do is gain an arms control agreement. It is a gamble where losing will have very high costs. If we buy the 100 MX missiles, and get no arms control, we will be \$41 billion poorer, \$41 billion that we need to provide for our security at home if we don't get security from Geneva. Buying the MX to get arms control is a gamble at very long odds with the American taxpayers' money.

If we build 100 MX missiles and get no arms control, then, Mr. Chairman, we will be stuck with the missiles. Even many of the supporters of the MX missile have said that they do not like it as a weapon, that they do not like it as an investment, that it is a dangerous and destabilizing anachronism. But they have to face up to the fact that if this body votes to appropriate the \$1.5 billion, and the next \$3 billion, and so on, America will probably have 100 dangerous missiles and no arms control.

There is one more point I would like to make. In news reports this morning we have read that some Members on this side of the aisle, some Members who reportedly voted against the MX resolution, were secretly happy that the MX was funded. Supposedly, these Members were concerned that by voting this missile system down, we Democrats would appear soft on defense. Let me tell those Members, if in fact that is their belief, that they are wrong, and that they are worried about the Democrats' image at the expense of our country.

We were not, and are not, soft on defense. We were being, and will be tomorrow, hard-nosed about spending money on bad defense. And it is ironic that those who now criticize us for refusing to waste money on this bad investment are the same people who criticize Democrats for being big

spenders and trying to solve problems only by throwing money at them.

If we want to avoid looking soft on defense, voting for this missile system is not the answer. What we may save in image, we lose in serving the national security interests of the American people. And if we think we can fool the American people, or the Soviets, by buying this pig in a poke of a missile system, guess again. In a Washington Post-ABC national poll published this morning it is reported that the public is opposed to our Government building the MX. The only ones we are fooling are ourselves, and the only ones who benefit are those who receive the \$1.5 billion dollars of taxpayers money. America will be less rich, less strong and less safe.

Arms control cannot be bought by spending \$1.5 billion for 21 more missiles. The idea that anyone will be safer if we spend this money for 21 more MX missiles defies all reason. I urge my colleagues to vote against the resolution and against releasing the \$1.5 billion.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time to make a few remarks in response to my friends on the other side of the aisle, and a few on this side of the aisle, who have raised a question, I think a common question, throughout this debate, and that is: How can a missile help arms control? And I think that was the question that was manifested in the statements earlier today of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELUMS]. I think surely the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AUCOIN], my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY], and several others. I think the best answer to that question was given in the letter that was written on the danger of thermonuclear war by Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, and he said this:

It seems very important to me to strive for the abolition of powerful silo-based missiles at the talks on nuclear disarmament. While the United States is the leader in this field, there is very little chance of its easily relinquishing that lead. If it is necessary to spend a few billion dollars on MX missiles to alter this situation, then perhaps this is what the West must do.

And that is what Max Kampelman was talking about at the White House the other day. And my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], said,

Well, I think, with all due respect to this great physicist and this peace prize winner, that he is wrong, because we cannot expect the Soviets to give up their SS-18 missiles, their 308 SS-18 missiles.

That may be so. That is very clearly the centerpiece of their strategic force. But we cannot expect reductions in that force, maybe not complete abo-

lition, but we cannot expect reductions in that force unless we have something that is very similar in throw weight and accuracy. That is the message that Andrei Sakharov gave.

Let me just say that my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. MINETA], said the MX is a gamble. If it is a gamble, it is a gamble that is recommended by America's arms negotiator Max Kampelman. And he said, in response perhaps to some in the negotiations—and I will be happy to yield to my friend in a minute—that he should not be, as a Democrat, leading this charge for the Reagan administration with regard to arms control, and he said—and I think my friend from Massachusetts talked about his statement—"I go on the philosophy that we only have one President at a time," and he thinks that if we give up this MX unilaterally the Soviets will, in his estimation, delay the arms talks. That should be of great interest to everybody who, No. 1, trusts Mr. Kampelman and, No. 2, is interested for these arms talks to go ahead.

Let me just conclude by saying that Paul Nitze said that if we unilaterally cut MX, then the Soviets will escalate their demands.

Now, if these gentlemen have bad judgment, maybe we should fire them from their jobs upon which the very existence of our country depends. If they do not have bad judgment and we do trust them, then we should trust them in this case and we should let American foreign policy this one time go from these shores with a single voice.

I very much agree with my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], who says it is Congress' right to fight with the President. Absolutely. But not every time.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

□ 1610

Mr. FRANK. I had yielded to the gentleman in similar circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say, I want to quote what the gentleman said about Mr. Sakharov. Of course I want to see missiles reduced. He asked me a specific question. He quoted Mr. Sakharov, I happen to have the transcript here: "It seems very important to me, Mr. Sakharov, to strive for the abolition of missiles."

My point to the gentleman from California is that no one is striving in these negotiations, as a realistic goal, for their abolition, and therefore, I disagree.

Mr. HUNTER. I take back my time to say but they are striving for the reduction of those missiles, and if the MX will allow us to get reductions, that is just as good as abolition.



I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FRANK. Let me also say, again, if he meant reduction, I would have talked reduction. I was only talking abolition.

Second, I have to profoundly disagree with the notion that we should speak on foreign policy with one voice.

Mr. HUNTER. I take back my time to say that I agree that we should not always speak with one voice, but in this particular instance, when we have our negotiators telling us we need it, we should go with the President, we should not fight with the President. We should let foreign policy go from the shores with one voice under these circumstances.

Mr. FRANK. I would just ask the gentleman to yield so I can express my disappointment that he would not show me the consideration and yield that I showed to him earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would announce that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McDADE] has 2 minutes remaining. The gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO] has 2½ minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO].

Mr. ADDABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCOIN].

Mr. AuCOIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I was impressed with the statement of the gentleman from California, who quoted the words of Andrei Sakharov, because I am sure the gentleman understands and remembers that Sakharov also had supported ratification of SALT II, and if his position today is that we should follow the advice of Mr. Sakharov, then I am sure the gentleman also supports the SALT II agreement, although I have not heard him say that he supports SALT II. But I hope that he does.

Mr. Chairman, we really return to the point that is that this is a vulnerable missile. It is vulnerable; some of my colleagues, the gentleman from California and the gentleman from New Jersey, said that this great concept of synergism in the triad is somehow going to protect the MX missile in vulnerable, fixed-base silos.

The only trouble with that is that the Scowcroft report said that synergism is going to die. To whatever extent that it exists today, it is going to ultimately die. The reason the report said that was that with the accuracy of Soviet SLBM's, ultimately that synergistic relationship that provides theoretical protection for these silos will no longer be there.

If you want to keep this synergistic relationship that you say provides us protection, then only the freeze will do so. Not the START proposal that our negotiators are putting on the table in Geneva; not the build-down

proposal or any combination thereof, but only a freeze on a mutual basis, a verifiable basis on production, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons. If you do not do that, then we are left with what we have said from the beginning. We have a vulnerable weapon; a vulnerable weapon does not deter; a vulnerable weapon invites the other side to hit us in our glass jaw.

Our glass jaw in our missile fleet is the MX missile. One point five billion dollars this year in a totally indefensible weapons system. At a time when we are seeing the vetos of farm credit legislation, that is a dismal bargain militarily and for the taxpayer. I hope my colleagues will vote against the MX.

Mr. McDADE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I want to address myself first to the notion that some people have floated on the floor that this is somehow a vastly different vote from the vote that the House expressed itself on the other day. That it is an appropriation vote that does not matter.

That could not be more erroneous. If you want to undo the good that was done in the vote yesterday, then you have got to continue and appropriate the money that will deliver the production of those 21 missiles. To fail to do so will be to negate, in an even more meaningful way, our efforts to be supportive of our negotiators in Geneva.

Let me say that it was the Scowcroft Commission that recommended that we do this. Now, the gentleman who just preceded me somehow seems to think that the Commission is not in favor of the MX, or at least he purports to put that proposition to the House, and that is not the case.

The case is that they recommended that we produce a limited number of MX's and then move to a Midgetman missile in order to preserve the triad concept which has maintained peace in the world. They do this by recommending that in the 1990's we transition to the Midgetman and we are spending R&D money for that missile now. It is a missile in concept, on a drawing board, in a computer. It is not extant anywhere.

There is only one missile that we have for the rest of this decade that we can negotiate with the Soviets about, and that is the missile, that not just the Scowcroft Commission but, indeed, four Presidents of the United States, dating back to 1972, recommended that we build because the Soviets had deployed over 600 hard target capable weapons and disturbed the equality and the symmetry that existed between our ICBM's.

They have the capacity today to destroy our ICBM's. It is essential that tomorrow we carry the vote for the ap-

propriation and continue on with our negotiations for peace in Geneva.

● Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my strong opposition to funding the MX missile.

First, let's look at the military merits of this missile. The MX does exactly the opposite of what a weapons system is supposed to do—deter. In order to deter a nuclear strike, a weapon has got to be able to survive that strike and fire back. The MX, in its fixed silos, cannot do this.

That would be a serious problem for any missile. But it is especially serious for the MX, because this missile has 10 warheads on it. These warheads make the MX more attractive than any other missile as the target of a first strike. The Soviets or any other adversary would know they could get "10 for 1"—they could knock out 10 of our missiles with only 1 of theirs. So from the standpoint of deterrence, MX is not only useless, it is counterproductive, it is actually an invitation to attack.

Second, let's look at the budgetary merits. We are in a year of terrible budget sacrifices. As the debates now going on in the House and Senate Budget Committees make clear, we are going to have to make terribly painful choices of domestic programs to cut this year. I cannot justify voting for billions for a weapons system that would add nothing to our security, while the same sums would fully fund many of the programs that will be frozen or cut.

Finally, let's look at the argument that we need MX for the arms talks in Geneva. You would think from those who make such arguments that MX is the only weapon in our arsenal, the only thing the Soviets would want us to give up. In fact, the Soviets are looking at accurate new warheads on our Minuteman III missiles; first-strike missiles coming from our Trident II nuclear subs; Pershing II missiles in Europe with pinpoint accuracy and 8-minute flight time to Moscow; a new generation of cruise missiles; and Stealth, radar-evading bombers—not to mention the prospect of an elaborate space-based missile defense in the future.

Mr. Chairman, for these three reasons I believe the MX is dangerous and unnecessary and I urge my colleagues to vote against funds for it. Thank you.●

● Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, the current debate over whether or not to release the \$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1985 funds for the production of a second increment of 21 MX missiles focuses primarily on three considerations: The military merit of the MX, its political value at the Geneva arms negotiations, and the overall cost of the program. Under each consider-

ation, the MX fails to be a worthwhile investment.

There is no military rationale for pushing ahead with the production of the MX. The missile was originally designed to replace the Minuteman ICBM's because these missiles were assessed to be vulnerable in fixed silos. If the silos are responsible for the vulnerability of our land-based forces, then placing the MX in the same silos clearly does nothing to address the vulnerability issue. The threat of the MX to Soviet ICBM silos, moreover, is highly destabilizing; we should not be taking a posture that encourages rash decisions on the part of the Soviets such as a launch-on-warning policy (Subject to computer error and heightening the risk of accidental war) or a decision in a time of crisis to launch a preemptive first strike.

The administration has all but abandoned efforts to justify the MX on military grounds. Instead, it has focused on the political rationale, claiming that it is needed for negotiating purposes. Both President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger have stated explicitly that the MX is not a bargaining chip, but credit the MX with bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table. This argument makes no sense. Congress approved production of the first 21 missiles in November 1983; 1 month later the Soviets walked out of the Geneva START talks. Congress suspended production of the MX in October 1984; 3 months later the Soviets agreed to resume negotiations. If a correlation is to be drawn between MX production and progress on arms control, the conclusion must be that suspending MX production improves the atmosphere for talks.

Finally, and perhaps most important in these difficult economic times, the MX is a prohibitively expensive weapon. The General Accounting Office has estimated that the total program will cost \$29 billion. A decision to continue production of the MX will be a blatant misuse of our financial resources, especially in light of its negligible military worth and considering the sacrifices we are asking our constituents to make in other areas.

Mr. Chairman, the MX is not fiscally, militarily or politically sound, and I believe strongly that it does not and cannot serve the interests of this country. In subcommittees, committees and on the floor, Members of this body have voted nearly one thousand times on the continuation of this program. I sincerely hope my colleagues will join me in making this vote the last. ●

● Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, I was very disappointed in the results of the vote on the MX missile yesterday. I can only hope that my colleagues will reconsider before the final vote is taken.

There were good, sound reasons why the Appropriations Committee voted

down the MX. The bottom line is that the American people are being asked to pay for a weapons system that is expected to cost more than \$40 billion when it is finally completed. \$40 billion! And what will we be getting for our \$40 billion that can justify that kind of expenditure? A good defense? Hardly. The MX will be almost as vulnerable as the Minuteman it is supposed to upgrade. An effective retaliatory weapon? Not likely. CBO estimates less than 5 percent of MX missiles would survive a Soviet attack after 1996. A deterrent force? Absolutely not. A system with no other conceivable use than as a first strike weapon can hardly be said to deter. With all our other defense options, with all the more credible weapons systems that have been proposed, with all our pressing operations, maintenance and personnel needs, the MX missile is, to say the least, not a wise use of our defense dollars.

How did our priorities get that twisted? How can we even consider spending that kind of money on a useless weapons system and at the same time ask the American people to absorb large cuts in domestic spending for programs which serve millions but which the President deems wasteful? Let's look at what we could buy for the \$4.7 billion—\$1.5 billion now and \$3.2 billion later—we are being asked to approve for the MX this year.

For starters, we could restore all \$2.3 billion the President wants to cut from student financial assistance. Then we could take the remaining \$2.4 billion and use it to make up for some of the after-inflation cut of 22 percent sustained by the elementary and secondary education budget between 1980 and 1984. A wise investment in the future of our Nation.

Or we could devote some of those funds to health care. We could restore the \$1.1 billion the President wants to cut from Medicaid next year. We could also restore some of the funds we cut when we consolidated 20 health programs into four block grants back in fiscal year 1982. The President is proposing less money for these block grants now than we spent in 1981, in spite of the way health costs have risen. For just what we're being asked to approve this year alone on the MX we could fund almost all of the National Institutes of Health.

Or we could take just half of the MX funds and pay for the entire school lunch program. For an extra \$1.4 billion we could pay for the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Nutrition Program as well. The possibilities are endless but the point is clear: That money can be put to far, far better use.

In spite of the high stakes, this is not a poker game. It is a debate over a nuclear weapon system that can kill millions of people and give destruction

a new meaning. Every time we seem to be getting ready to put the brakes on this panic-like military buildup, we allow the President to redefine the basic argument. Every time the President tells us we will be harming the arms control negotiations if we do not approve the latest superweapon someone has dreamed up we back away from our duty. From what I've seen of this administration, its only real interest in arms control is in using negotiations as a bargaining chip. We get all those new superweapons. The strategy seems to work every time, and all the while the deficit continues to grow and future generations are being saddled with the cost of our mistakes.

It is ludicrous to build the MX in the name of peace, for it is no peacekeeper. It is ludicrous for Congress to keep falling into the same trap. Let's return to common sense and vote down further funding for the MX. ●

● Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, the argument that the MX missile is needed as a bargaining chip has been made for the past 6 years by two Presidents, and the argument has been unsound every time. President Carter said that he needed the MX to bargain with the Senate for ratification of the SALT II treaty. President Reagan asserts that he needs it to bargain with the Russians at the arms control negotiations in Geneva. It didn't work in 1979 and it won't work in 1985.

I've been voting against funding research, development, and production of MX for 6 years under a President of my own party and a President of the opposite party because I have been and am convinced that the MX missile is a waste of money and a grave threat to world peace and consequently to our national security. In addition, our Treasury cannot afford this kind of waste.

Ideally, Congress should have resolved the MX question long ago. We should have acted responsibly and directly to kill the MX. We haven't and we again face the cliffhanger outcome upon which the decision to spend \$26-\$40 billion ultimately depends. An affirmative vote by even the smallest of margins will set us on a course to waste even more money on this system—and the decision will have been made not on the merits of the MX as a weapons system but on its extremely questionable status as a symbol of national resolve.

The MX, like any weapons system, should be evaluated by assessing its contribution to national security. Under this evaluation, the MX is clearly deficient. The MX is extremely vulnerable to a Soviet first strike because the Minuteman silos are vulnerable. Hardening of the silos will not be completed until after deployment of the MX missiles and after the expenditure of \$18 billion for hardening



alone. Furthermore, by the time the hardening is completed, the Soviets will have made significant improvements in accuracy overcoming the benefits of hardening, and we will have the Trident D-5 and the Midgetman ready for our arsenal.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that less than 10 percent of our MX missiles would survive a Soviet attack in 1990, and less than 5 percent after 1996 because of improvements in Soviet missile accuracy.

Consequently, the MX will be of little use in responding to a Soviet first-strike attack. Rather, its only potential effective use would be in a first-strike by the United States, a use which this administration has fore-sworn for the MX. Consequently, either the system is of no use or we intend to increase our first-strike capability.

The Soviets can either conclude that we would spend up to \$40 billion on a useless system or that we intend the MX to be a first-strike weapon. Assuming at least a minimum of rationality on the part of the Soviets, this Congress must expect that the Soviets will conclude the latter—that, we intend the MX to be effective, and it is effective only as a first-strike offensive weapon. Their reaction will be to increase their arms development, and move to a "launch-on warning" response system, further accelerating the arms race.

So much for the argument that the MX will encourage the arms control negotiations and that we need an affirmative House vote to provide an incentive for the Soviets to bargain seriously at Geneva. Furthermore, although the President has proclaimed the MX a symbol of national resolve, I cannot see how the U.S. Congress approving a colossal waste of money can demonstrate national resolve to the Soviet Union.

In addition, the record of arms control negotiations actually suggests that MX production is not a bargaining chip. The Soviets withdrew from the talks when Congress had approved MX funding, and agreed to resume last year when we suspended MX funding for new missiles. Paul Nitze, President Reagan's arms control advisor, has said that the MX was not key to the arms talks and that they would not make a dramatic difference in the outcome of the negotiations.

Today's vote will be to authorize the release of an additional \$1.5 billion for 21 new missiles. Today's vote may be the last chance to stop the MX and the ultimate expenditure of \$40 billion.

It is the last chance because the issues are clear, the defects of the system obvious, the cost to our Treasury unaffordable.

This House should end the madness, reduce the risk of nuclear war, and stop the waste of taxpayer money.

We already have the capacity to destroy every major Soviet military and civilian target. Further funding of the MX system will divert resources not only from necessary and effective defense programs, but from critically needed nonmilitary uses. The MX will continue to be part of the deficit crisis facing the United States. We are borrowing from the future to fund the MX missile, and the effect is a significant erosion of true national security which this administration fails to appreciate.●

The CHAIRMAN. All time agreed upon for today has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. SHARP] having assumed the chair, Mr. KILDEE, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 181) to approve the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances made available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles, had come to no resolution thereon.

#### PERMISSION FOR MEMBER TO REVISE REMARKS IN DEBATE ON HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 181

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent, which I did not previously ask, that I be allowed to revise, slightly, my remarks that the Parliamentarian called to my attention that I had inadvertently transgressed a rule by referring, in less than glowing terms, to the other body. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to conform my remarks to the rules.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

□ 1620

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the subject of the special order speech today by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HOWARD].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the subject of the special order speech today by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

#### ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY: BUILDING A BETTER FUTURE WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY

(Mr. O'BRIEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. O'BRIEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues an editorial that appeared in the March 18, 1985, edition of the Chicago Tribune.

The subject of this article is a laboratory of international renown: Argonne National Laboratory. Long recognized as a leader in the field of nuclear energy, its discoveries and the technologies it has pioneered will have far-reaching effects and lasting significance for generations to come. One major initiative developed at Argonne is the integral fast reactor. This new generation of nuclear reactors will breed its own fuel and provide a steady, inexpensive, and nearly inexhaustible supply of energy needed to meet the growing energy demands of American industry. Yet deep cuts in the Department of Energy's fiscal 1986 budget threaten the viability of the integral fast reactor research program and a spate of other equally important projects at Argonne.

For 40 years, a cadre of hardworking researchers has charted undiscovered areas in the field of science in search of ways to improve the quality of life. Innovation, ingenuity, creativity, and a commitment of excellence to quality research have made Argonne a leading scientific force. The technologies it has developed have benefited American industries in fundamental, significant ways. Argonne is a friend, helping hand, and handmaiden—all in one—to industry. With the innovative ideas and solutions it provides, industry will continue to remain strong, competitive, and prosperous. Visionary ideas like the integral fast reactor could help this country not only to regain its technological superiority but also to build a better future. But ideas, like anything else, need nurturing and support. Snuff out the fires of invention and creativity with cuts like those proposed in the Energy Department's

budget, and the bright future is gone. Tend the fires by fueling them with needed research funds and they will burn brightly forever.

I commend this editorial to my colleagues and include it in the RECORD:

[From the Chicago Tribune, Mar. 18, 1985]

#### A BETTER NUCLEAR REACTOR

The nuclear reactor was developed by Argonne National Laboratory and its antecedents beginning with the Manhattan Project during World War II, and reactors that run ships and commercial power plants the world over trace their origins to the southwest suburban facility. Unfortunately, research into more advanced reactors at Argonne is now threatened by reductions in the U.S. Department of Energy's 1986 budget.

Argonne's subsidies from DOE may be reduced by \$45 million next year, the bulk of that intended for research into advanced reactors. The cuts would result in the advanced reactors. The cuts would result in the cancellation of a program to develop what physicists there believe is a major breakthrough that has worldwide implications—a device called the integral fast reactor.

Other federal budget cuts will also gut research programs in such areas as development of improved batteries that could ultimately power cars, application of improved technology to the ailing U.S. steel and agricultural machine industries and removal of pollutants to permit high sulfur Midwest coal to be burned by utilities without raining acid on the East.

But the most important program in jeopardy is the integral reactor.

Over the years, Argonne's physicists naively believed that the scientific merit of the proposed machine would prove itself. What happened was that a succession of politically motivated decisions in Washington has kept the integral reactor on the back burner while the government undertook such boondoggles as the now canceled \$4 billion Clinch River Breeder Reactor and discovered, as a result of the Three Mile Island accident, major safety problems with its existing commercial program.

The Three Mile Island machine is an evolutionary successor to the world standard light water-cooled reactor that Argonne originally developed. Cooling it requires a complex system of pipes and pumps. But the proposed integral reactor would be fueled by metal rods and cooled by a pool of liquid sodium that Argonne physicists claim would not be vulnerable to the same quality control and human failing that have plagued existing reactors.

Each integral reactor could also breed its own fuel, eliminating the need to transport hazardous radioactive fuel and waste across the country.

Argonne officials fear that cancellation of the integral reactor project will cost the United States its lead in nuclear technology and force it to buy that technology back from France or Japan at some future time.

There appear to be sufficient funds in the more than \$370 million that the Energy Department plans to spend on nuclear research next year to continue work on the integral reactor project. Congress should order the department to do so.

#### THE KILLING FIELDS—AGAIN?

(Mr. DORNAN of California asked and was given permission to address

the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, an article in the Sunday Washington Post came to my attention that I believe has a powerful message for all of us in the Congress—both Chambers. It's about a 10-year anniversary that is coming up next month, a tragic gut-tugging double anniversary that we refer to as the fall of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on April 17, 1975, and then, 13 days later on April 30 the fall of Saigon. "Fall" is such a weak word to describe the mind numbing events that followed the Communist conquest of Southeast Asia.

This Post guest column is by a gentleman I have never met. His name is David M. Fitzgerald. He is the president of a Washington, DC, political and public affairs consulting firm. In April 1975 he was a young Naval assistant attaché assigned to our Embassy in Phnom Penh. His article is entitled "The Killing Fields—Again?" It sears my memory and I hope my colleagues remembrance of that disgraceful month in American history.

Mr. Fitzgerald refers in his column to one of the many inspiring sayings carved in stone around our Archives Building. There are two statues on the north side of the Archives, the side that our Presidents drive in front of or walk in front of on the day they are inaugurated as the President of our country. Beneath the statue of wisdom to the left of the north door are the words "The Past Is Prologue," and beneath the statue on the right is the admonition "Study the Past." Will we ever, ever heed those words.

Dave Fitzgerald hits Congress hard, and I think every Member of this great deliberative body and every Member of the other body, particularly those who served here in April of 1975 must read his warning "The Killing Fields—Again?" I submit it for our RECORD. History will judge us and its only guide will be the truth.

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1985]

#### THE KILLING FIELDS—AGAIN?

(By David M. Fitzgerald)

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the communist takeover in Cambodia, one may wonder when fighting and hardship will cease in that torn land. Mired in death and destruction, the Cambodian people have experienced a scenario of horror. The film, "The Killing Fields," grimly reminds us of the final days before their sentence to genocide. What is missing, however, is the role in bringing catastrophe that was played by actors whose interest in posturing overwhelmed Cambodia's cries for survival. At twenty-nine and a Navy Lieutenant, I was on the ground during that final year. I watched as Congress crafted a future that many today would rather forget.

A Seal commando first and intelligence officer second, I was one of the military attachés selected for duty in Phnom Penh.

Our charter was clear—get the Cambodians through the offensive.

It was *deja vu* Vietnam. Phnom Penh, the capital city, was surrounded by thousands of communist gunners. By day and night, thundering rockets tore open the city. Bloodshed and hunger were everywhere.

Attachés did not suffer politicians easily. Congress was divided over whether Cambodia's problems were to be settled by conquest or negotiation. We wondered if anyone bothered reading combat intelligence reports written by the people who were there.

Days began at 5 a.m. It was then that I read press clips sent by my mother. Breakfast took conditioning: warm bread from the local market baked with insects, coffee and half-ripened fruit. Attachés lived off the local economy. Our thoughts drifted often to Congress at mealtime. It cut our cost-of-living allowance in its rift with the White House.

"The Killing Fields" reminded me of how tough it was for correspondents living at the Hotel Phnom. It was Phnom Penh's Plaza Hotel. Sitting by the pool at night they sipped cool drinks served by short-coated Cambodians. Constantly on the prowl, they dogged us by day to get a combat lead or a picture surreptitiously taken of an American officer poring over a map with a Cambodian. They would label it unlawful advising.

As deputy naval attaché, I observed the Cambodian performance in moving supplies from Saigon up the Mekong. It was nightmarish. Blasted by sophisticated rockets and mortars, raked by machine-gun fire, the small Cambodian navy paid the price. Expert communist gunners became better. The river became littered with battered hulks, rusting sentinels in a riverine graveyard.

As communist lethality on the rivers increased, so did the din of congressional outrage. The lawmakers tightened down on personnel numbers. In time only 200 Americans could lawfully remain in the country. It made our task more difficult. President Ford pleaded for humanitarian and military assistance. Congress needed to act quickly to save lives. We wondered if the politicians could see the Cambodians through this hurricane gate of bloodshed.

In Washington, Sens. Kennedy, Tunney, and McGovern painted a dismal picture of Americans' economic stagnation. They urged that not another dime be spent on Southeast Asia. Only Cambodians could solve Cambodia's problems, they said. Emergency supplemental assistance was not the answer.

News came that Bella Abzug and some congressional friends would visit—to menace, we feared—the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh. Their actual reactions were sober and respectful after viewing first-hand the Cambodians' bone-chilling agony.

The war's reality was especially strong and discordant for young staffers. Some had dodged the draft only to find themselves, strangely, on a Navy combat vessel viewing remnants of war along the Mekong.

In Washington, debate continued. President Ford warned that without near-term relief the Cambodians would not make it to the rainy season; negotiations would have no chance. America's heartland was reaching out with sympathy and concern to the Khmer people. Would not Congress respond?

Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "I guarantee 100 to 0 that without aid Cam-



bodia won't survive." In the Senate, Edward Kennedy bellowed, "Once again we are hearing the same old arguments and the same old controversies over the same old war. The lingering and bloody conflict there deserves more of our diplomacy and not more of our ammunition."

Intelligence reports told that the Khmer Rouge were on the march to Phnom Penh. Communist field commanders crushed skulls with hammers and chained men to machine guns in the face of government fire.

On March 13, 1975, the Senate Democratic Caucus voted 38-5 against further military aid to Cambodia, 34-6 against any supplemental aid in FY '75. This followed a similarly lopsided vote by House Democrats on March 12. The House resolution stated "the sense of the Democratic caucus to firmly oppose" any further aid. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott said he too favored a new government in Cambodia that could negotiate a truce and safe treatment of refugees.

The news came to us like a fusillade of Soviet rockets. We in the embassy felt scorched, deserted, betrayed. Saddened military attaches wept with their Cambodian comrades. The final indignity was having to explain away congressional justification for sending Phnom Penh down the drain into hell.

Ten years have passed since this devastation of humanity. Untold innocents still suffer. Graphically, the movie shows communist justice monstrous and murderous.

What about the Congress that played a leading part? Many still try to cleanse their souls by speaking out on hunger and refugee problems worldwide. Many villains, however, remain behind cold marble walls waiting for the next "Killing Fields."

Engraved in stone at the face of the National Archives building less than a mile from the Capitol is the message, "What Is Past Is Prologue." Will these words be ignored as Congress sets the stage again, this time for millions of people in Central America?

Clearly, the country, including the Reagan administration, contemplating lessons for dealing with Central America now, has lessons to sift from Cambodia's ashes. Close attention must be paid to the guardians of liberal politics and to their kind of commitment against communism. A Latin policy crafted after the Cambodian tragedy may result in another cinema that none of us may wish to see.

(The writer is president of a political and public affairs consulting firm.)

#### PROBLEMS WITH HEALTH SERVICES

(Mr. BEDELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Speaker, I could not believe my eyes when I read a letter earlier this week that my colleague from Iowa, [Mr. TAUKE], received from Dr. Carolyn Davis regarding the revised wage indexes under Medicare. Dr. Davis states that the revised wage indexes would not be proposed until October 1, 1985. Considering congressional efforts this past year, this is a terribly unfair turn of events.

Let me first briefly summarize the events and important dates that led up to this most recent correspondence.

January 1984: It had already become very obvious that the new prospective payment system had calculated a large inequity in its rural wage indexes, which penalized our Nation's small cost efficient hospitals.

July 18, 1984: Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 which directed Secretary Heckler to conduct a study for the purpose of developing more equitable hospital area wage index to be reported to Congress within 30 days of the bill's enactment.

August 1984: After missing the first deadline, Secretary made a second commitment that the report would be complete by December 31, 1984.

February 28, 1985: Secretary Heckler stated in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee that the wage index report would be issued to Congress within 2 weeks.

Well it is now March 27, with no report in sight, and even if the report was issued tomorrow, Dr. Davis tells us that revised wage indexes would not be released until October 1, 1985. I have written six letters to the Department of Health and Human Services during the past year describing the plight of my rural hospitals and enclosing copies of hospital balance sheets showing tremendous losses, despite staff layoffs and other budget cutting efforts. Yet, no action. In this most recent response from HHS, Dr. Davis continues to fail to recognize two very important facts:

Without immediate relief, some of our Nation's most cost-efficient hospitals will close their doors, leaving access to care for rural elderly an even larger problem to deal with than it had been.

The retroactivity of the revised wage indexes will cause hardship for those hospitals who have been receiving larger than justified payments, and further delay will only compound their financial hardship.

I believe the Congress has been more than patient with HHS, considering three unmet deadlines. But we cannot tolerate this bureaucratic runaround any longer. Congressional intent was obvious on this matter and I urge Dr. Davis to relent and release the revised wage changes as soon as possible.

Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from Nebraska [Mrs. SMITH] has clearly pointed out the details of the problem we face with Health and Human Services. The problem is pure and simple. It is that since it costs less money to provide equal health services in rural hospitals, Health and Human Services has said that the differential is going to be even much greater than the difference in cost.

What that Department would do is close up our rural hospitals, which they admit are less expensive, and

have our people have to be transported to urban hospitals which they admit are more expensive. Time after time after time they have told us they would change those regulations, and now they tell us it is going to be next October.

I ask my colleagues what kind of an administration we have, Mr. Speaker. Everybody acknowledges that the family farm is the most efficient method of producing agricultural products. This administration would eliminate that family farm. Everybody is well aware of the fact that small business is more efficient than big business. This administration would eliminate the Small Business Administration.

Everybody recognizes, including the administration, that small hospitals are less costly than big hospitals. This administration would eliminate small hospitals.

I believe it is time to put some sense back into what we do.

#### PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I want to say a few words about someone we lost over the weekend—someone who appeared on many occasions before the HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriation Subcommittee that I chair. Of course, I am talking about Patricia Harris.

When one dwells on the tributes that have been said in remembering Patricia Harris—one picks up a constant reference to her toughness on the one hand, and her uncompromising efforts to help those less fortunate Americans on the other. People talk about Pat Harris and her firsts—and there were many.

The first black woman to become a law school dean—the first black woman ambassador—the first black woman Cabinet member—the first black to ever serve as a delegate to the United Nations—but the most impressive first is the one in which she led a sit-in by a group of Howard University students protesting a segregated lunch counter in Washington in 1943.

As she herself described it, that was before the days of media events—before the days of constant TV coverage—in other words you were out there by yourself. That was a real first.

And that was precisely the kind of woman Pat Harris was. When she appeared before this subcommittee she was unyielding in her principles and always extremely effective in her efforts to help those who most needed help in this country.

We didn't always see eye to eye on every issue—we had our differences—but no matter which side of an issue one was on—you always knew you were dealing with someone who had the best interests of all Americans in mind. She was a tough lady—there was no doubt about that—but maybe that explains why she was as principled and dedicated as anyone I came to know in my 34 years in Congress.

Meg Greenfield in a piece in Sunday's Washington Post probably said it best—"Pat Harris finally had to yield in her fight with cancer, but she never gave up."

I am pleased to include Meg Greenfield's tribute in the RECORD.

#### PAT HARRIS: A FRIENDSHIP

(By Meg Greenfield)

When I met Pat Harris 16 years ago, she was recovering from the shock of her one-month career as dean of the Howard University Law School. I went to her house on Holly Street for an interview and we talked the afternoon away in her big sunny living room. The subject was the circumstances that had led to her abrupt departure from Howard amid great controversy. So it was a working encounter. But we also became friends that day.

Over the years, this friendship grew and it was, as you would expect, put severely to the test as she took on a series of public jobs and I found myself in the role of editorial commentator on them. There were some awful ruckuses during her time at HUD, and when The Post endorsed her opponent, Marion Barry, in the last mayoralty election, communication all but ceased for a year. It resumed, though, as did the friendship. Over the years, there were many more amicable times than strained ones.

I admired Pat for precisely those qualities that landed her in the soup so often and which made her, I thought, hopeless as a practicing politician, but awesome as a public figure. She was a woman of stunning, electric intelligence, obdurate, uncompromising, given to searching out the moral principal in an issue and, once deciding she had found it, refusing, come what may, to budge. Pat was always independent and (therefore) often desolately alone.

There was a poignancy in this. I felt it that first day we met as I came to understand both the temptation she had resisted in the Howard Law School conflict and the terrific assault she was taking as a result. The students were protesting violently. Their grievances had been essentially against law school teachers and officials who were there before this brand new dean took over. She in fact sympathized with some of the student's complaints.

But they had, among other things, seized the law school building and held it for a time, and she would not, absolutely not—that's spelled N-O-T—negotiate under that sort of unlawful pressure. She was outraged that law students of all people should do such things. Just about everybody on all sides of the dispute—the protestors and the old regime that was being protested against—wanted her to give in on this point. She wouldn't. She was ousted. She was right.

The Pat Harris I saw that day in the living room on Holly Street was the woman I was to see many times again over the years, as she recurrently got in this kind of

predicament: strong, sad, angry, beat-up and yet undefeated all at once. There was a vulnerability, a gentleness mixed with her ferocity.

I sensed and saw this complexity of feelings as Pat fought her way through the bafflements of the past decade and a half, taking stands on racial issues and questions of public policy that often alienated people she wanted as friends and that regularly defied the easy, fashionable, self-protective wisdom of the moment.

But I never saw this particular spirit so strong or moving as it was when I visited her in the hospital and spoke with her on the phone in the last painful months of her life. She had lost Bill and now she was losing her battle to cancer. Pat was, as usual, forthright, strong, outspoken about her illness and her prospects, concerned about how she should die, determined to do the thing right. And all the while, in her physical agony and what must have been deep fear, she maintained the familiar sharp interest in what was going on in the public world around her. Pat Harris finally had to yield. But she never gave up.

#### NICARAGUA—THE STOLEN REVOLUTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, all of us have been very much concerned about the situation in Nicaragua. On March 12 of this year, I wrote President Reagan a letter in which I asked the President to consider following the recommendation of Congress embodied in Public Law 98-215, December 9, 1983, that the President should seek a prompt reconvening of the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States for the purpose of reevaluating the compliance by the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, and then upon that inquiry being made, it be determined whether or not the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua has kept that promise that it made to the Organization of American States in 1979, and if it is found that it has not kept the promise it made, that the President do what he could to induce the Organization of American States to see to it that Nicaragua did live up to the commitments that it made to the Organization of American States as a condition of which the Organization of American States recognized that group, the group that became the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua.

I discussed my letter with the Secretary of State, and Mr. McFarlane, our National Security Adviser, Mr. Freidersdorf, the congressional liaison for the White House, and other White House personnel. The President was kind enough to call me up personally and thank me for my suggestions and said that they were being very warmly considered.

So this morning I was very happy to have an invitation from Hon. J. Wil-

liam Middendorf II, our permanent Ambassador to the Organization of American States, to join him at a formal meeting of the Organization of American States Council in their beautiful building here in Washington.

At that meeting, Ambassador Middendorf made a magnificent presentation, from our point of view, of the situation in Nicaragua and how the Sandinista group that they now call the government of that country, had flagrantly violated the solemn commitment they made to the Organization of American States when the Organization of American States recognized them in 1979. He was kind enough to refer in his address to the fact that I had written this letter to which I referred to the President, and that I was sitting with them this morning while he was making that presentation.

Mr. Speaker, I simply wanted to put into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this magnificent statement by our permanent representative to the OAS because he very strongly insisted that it was the responsibility of the Organization of American States to make the Sandinistas live up to their promise that they would, if recognized and supported by the OAS, would conduct a government that was a free, democratic government which respected human rights, private property, and expression of political opinion as the people wish to express it, and the other accoutrements of a free and democratic state. He very strongly indicated that the OAS should discharge that responsibility and intimated that if it did not do so, he reserved the right to introduce a resolution on behalf of the United States calling upon the OAS to discharge its responsibility to see to it that that promise made to the OAS by the Sandinista group shall be kept by what is now the Sandinista government.

I thought this address by our able and permanent Ambassador was worthy of the consideration of the Congress and I include the address of Hon. J. William Middendorf II, our Ambassador and permanent representative to the Organization of American States, delivered to the permanent council meeting of the OAS this morning:

#### NICARAGUA—THE STOLEN REVOLUTION

(By Ambassador J. William Middendorf II, Ambassador, Permanent Representative, Organization of American States, March 27, 1985, OAS Permanent Council Meeting)

The U.S. delegation wishes to note that on July 18, 1984, we last raised the matter of Nicaragua's failure to live up to its solemn promises of July 12, 1979, to the Secretary General of this body. They promised to hold early free elections, to establish an independent judiciary, and to uphold human rights.



It is my delegation's sad duty to report that, since that date, nothing has happened to change the situation.

When Sandinista troops entered Managua on July 19, 1979, they were met by joyous throngs of Nicaraguan citizens who believed that, at long last, freedom and economic well-being were at hand. We all know now that the Sandinista revolution was stolen—stolen by a small, hard-core group of Marxist-Leninists who did not represent majority opinion within the Sandinista movement, but who had long conspired to take the movement over, and who were armed to make it possible to carry out their plan.

Let us look first at the impact almost six years of Sandinismo have had on the ordinary Nicaraguan people. We are not talking now about political figures, or business leaders, but about the Nicaraguan "man-in-the-street," the ordinary Nicaraguan whose only ambition is to make a decent enough living to support his family.

What is happening to this ordinary Nicaraguan today?

His children don't have enough to eat. Robert Leiken, who initially strongly supported the revolution, wrote in the *New Republic* on October 8, 1984, that children were supposed to be the "spoiled ones" of the revolution. Instead, he noted, on his visit last year, he noticed far more naked children with signs of malnutrition than he had ever seen before in Nicaragua. Most foodstuffs are rationed, with the local committees for the defense of Sandinismo handing out ration cards—or withholding them—for citizens who show "insufficient revolutionary fervor."

His older children, from age 11 on up, face the possibility of being drafted into the Sandinista Armed Forces. Strong-arm recruiters snatch them off the streets or from their school rooms to fill the ranks of the Sandinista military. Which now outnumber all of the other military forces of Central America combined.

His freedom of speech is sorely limited. The Committees for the defense of Sandinismo keep their eye on him. If he complains to a neighbor about something the government has done, he may find himself hauled before a neighborhood court, with no appeal of any sentence that court hands down allowed.

His freedom to be informed about national and international events is restricted. Radio and television news are under government control, and they broadcast only what the Sandinista party wants them to. There is only one opposition newspaper, *La Prensa*, and it is so heavily censored by government censors that it frequently suspends publication because after the censors are through, there is not enough news left to print. And sometimes the government orders it to suspend publication anyway.

His livelihood is threatened. If he works in the private sector, the gradual elimination of private enterprise by the Sandinista government may leave him without a job. If he is a farmer, under the laws establishing state agencies which are the only entities to which he is allowed to sell his produce, at a non-negotiable price fixed by the government, he may not even hold back seed for next season's planting. He may not receive enough income to make ends meet.

The average Nicaraguan has always been religious. He has usually been a devout Catholic, or in the case of the Miskito Indians, a devout Moravian. Now, he finds his church leaders, including the Pope, harassed by Sandinista youth mobs, the

"Turbas Divinas." He finds his priest or pastor accused of being "a counter-revolutionary" when he refuses to praise the Sandinista government in his sermons. He can no longer hear the archbishop's homily on radio or television, because the Sandinistas do not allow it to be broadcast without their prior censorship, something to which the archbishop has understandably refused to submit.

Compare his situation with that of ordinary citizens in neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras, and you will see the contrast. While those countries have problems, they are working democracies where people can say what they please, don't have to worry about their children being drafted, and where farmers can sell their produce in the market themselves or choose among several competing middlemen, who will buy the produce for resale.

Yet, the Sandinista leaders say that countries such as Honduras and Costa Rica must undergo their own revolutions. Interior Minister Tomas Borge, in his interview in *Playboy* magazine of September 1983, was asked to respond to the Reagan administration contention that, following its triumph in Nicaragua, the revolution will be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico. Borge replied, "that is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true."

On the second anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, Borge gave a speech in Managua, in which he said: "This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist . . ."

In our special session on February 29, 1984, my esteemed colleague from Nicaragua told this body: "If we had wanted to attack Costa Rica with a specific end in mind, we would have done so, and they wouldn't even have had enough time to ask that a special session be called, because by then they would have been occupied . . ." While supposedly denying an intention of invading Costa Rica, this statement shows how confident the Sandinistas are in their ability to invade their southern neighbor successfully, if they ever feel the desire to do so.

I think it is worth asking, taking into account these statements I have just mentioned, as well as many others, what makes anyone believe that the Sandinista government is willing to live in peace with its neighbors? Just because they have stated their peaceful intention?

You will recall that promises made to this body on June 12, 1979, have not been kept. How, then, can we assume that promises not to attack their neighbors will be kept by the Sandinistas? When almost daily we observe shots fired by the Sandinistas across the Honduran and Costa Rican borders, and guerrillas trained by the Sandinistas carry on their activities in El Salvador and Guatemala, and Managua has been the command center for guerrilla activities throughout Central America. Can we believe their approval of peaceful intentions?

Let us review the record again. In 1979 the Sandinista junta promised the Secretary General that it would respect human rights, set up an independent judiciary, and hold "the first free elections in this country."

As I have already pointed out, human rights have been violated on a massive scale. The mistreatment of the Miskito and other Indian tribes was especially noteworthy. Shortly after the revolution. The Miskito Indians' traditional homelands were flooded with Cuban and Nicaraguan personnel who

said they were there to "rescue" them. The attempt was made to force them to give up their traditional way of life and adopt the Marxism-Leninism of the revolution. As Freedom House said at the time, the program "is to deprive them of their socio-cultural identity". Their traditional, freely-elected leaders were replaced with Sandinista-appointed authorities—some of them Cubans.

Massive relocation of the Miskitos, as well as other tribes, as the Sumo and the Rama, were undertaken. In some instances where they resisted, Miskitos were killed. Men, women and children were forced to walk long distances on foot. Their farm animals were often appropriated by the state. Obviously, we hear reports today of a similar involuntary forced relocation of people from a wide area in rural northern Nicaragua, and of Sandinista army personnel putting the torch to the fields left behind. So much for respect for human rights!

In 1979, the Sandinista junta promised this body that an independent judiciary would be established. Yet justice has become the servant of Sandinista totalitarianism. The neighborhood courts, where people are judged for such "crimes" as failing to attend Sandinista Party rallies, hand down sentences which are not subject to judicial review. The nominally independent Supreme Court of Justice has limited power to review decisions handed down by lower courts. The right of habeas corpus has been practically eliminated.

The recent Urbina Lara case illustrates the lack of respect Sandinista justice has for the traditional Latin American doctrine of asylum. Mr. Urbina Lara, who had taken refuge in the Costa Rican Embassy, was forcibly removed from the embassy building, wounded and imprisoned, by Sandinista authorities at a moment when the Costa Rican diplomats had briefly left the embassy building unoccupied except for Mr. Urbina Lara. Mr. Urbina Lara was allowed to leave Nicaragua only after the incident threatened to disrupt the Contadora peace process. We understand that President Ortega has told high-level visitors to Managua that Urbina Lara left the embassy of his own accord. On his arrival in Colombia. However, Mr. Urbina Lara confirmed the details of this breach of the principle of diplomatic asylum. Meanwhile, his defense lawyer was detained for several days in a Managua jail without charges. So much for Sandinista justice!

Finally, in 1979 the Sandinista junta promised early, free elections. Late last year, "elections" were held. But they were nothing but a sham, as the Sandinista government refused to create the conditions whereby the largest opposition coalition, the Coordinadora Democratica, could have any chance to compete. That group's candidate, Arturo Cruz, who had at one time been the Sandinista government's own Ambassador to Washington, had his rallies disrupted by Sandinista youth mobs—the so-called "Turbas Divinas"—on repeated occasions during the pre-electoral period. His pronouncements were censored from the opposition newspaper "La Prensa", and were not carried by the government print and broadcast media. Indeed, Sandinista censors have assured that criticism of the government is all but absent from the media.

Faced with the situation in which the Sandinista government would not allow Cruz to conduct a full and free campaign, after many attempts to negotiate campaign

guarantees, the Coordinadora refused to participate in the election campaign.

Two other parties intended to pull out also. In one case, mobs broke up a meeting of the Partido Conservador Democrata at which a vote to pull out of the elections was about to be taken, with a clear majority in favor. In the other case, Partido Liberal Independiente candidate Virgilio Godoy announced on October 21 that he was withdrawing his candidacy, but the government press continued to run his campaign advertisements, and *La Prensa* was censored when it attempted to report the withdrawal.

No matter how honest the vote-counting itself, an election is nothing more than a sham if parties who wish to run are not given the chance to mount a full and fair campaign.

I think it would be interesting to see what Sandinista leaders themselves have said about elections.

In May 1984, Comandante Bayardo Arce, one of the nine members of the Sandinista Directorate gave a speech to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. He did not realize that the speech was being tape-recorded. A text of it appeared in the Barcelona newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, on July 31, 1984, and I note that the Sandinista government has never denied the authenticity of the text.

Comandante Arce said, "... of course, if we did not have the war situation imposed on us by the United States, the electoral problem would be totally out of place in terms of its usefulness ...".

If we analyze this statement, we are led to believe that if the Freedom Fighters had not waged their valiant fight to force Sandinistas to live up to their promises, the junta never would have held elections.

Comandante Arce also said "... We think the electoral process ... was and continues being an offensive tool from the standpoint of confronting U.S. policy ... It is well to be able to call elections and take away from American policy one of its justifications for aggression against Nicaragua ... bourgeois democracy has an element which we can manage and even derive advantages from for the construction of socialism in Nicaragua ... we are using an instrument claimed by the bourgeoisie, which disarms the international bourgeoisie, in order to move ahead to matters that are for us strategic ... we believe that the elections should be used in order to vote for Sandinismo, which is being challenged and stigmatized by imperialism, in order to demonstrate that, in any event, the Nicaraguan people are for that totalitarianism, the Nicaraguan people are for Marxism-Leninism ... we see the elections as one more weapon of the revolution ...".

There you have the affirmation, in Comandante Arce's own words, that the elections were held not because of the Sandinistas love for democracy, but for purely tactical reasons. Is it any wonder, then, that they established conditions under which only the Sandinista Party had any chance of victory? Had they given the Coordinadora Democrática a fair chance to campaign on an equal footing, the Sandinistas have been in danger of being swept out of office, something they could not risk. Thus, on November 4, 1984, the election which was held had to be the sham that it was. So much for the Sandinista promises to the OAS Secretary General in 1979.

In this connection, Mr. President, I would like to note that Congressman Claude Pepper, who honors us with his presence today, has written my country's President, Ronald Reagan, to call attention to the rec-

ommendation of the U.S. Congress, embodied in Public Law 98-215 of December 9, 1983. This recommendation proposes that the President seek the prompt reconvening of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of evaluating the compliance of the Sandinista government with respect to the promises to the OAS and also to consider whether that Government is living up to the terms of the OAS Charter.

I would also note that I have received the text of House Congressional Resolution 81 of March 7, 1985, sponsored by 56 members of the U.S. Congress, which calls on the President to grant explicit recognition to the democratic Nicaraguan resistance, and urges the President and all members of the OAS to support the Nicaraguan resistance—the so-called "contras"—in their quest for peace, human rights, free elections and national reconciliation. Yesterday, Sen. Durenberger spoke to the National Press Club about the Nicaraguan situation.

My government's efforts to get the Sandinistas to live up to their promises has often been branded by them as a lonely effort by President Reagan which does not have the support of the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress. I would submit that the existence of these Congressional initiatives by Congressmen from both the Democratic and Republican parties shows the deep concern of the American people about the danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere posed by the actions of the Sandinista dictatorship.

I would also like to take note of the recent document on national dialogue of the Nicaraguan resistance, proclaimed in San Jose, Costa Rica, on March 2, 1985, by the Coordinadora Democrática, which has named as its representatives Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero.

In it, they request that the Sandinista government engage in a National Dialogue, leading to democratization of Nicaragua, a political system which guarantees real separation of power, development and reconstruction, recognition of civilian primacy over the state, full respect for human rights, de-militarization of the society, a foreign policy which emphasizes good relations with neighboring states, an economic system which gives importance to the development of the private sector, institution of a multi-party system which guarantees alternation in power and respect for minorities, freedom to organize labor unions, agrarian reform, municipal autonomy, respect for the culture and traditions of the Atlantic Coast, a general political amnesty, and expulsion from the country of advisors from Cuba and other Communist countries.

In this connection, the Coordinadora is not asking that Daniel Ortega be ousted as president, but only that he live up to the 1979 promises to the OAS.

Mr. President, it is Sandinista government did not take advantage of this opportunity to resolve Nicaragua's problems by peaceful means.

Up to now, the Sandinistas have refused calls for dialogue with the opposition. Yet in El Salvador and Colombia, we have recently seen the occurrence of dialogue with the armed opposition, so why should Nicaragua be a special case where dialogue is inadmissible?

We are told constantly by the Sandinistas that the armed resistance in Nicaragua is nothing more than a movement of former Somocistas who are battling to return to power. This lie has been repeated so often

that even some of my own country's press seems to have accepted it as true.

I note also that the Contadora group will meet next month in the hopes of establishing a final solution to the Central American problem. It is my hope that this process will finally resolve the crisis not only in Nicaragua but in all of Central America. I would like to say at this point, however, that any agreement is only so many pieces of paper until it is put into practice. Once again, fool-proof measures of verification must be included in any such agreement if it is to be effective. I note the words of Lenin, as quoted by C.I. Sulzberger in the New York Times of June 13, 1956. Lenin said "We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, law breaking, withholding and concealing truth". The Sandinista leaders have proclaimed many times that they are Marxist-Leninists. Are they in accord with this statement by Lenin?

Mr. President, my government only asks that the Sandinista government live up to its commitments to the OAS. I would note, that no government provided more aid to the Sandinistas during its first 18 months in power than the United States, which gave \$118 million in aid. The Sandinista government began its inordinate military buildup immediately upon taking office, when the resistance had not yet formed. Texts used in literacy programs and elementary education from the beginning of the revolution used perjorative terms against my country. Radio Sandino, from the beginning of the revolution, attacked my country in the most vicious terms. On 15 different occasions over a period of four years, President Ortega falsely and irresponsibly accused my government of organizing an imminent invasion of his country, a tactic similar to that used by Castro 20 years ago in Cuba to consolidate power. The record shows that militarism and hostility to the United States were hallmarks of this Cuba-Soviet style revolution from the very beginning.

It is my hope that peace will return to Nicaragua through one or another of the processes that I have mentioned here, but, if no process is successful, I would remind this body of its responsibilities. In the final instance, the Organization of American States has a responsibility to assure peace in Nicaragua, since in 1979, it took the unprecedented step of withdrawal support from a sitting member government in Nicaragua and replacing it with the Sandinista junta. My government does not intend to allow this Organization to ignore its responsibilities in this regard, and reserves the right at some future date to introduce a resolution leading toward the satisfactory resolution of the Nicaraguan problem, if the processes which I have already detailed do not bear fruit.

Thank you.

#### THE UNITED STATES AS A DEBTOR NATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, since the establishment of the Bretton Woods agreement and the system which was put into place following that agreement after World War II, the American economy has grown at a



fantastic pace, and that growth was exported into the world economy.

As late as 1981, our current export account in the United States was in surplus by over \$6 billion, but by 1984, America's current export account surplus had turned to deficit, with the deficit rising about \$100 billion. For the first time in history, we are buying more than \$100 billion a year than we can afford to pay for. It is like an individual who goes to the store and charges more than they can afford. The United States is buying about \$100 billion a year more than it can afford.

Our international trade and financial position has, in fact, become so precarious that the United States will become a debtor nation this year. By the end of 1985, the United States will become, in fact, the largest debtor in the world.

Fred Bergsten, an authority on international economics, and many other authorities, have estimated that unless the value of the dollar, which is now overvalued by as much as 60 percent, is corrected, U.S. external debt by 1989 could exceed the debt of all the developing nations of the world combined.

□ 1630

The problem is so severe that our external debt could rise above \$1 trillion—I repeat, \$1 trillion—by the end of the decade. If you started out spending a million dollars a day from the birth of Christ until today, you would not spend one-half of \$1 trillion. That is how much a trillion dollars is.

The result, which we are beginning to see already, is a crisis in confidence in the soundness and the integrity of the American economy. The pain is now severe among many, many sectors of our economy. Farmers, for example, are in a state of economic depression. Workers in textile manufacturing and in shoe manufacturing, as well as many other businesses across our country, are in a state of depression because of the trade deficit which is mounting and which no one is doing anything about.

Mr. Speaker, for every \$1 billion in trade deficit, over 25,000 American jobs are destroyed. They are exported. Last year, in my hometown of Osceola, AR, two textile manufacturing firms were closed because they could not compete with the cheap, subsidized foreign exports, and 1,000 of my fellow townsmen lost their jobs, not because they were not productive or efficient but because our trade deficit in effect subsidizes foreign imports which put them out of work.

Shoe factories are closing as well from Maine to Arkansas. Farmers are going bankrupt in record numbers every day. Someone from my district sends me full-page advertisements giving notice of foreclosure sales of

farmers who are bankrupt because of our current economic policy. Textile workers are being laid off, and high-technology workers are facing intense foreign competition.

Today a number of my colleagues and I are beginning a series of special orders on the current and the increasing crisis in the trade deficit. The special orders are designed to discuss and to develop a set of trade policies for the future of all America. We will look at trade problems from the farms to the factories. We will explore the challenges facing new and old industries alike. We will look at foreign trade barriers and propose new export promotion initiatives. We will suggest new ways to make American industry and American agriculture more competitive with their competition around the world.

I invite my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join in this special-order effort, with the hopes that it will be worthwhile to all Americans.

Madam Speaker, as we begin these special orders, I would like to emphasize a few points that I believe are fundamental to our national economic health.

The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mrs. BURTON of California]. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] has expired.

#### AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. SHARP] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHARP. Madam Speaker, I join my other colleagues this afternoon who have been speaking about the need for a more effective trade policy for this country and I particularly want to highlight the serious nature of the problems we are facing in agricultural exports.

This is of great concern to my part of the country, but I think it also is very important to the entire Nation, because exports have in the past, certainly in the last 10 years, been a critical part of the farm economy of the United States, and yet for the last several years we have been slipping in this area of exports as in too many others.

I trust that there are going to be many speakers in the House this year to address the ramifications of trade, whether in agricultural or industrial products, and we are going to find it very difficult to find a sensible long-term policy for this country that somehow can avoid the dangers of extreme protectionism and at the same time not follow the false flag of free trade, which I believe is a very noble goal and which would be nice if we could follow it, but which we find very few countries around the world in fact who do follow it.

Today I simply want to join my colleagues who are focusing attention particularly on the plight of our farmers and the need for us to pursue far more aggressively than we have in recent years efforts to see that we export more through our own initiative and our own improvements in competition, as well as trying to get our trading partners to more aggressively alter the trading practices that work against their purchase of our products.

Madam Speaker, American agriculture is facing a wide range of problems, all of which cannot be solved by increasing farm exports, or any one specific action. We can however, make a dent in them, which is more than has been done up to this time to solve problems farmers face.

The Department of Agriculture's reluctance to stimulate farm exports is inexplicable. At a time when the administration is extolling American business to compete, it does nothing to stimulate competition in agriculture abroad. In fact, it has opposed many of our efforts in the House over the last 4 years to expand farm exports and other exports.

A central point which must be addressed, as in any discussion of import-export policy, is the high value of the dollar overseas. It is automatically giving our foreign trade competitors a massive advantage which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. In the past, up to 40 percent of U.S. farm produce went to foreign markets. That percentage has been dropping, and the domestic consequences alone should lead us to the development of an effective and aggressive farm export policy. Many farmers across the country are in deep trouble for various reasons, some so deeply that the Government cannot save them. Others can and should be helped. Because it appears increasingly unlikely that direct Government aid will be forthcoming, we can and should aid on other fronts.

Farm income has been catastrophically low for several years. American farmers are unjustly paying a high price for massive and efficient production. In any other industry or business, a combination of efficiency and productivity would produce large profits. The domestic market, however, has limited capacity to absorb production. Surpluses have resulted in lower prices, less farm income, and widespread bankruptcies should surprise no one. Is bankruptcy an acceptable policy?

We live in an increasingly complex world, one which has changed greatly in the last 20 years. Part of the change we face is stiff competition in international markets, played by rules that have also changed. Unless we can adapt, and meet the challenges, we

will fail—in agriculture policy and in every other basic industry in this Nation.

A major revision of current farm programs will be undertaken this year. There will be many hard decisions to be made. One part of it, however, must be to help get our massive and costly surpluses to markets overseas. We can minimize the costs to taxpayers while boosting farm income. We will have such an opportunity, and I urge that we take it by developing a strong, aggressive farm export program.

#### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISCAL POLICY AND THE TRADE DEFICIT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIBBONS. Madam Speaker, we have had in the last year a \$123 billion products trade deficit. This year we are probably going to have a trade deficit that will be substantially higher than that. There are no quick fixes in any of this. The real problem is not trade policy; the real problem is domestic economic policy, specifically the fiscal policy that we follow.

Being very specific, this country is now running in this year at the present time a \$248 billion fiscal deficit. It has run that kind of fiscal deficit for quite some time. The impact of all of that is a monetary policy that causes real interest rates to rise, and while we have almost a zero inflation rate, the average interest rate on Federal obligations is now around 11 percent. Therefore, we have a very high real interest rate of around 10 percent.

In no place on Earth can money earn that kind of real growth just by letting money sit in a bank. So investments in American obligations are very profitable for everyone, particularly for foreigners. Not only is an investment in an American obligation safe, but it is also at the highest real return you can get for your money. All of this drives up the value of the dollar. As the value of the dollar goes up, it acts like a tax on exports of American products and it acts like a subsidy on imports of foreign products.

So the real cause of our trade deficit is our fiscal policy, our domestic economic policy. The results of it are as natural as night following day. You cannot run the kind of deficits that we have been running year after year, and particularly for the last 4 years, and have any other result than the result we are currently seeing.

Now, it is easy to call for changes in trade policy. It makes good political fodder, but it will not solve the problem. The problem is that most of the remedies that have been suggested in the area of trade policy will not solve

the problem but will only make it worse. So the challenge facing this Congress and the challenge facing the President and the White House is, how do we get the fiscal deficit down?

It is a very tough challenge. Obviously it must be done by limiting Government expenditures to the very bare bones, with belt-tightening of the most inordinate kind. It also means that at a time when we are talking about revising our basic tax policy—and this is a general criticism of all the proposals I have seen—most of them shift the burden away from the individual taxpayer to the business taxpayer. Now, there is no excuse for any business not paying any taxes, but we could cure that by imposing an effective minimal tax.

□ 1640

But you cannot add more taxes to business in total in America and make it anything other than less competitive in the international scene; so at this time I hope that the administration and all people who are advocating tax reform will realize that you cannot throw a distressed, perhaps drowning industry, farms and factories, greater weight to carry and expect anything other than the responsibility for a greater rescue effort of them.

What is happening to the farms of Iowa and the factories of the United States is an economic consequence of the policy we follow. You cannot run these high fiscal deficits without having a high trade deficit.

Now, there are other problems in the trade picture. Some of our trading partners are greedy. We do have remedies for those. Some of them are not following the law. They are subsidizing product into our markets. But why anybody would want to subsidize into this market today with the vast incentives that are given, almost subsidies by this Government, with the overvalued dollar, I do not know why anybody would want to subsidize them, but they do.

#### OUR TRADE PROBLEM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. JONES] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JONES of Oklahoma. Madam Speaker, I want to follow the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS] in talking about this trade deficit problem. It is a very real problem; but what concerns me in the Congress and in the administration is that we may be wanting to treat the symptom and not get at the root cause. I think very clearly the root cause of our trade deficit, which is growing larger and becoming a problem all across this country, the root cause is the Federal budget deficit, because

you can clearly show a connection between the high Federal budget deficits and the real rates of interest, which are still at record highs. Those high interest rates have had an effect of attracting foreign investments and foreign purchasing of our debt. That has had an effect of overvaluing the U.S. dollar in relation to the other currencies by something like 30 percent. Therefore, it really matters not how efficient our management is or how productive our workers are. The overvalued dollar puts the American worker and American management at a disadvantage in the international marketplace or in our own marketplace. It is the same as producing an American item, an American piece of equipment as efficiently as any other piece of equipment, but putting a 30-percent tax on the American item, or conversely, giving a 30-percent subsidy to the foreign produced item. That is the effect of the overvalued dollar in making American products noncompetitive in the international marketplace. That is why primarily we have the trade deficit that is also setting all time records.

In order to reverse that, in order to become competitive again, we are going to have to deal with this Federal budget deficit.

Quite frankly, I am very disappointed in the Reagan administration to this point because the signals they have sent are that deficits do not matter. We are going to have to have some strong leadership from the President, from the administration and from both parties in the Congress if we are going to deal substantially in getting these budget deficits under control. Until we do that, we are not going to see a harmonious or complimentary monetary policy that will allow this economic recovery to continue and to allow a soft landing of the overvalued dollar so that we can again become competitive in the international marketplace.

So I would hope that Members on both sides of the aisle and that the administration, the President and his leaders in the administration, will give very serious attention to this Federal budget deficit, that we will reach some bipartisan consensus or some sort of an across-the-board freeze, plus other eliminations and reductions in Federal programs so that we can send a positive signal to the financial markets that we do have some fiscal discipline and send some signals to the Federal Reserve Board to loosen up on monetary policy so that we can bring the value of the dollar down in relation to other currencies and can have continued economic recovery.

I might also say in the meantime that there are going to be some individual problems with individual countries and the President has the tools,



thanks to the law passed by Congress last year, called the reciprocity trade legislation, the President does have the tools to deal on a case-by-case basis with those countries who are discriminating with tariff and nontariff barriers, discriminating against U.S. products.

I would hope that the President would use those tools to reciprocate and to tell those countries that discriminate against our products that we are going to reciprocate against your products in our own markets.

These two items, the reciprocity trade legislation that is on the books, plus a resolve to lower these Federal deficits, can have a marked improvement in our international trade deficit and can get us on the road to increased productivity, get us back on the road to job development in our own country.

#### THE STAGGERING TRADE DEFICIT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KANJORSKI). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. BONKER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Arkansas and the gentleman from Oklahoma who have addressed this very important and timely topic.

This week the Secretary of Commerce will once again announce the trade deficit for the preceding month. He does this on a regular basis and each month the trade deficit is staggering. It is usually a record setter. Every month when the Secretary announces this amount, it was \$10.3 billion last month and it may be higher this month, everybody expresses concern. There is a problem with the trade deficit, but each time that the announcement is made, there is no particular plan announced. There is no proposal. There is no strategy. There is no effort by this administration to deal with that staggering trade deficit, no policy recommendations to the Congress. There is nothing but a shrug of the shoulders. "It's too bad that the trade deficit is this high," they say, "but we cannot do anything about it". Well, the truth is, if we do not do something about it soon, that so-called soft landing to which the gentleman from Oklahoma referred will be a crash landing.

There are two serious problems now associated with the trade deficit. The first is the new status that we take on this year as a debtor nation. For the first time in 65 years, the United States will be a debtor nation. We will owe more than we own abroad. The amount will be somewhere around \$1 trillion by the end of this decade, \$1 trillion that we will owe foreign sources.

The head of the Federal Reserve Board testified before congressional committees and made reference to this as not being sustainable. While it may not pose an imminent danger at the moment, it simply is not sustainable.

He also said that we are living on borrowed time. We are living on borrowed money and borrowed time, money borrowed to service this debt, not only from future generations of Americans, but also from abroad to help finance the staggering budget deficit this administration has created.

□ 1650

The second problem associated with our massive trade deficit is the dramatic shift it has caused in this country's economy. We are experiencing a deterioration of our industrial base. We are seeing the export of our manufacturing capability and the export of American jobs.

In a headline last week it was pointed out that we are now seeing a rather dramatic slowing of our production capability. Our GNP growth for the first quarter was pegged at 2.1 percent, which is a very dramatic decline. At the same time our production capability is down while the consumer demand is up. And what makes up the difference is the large volume of imports that are now flooding American markets.

There is no way that you can reconcile the trade deficit without looking at the inflated dollar. The inflated dollar has been called variously the strong dollar, the bloated dollar, the overvalued dollar, the high flying dollar. But however you characterize it, it is like a 40-percent tax on American exporters and a 40-percent subsidy on imports into America.

Those imports, if they are the result of an artificially high dollar, or unfair trade practices, threaten American domestic industries.

And what does this administration expect to do about the strong dollar? First of all, they do not even recognize that there is a problem. The President at press conferences has said that the strong dollar is really good for the American economy. He says that it is helping to support the present economic growth of this country by keeping inflation down. But he doesn't recognize the staggering cost the inflated dollar is exacting from vital industries and productive American workers. He has no plan whatsoever to deal with the overvalued dollar.

Meanwhile we are experiencing the export of American jobs and American industrial capability. All of our European friends and other trading partners are concerned about the inflated dollar. They realize that the capital flows are moving artificially and that not only are they bringing forth cheap imports to this country but they are denying capital that is vital to their

own industrial growth. Yet this President has no plan and no policy, no program. Indeed, he has no concern at all about the inflated dollar.

So unless America can get its act together fiscally, until we can deal with both deficits, the twin deficits, we are going to go through a very agonizing period of watching our industrial base decline and watching those jobs be exported abroad.

I call upon the President and his Secretary of Commerce to come forth with a bold plan to deal with this embarrassing trade deficit and to do it now.

#### HEALTH INSURANCE AVAILABILITY ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY] is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill to provide incentives for States to create "risk pools" to provide health insurance for individuals and families who cannot purchase this insurance on the open market due to poor health.

A vast majority of Americans are covered by private health insurance. In 1982, 162 million Americans under age 65 were covered by some form of group health insurance, and millions more were covered by individual health insurance policies. However, some Americans still fall between the cracks of our current system for one reason or another. Many of these people are working, are willing and able to pay for private health insurance, are financially solvent but in poor health, are not in any group health plan, and are not covered or eligible for individual insurance; they are, in effect, uninsurable.

In 1975, my own State of Connecticut enacted a program to solve the problem by guaranteeing the availability of comprehensive major medical coverage for all Connecticut citizens. Under Public Acts 75-616 and 76-399, the Connecticut Health Reinsurance Association was established to provide for a State pool for uninsurables which offered comprehensive health insurance to all citizens of Connecticut regardless of the status of their health. The coverage is expensive since the pool is composed of individuals who cannot obtain coverage on the open market due to their health problems.

There is an upper limit on the premiums charged, which when combined with the health status of the people in the pool, can be generally expected to produce pool losses. These losses are shared on a pro-rata basis among all the members of the pool in the State; that is, all the competitors in the insurance market in the State including

insurance companies, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, health maintenance organizations, and self-insured employers. Thus, the losses experienced by the pool do not disadvantage anyone competitively and are spread evenly across the entire spectrum of good business in the State. Four other States currently have similar pools.

The Health Insurance Availability Act provides a powerful incentive for all States to establish this type of pool by levying a 10-percent excise tax on health plans which do not participate in a qualified risk pool after January 1, 1987, this guaranteeing to all Americans the opportunity to purchase comprehensive health insurance. It also resolves a problem created by a provision in the 1974 Employees Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA] which precludes the States from regulating employees benefit plans. This provision prevents the States from requiring self-insured employers to participate in any pool losses, driving up the cost of the pools for those who do participate. This bill encourages self-insured employers to join the pool through the mechanism of the excise tax.

This bill does not directly address the high cost of health care. But it does give a number of people the opportunity to obtain the same protection now available to the vast majority of Americans.

It will ease the increasingly serious uncompensated care problem faced by hospitals and other health providers when unprotected Americans face higher and higher medical bills.

It does not resolve the health care problems of the poor. But it does protect those middle-class Americans who want protection from catastrophic medical bills and who are willing and able to pay for it. It does not guarantee insurance coverage for everyone, only its availability.

Finally, the bill does not require the appropriation of a single Federal dollar. All costs of administration are borne by the insurance pool. All pool losses are borne by private competitors in the insurance marketplace. No new Federal bureaucracy or program is involved. The plans will be established in the States, on a State-by-State basis, and are to be regulated by the States just like any other insurance.

This bill simply lays down minimum standards for qualification of the pooling associations for Internal Revenue Service purposes. The bill makes available health insurance with deductibles not to exceed \$2,500, coinsurance not to exceed 20 percent, out-of-pocket payments for covered medical expenses not to exceed in the aggregate \$3,500 per individual per year adjusted for inflation, and a preexisting conditions clause not to exceed 12 months.

I believe this legislation cures a large problem for a small group of Ameri-

cans. I am inserting the legislative language in the Record at this point.

H.R. 1770

A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide incentives for the establishment of statewide insurance pools to provide health insurance to high-risk individuals

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Health Insurance Availability Act of 1985".

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) there is a significant number of persons not covered by health insurance who, because of health conditions, cannot qualify for health insurance;

(2) the unavailability of coverage to such persons may adversely affect the availability of health care to them;

(3) the lack of adequate health insurance for such persons jeopardizes the viability of health care financing and aggravates the bad debt and cash flow problems of health care providers; and

(4) such persons include some who lose their employment related coverages under both insured and self-funded employee benefit plans.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purpose of this Act is to—

(1) establish minimal standards for voluntary State action to establish pooling mechanisms for such persons resident in each State;

(2) encourage the establishment of such pooling mechanisms through the initiatives and resources of the State and private sector; and

(3) provide incentives for participation by all private health care financing mechanisms including self-funded employee health benefit plans.

#### SEC. 3. TAX ON HEALTH PLANS OF LARGE EMPLOYERS NOT MEMBERS OF QUALIFIED STATE POOLING ASSOCIATIONS.

(a) GENERAL RULE.—Chapter 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subchapter:

"SUBCHAPTER B—HEALTH PLANS OF LARGE EMPLOYERS NOT MEMBERS OF QUALIFIED STATE POOLING ASSOCIATIONS

"Sec. 4912. Tax on expenses of health plans of large employers not members of qualified State pooling associations.

"SEC. 4912. TAX ON EXPENSES OF HEALTH PLANS OF LARGE EMPLOYERS NOT MEMBERS OF QUALIFIED STATE POOLING ASSOCIATIONS.

"(a) Tax Imposed.—In the case of a large employer, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount of the nonqualified employee health expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year.

"(b) LARGE EMPLOYER.—For purposes of this section—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the term 'large employer' means an employer who, on each of some 20 days during the taxable year or the preceding taxable year, each day being in a different calendar week, employed for some portion of the day (whether or not at the same moment of time) 25 or more individuals.

"(2) EXCEPTION FOR GOVERNMENTAL UNITS.—The term 'large employer' shall not include the United States, any State or political subdivision thereof, or any possession of the

United States or any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission); except that such term shall include any nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the United States.

"(c) NONQUALIFIED EMPLOYEE HEALTH EXPENSES.—For purposes of this section—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—The term 'nonqualified employee health expenses' means the expenses paid or incurred by the employer for a group health plan to the extent such expenses are allocable—

"(A) to employment within a State, and

"(B) to a period during which neither

"(i) the employer, nor

"(ii) any entity through which benefits under the plan are provided,

is a member of a qualified pooling association in such State.

"(2) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.—the term 'group health plan' has the meaning given to such term by section 162(i)(2).

"(3) QUALIFIED POOLING ASSOCIATION.—The term qualified pooling association' means any organization which—

"(A) is a nonprofit corporation established pursuant to and regulated by State law;

"(B) permits any of the following doing business in the State to be participating members:

"(i) insurers writing expense incurred health insurance,

"(ii) hospital and medical service plan corporations,

"(iii) health maintenance organizations, and

"(iv) employers and other health financing entities;

"(C) makes available (without regard to health conditions) to all residents of the State not eligible for Medicare levels of health insurance typical of the levels of coverage provided through large employer groups with deductibles not to exceed \$2,500, coinsurance not to exceed 20 percent, with out-of-pocket payments for covered medical expenses by the insured not to exceed in the aggregate \$3,500 per individual per year including amounts paid to satisfy the deductible (such dollar amounts to be adjusted according to the Medical Care Component of the Consumer Price Index), except that variations in the amounts and applications of such deductibles, coinsurance, out-of-pocket limits and other policy provisions such as restrictions on coverage for pre-existing conditions (not to exceed 12 months) shall be permitted in accordance with customary insurance practice;

"(D) charges a pool premium rate expected to be self-supporting based upon a reasonable actuarial determination of anticipated experience and expected expenses, such pool premium rate in no event to exceed 200 percent of average premium rates for individual standard risks in the State for comparable coverage; and

"(E) assesses losses of the pool equitably among all participating members.

"(4) MEDICARE.—The term 'medicare' means the insurance program established under part A of title XVIII of the Social Security Act.

"(d) CROSS REFERENCE.—

"(1) For provisions denying deduction for tax imposed by this section, see section 275(a)(6).

"(2) For provisions making deficiency procedures applicable to tax imposed by this section, see section 6211 et seq."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—



(1) Chapter 41 of such Code is amended by striking out the chapter heading and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"CHAPTER 41—PUBLIC CHARITIES; CERTAIN HEALTH PLANS OF LARGE EMPLOYERS  
"Subchapter A. Public charities.  
"Subchapter B. Health plans of large employers not members of qualified State pooling associations.  
"Subchapter A—Public Charities".

(2) The table of chapters for subtitle D of such Code is amended by striking out the item relating to chapter 41 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"Chapter 41. Public charities; certain health plans of large employers."

(3) Subparagraph (B) of section 6104(c)(1) of such Code is amended by striking out "or chapter 41 or 42" and inserting in lieu thereof "subchapter A of chapter 41 or chapter 42".

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1987.●

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my 10-minute special order for today be vacated, and I be allowed to address the House for 5 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KANJORSKI). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

#### LIVER TRANSPLANT FOR A 6-MONTH-OLD INFANT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HUTTO] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Speaker, I come before you today with a very serious plea for your help and attention. An opportunity is before us to assist a young family in a matter quite literally involving life and death. Daniel J. Gasparini, 6-month-old son of Mr. and Mrs. Jeffery Gasparini, is in desperate need of a liver. Technically, Daniel was born without a bile duct, and consequently suffers from biliary atresia, a debilitating disease affecting the liver. In layman's terms, that medical parlance translates into the stark reality that Daniel will die if a suitable transplant organ is not found for him in time.

Efforts to locate a healthy, appropriate liver for Daniel are ongoing. As you may imagine, however, it is a monumental task for the persons directly involved to keep abreast of potential donors from across the Nation. This is where your help, and the help of your staff, is needed. I would like to ask you or someone in your office to contact the hospitals in your district, alerting them to the need of a liver for Daniel. Your calls may turn up nothing; nevertheless they will be an important, personal exercise in humanity and compassion. Your calls, on the other hand, may unearth a donor, and give hope and life to a family that too long

has agonized over a perilously ill infant. No description I can give adequately conveys the pain experienced by Daniel and his parent. No appeal I make can approach what a few phone calls on your part might accomplish for this family. Therefore I ask you simply, please help.

Daniel is currently a patient in Yale New Haven Hospital, New Haven, CT. Dr. Flye, his physician, may be contacted at the Yale New Haven Hospital Transplant Center at (203) 785-2565. Any information concerning the availability of an organ for transplant may be directed to my office (202) 225-4136, or passed on directly to Dr. Flye at the number above. Your timely attention to this situation is critical, and cannot be underestimated. The thanks and overwhelming gratitude of the Gasparinis, of myself, and my office, and of all persons who have ever been faced with the same life-sustaining need of an organ donor, attend your efforts. Thank you for your service and care.

#### AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I have asked for this special order today so that Members of Congress can discuss the current state of U.S. agricultural exports, the causes of the problems we are experiencing in this area, and offer their suggestions as to what, if anything, we can do to reverse the downward trend in U.S. agricultural exports we have seen in recent years.

According to recent forecasts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, both the value of U.S. agricultural exports and U.S. agricultural export volume continue to lag well behind the historic highs reached in the years 1979-81. Although this decrease in agricultural exports is not the sole cause of the financial crisis facing American farmers today, it certainly has been a major factor. The area of agricultural export trade must be addressed by Congress as it considers the 1985 farm bill this session. It is my belief that there will be no substantial, long-term improvement in our farm economy until we reverse the decline in agricultural exports and begin to create new markets for our agricultural products, and expand existing ones.

A brief review of the agricultural export boom of the 1970's helps explain the current situation. U.S. agricultural exports increased tremendously in the 1970's and into the early 1980's. The value of U.S. agricultural exports increased over sixfold from 1970 to 1981. The volume peaked in 1980 at two and one-half times the 1970 level. The main reasons for this boom were rapid economic growth, es-

pecially in the developing countries, the easy availability of credit, the relatively steady depreciation of the dollar throughout the decade, and a policy change in the Soviet Union and other nations with centrally planned economies to import food and feedstuffs instead of tightening the belt. The United States was in a good position to respond to increased global demand for food and feedstuffs. First, we had surplus stocks which enabled us to respond to short-run demand changes. In addition, as an efficient producer with abundant agricultural resources, we had the capacity to increase production.

In the early 1980's, however, a dramatic reversal of the economic conditions of the previous decade led to a sharp drop in U.S. agricultural exports. The major causes were the worldwide economic recession, the enormous debt problems of developing countries, the rapid appreciation of the U.S. dollar, increased worldwide production of major agricultural commodities, and agricultural trade policies including both the partial U.S. embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union and policies of our competitor nations. As a result of this declining demand for U.S. agricultural exports, we lost export market shares, especially for wheat and corn, while our competitors gained or maintained shares.

This decline in agricultural exports played a major role in the financial stress we see on American farms today. Our agriculture is no longer national in scope. In the 1950's only 10 percent of farm income was from exports. Today, production of 4 acres out of every 10 is destined for foreign markets. We export one-fourth of our corn crop, one-half of the soybean crop, 60 to 65 percent of our wheat, and over 40 percent of our cotton and rice.

Agricultural exports are also important to the national economy. They represent one-fifth of all merchandise exports, they reduce the overall deficit in the balance of trade, and they help pay for imports. Moreover, U.S. agricultural exports generate employment, income, and purchasing power across the entire economy. Each dollar of agricultural exports generates an additional dollar of domestic business activity. Every \$1 billion in farm exports creates 35,000 jobs. To put it another way, in 1982, more than 580,000 jobs in the nonfarm sector existed because of agricultural exports.

These statistics establish how important it is for our Nation to maintain and expand our share of foreign agricultural markets. Accomplishing this will not be easy. There is no one magic solution to our export problems. If the world economy remains in recession, with heavy debt inhibiting growth in the developing nations that have the most potential for agricultural export

expansion, then there will be strong competition for world agricultural markets. This is a realistic scenario, and we must be prepared to deal with it. We must be prepared to meet our competition with flexible credit terms and we must be prepared to counter the predatory export subsidies used by many of our competitors and to fight unfair trade barriers.

In my opinion we should aggressively use the agricultural export credit revolving fund which has laid dormant since being authorized by Congress in 1981. This would make funds available for short-term financing of commercial export sales of U.S. agricultural products, export sales of U.S. breeding animals, and the establishment of grain-handling and storage facilities in important nations. It would make use more competitive, and moreover, since it is a revolving fund, the program would be fully self-supporting. In addition, I advocate the passage of legislation such as I introduced last year, and which other Members have also sponsored, which would provide the Secretary of Agriculture with the authority to use Government surplus commodities to promote the increased use of U.S. agricultural products by tendering them as bonuses to U.S. exporters, processors, and foreign purchasers.

What we need, Mr. Speaker, is an aggressive U.S. agricultural export policy. We need to take advantage of our strengths—farm productivity and an efficient agribusiness marketing system. We must also recognize and correct our weaknesses. We can take nothing for granted. We will have to do our homework and become export oriented. We will have to analyze our customers' needs and tailor our export programs to meet those needs. We will have to recognize that demands have leveled off in the industrial countries, and that the developing world offers the best opportunities for expansion in the years ahead, if and when those nations begin to grow economically once again.

This brings me to a final point, Mr. Speaker. We can do nothing in international agricultural trade unless we preserve the production capacity of U.S. agriculture. If the world economy returns to a reasonable level of growth and prosperity, we must be able to respond. We must, therefore, Mr. Speaker, adopt policies, both in the Federal budget and the 1985 farm bill, which will preserve and protect an agricultural structure based on the owner-operated family farm. These family farmers are not only a significant part of our productive capacity, but they also are a vital part of the social and cultural fabric of rural America.

□ 1700

Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON].

Mr. EMERSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Missouri for the very fine statement that he is making and note that the speaker is the chairman of the rural caucus of the House of Representatives, on which I am privileged to serve as a member of the executive committee.

I want to commend the chairman of that caucus for the leadership that is showing in inquiring into a number of our export-related problems and say that I think this effort of the rural caucus can hold some real promise. I hope we can come up with some suggestions and solutions that we will share with the Agriculture Committee as we deliberate on the 1985 farm bill. And beyond that, that we share with other committees which have jurisdiction in the trade area.

I commend the gentleman for his statement and for his efforts.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank my colleague from Missouri for his kind comments and also thank him for the work that he is doing in the area of agriculture. Agricultural exports are so terribly important to us.

For so many years it has been agricultural exports that kept our balance of trade in the black. For so many years it is agricultural exports that have kept us from being a debtor nation.

Now we see that agricultural exports have begun to slip. As a result, we have and we are becoming a debtor nation. This must be reversed, Mr. Speaker. We in this Congress have an opportunity through the farm bill of 1985 to reverse the trend, to cause our export policy to be one that is positive rather than something that for so many years has been taken for granted.

So with the determination that I know that we have in this body we can make our agricultural export policy a positive one, one that will put us back in competition throughout the world so that we can get the balance of trade where it should be, we can assist our American farmers, and that we again will be a proud exporting agricultural nation.

I thank the Speaker.

● Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleague from Missouri for calling a special order to focus on the need to do more to promote agricultural exports. Personally, I find this special order very timely, since Secretary of Agriculture John Block will be visiting my district this Friday, March 29. I will be hosting a farm forum so that the farmers of northeast Wisconsin can question the Secretary on the administration's agricultural proposals. A longstanding interest of the farmers of my district has been increasing their markets through exporting.

Given our overall 1984 trade deficit of \$123 billion, it is ironic that the United States pays so little attention to its most profitable export, agricultural products. Last year alone, the United States exported \$38 billion in farm goods and imported only \$18.9 billion.

U.S. agriculture enjoys a comparative advantage over other countries for many products. The reasons are the favorable American climate, an abundance of fertile land, and modern farming technology. As a policy, the United States should maximize these advantages and take additional steps to enhance farm exports.

Last year, I proposed a four-point plan to enhance the potential of our agricultural community by increasing its exports. Steps have been and are currently being taken to follow through with the ideas that I put forth, but we can do more.

First, I called for a vigorous and hardline bargaining approach by the U.S. Government in pursuit of expanded markets, and elimination of restrictions against U.S. agricultural products. The 1985 farm bill addresses the importance of agricultural exports and the need to expand our trade. The major provisions would provide a commitment on the part of the U.S. Government to promote open access in world markets for U.S. farm products. They call for expanded trade through the elimination of restrictive trade deficits.

Second, I urged congressional action to ensure that agriculture be given equal treatment with other export interests in multilateral trade negotiations. We cannot afford to play "innocents abroad." Many nations are aggressively selling products in traditional U.S. markets at below the cost of actual production.

I will soon be introducing a resolution calling on the President to negotiate with our trading partners to revise GATT rules so that agricultural export subsidies would be treated the same as tariffs. Primary products would be treated the same as manufactured products. Current rules make an artificial distinction between primary and manufactured products. They provide an excuse for subsidized agricultural exports by many of our friends and allies.

The protectionist nature of the European Community's common agricultural policy has been widely documented. GATT procedures should explicitly recognize that domestic subsidies alter trade by reducing the demand for imports and increasing the supply of exports.

Third, I declared the need for the U.S. Government to more fully utilize the barter and countertrade provisions of the last farm bill to acquire strategic materials in exchange for our agri-



cultural products. This provision was responsible for \$13.6 million in dairy for bauxite trade with Jamaica in 1983. Last year the trade was increased by almost \$7 million. This is only the tip of the iceberg. From 1960 to 1968, we were engaged in counter-trade or barter up to about \$1.2 billion; I believe we can make this a goal for the future.

Fourth, I called for new and innovative marketing techniques to expand our farm exports. Wheat, corn, and soybeans form the bulk of agricultural exports. But there is no reason why we cannot compete in other areas. As the representative of the third largest dairy district in the Nation, I believe we are overlooking the many opportunities this agriculture sector provides. Recent sales of dairy products to Egypt and Iraq show there is an international market for our products. We must tap new markets and aggressively meet overseas competition.

There is much to be gained if the U.S. dairy industry can expand into these new foreign markets. Dairy products containing low levels of lactose may find a new home in the People's Republic of China and other Asian countries. I have seen some innovative marketing schemes for low lactose yogurt. The sales potential here is enormous. Imagine what this could do for our trade account.

In 1983, Land O' Lakes, with assistance of the Agency for International Development, devised a private sector mechanism to utilize dairy products being held by the CCC to promote economic development in developing countries. Under the plan, Public Law 480 commodities are granted to a small nonprofit foundation in Jamaica. It then contracts with the lowest bidder in the country to have the bulk commodities processed into value-added products. The products are then sold commercially in markets outside the United States and which are not available to U.S. dairy products. The profits generated from the sale of these products are used for two purposes: First, to provide financing in the form of loans, loan guarantees, investments of grants, for large or small scale projects to increase Jamaican production. Second, to promote the growth of the Jamaican economy. The goal is to assist Jamaica to become a viable trading partner with the United States. I would like to see more of these types of projects—partnerships between private enterprise and government that benefits developing countries, as well as the United States.

In conclusion, I'd like to say that I am pleased that the U.S. Government is finally recognizing the importance expanding its agricultural exports. This importance has been recognized by the administration which has made export promotion title I of the 1985 farm bill. The United States has every-

thing to gain from encouraging farm exports. In promoting agricultural exports, we can both help the American farmer and the citizens of a hungry world. And, from a national perspective, we can reduce the trade deficit to the benefit of our entire economy. ●

● Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, agricultural exports are of particular importance to my district and so I greatly appreciate the chance to join in this important discussion today. My home State of Nebraska ranks sixth of the 50 States in the value of agricultural exports.

I especially would like to address my urban colleagues as to why they should be concerned about agricultural exports. First of all, a great deal of nonfarm economic activity is generated by agricultural exports. Each dollar earned from farm exports stimulates \$1.23 of output in the U.S. economy. Approximately 80 percent of this additional economic activity accrued to the nonfarm sector. USDA estimates that \$81.8 billion in total U.S. business activity was generated by farm product exports.

Second, an estimated 1.1 million full-time jobs were related to the production, processing and transportation of U.S. agricultural exports. Less than half of these jobs were on the farm. Keep in mind these are just the jobs directly related to exports. More than 1 in 5 jobs in America can be traced to the farm. USDA estimates that 23 million people earn their living in the food and fiber system.

A third reason agricultural exports are so important to every person in the United States is that the overall U.S. trade deficit is expected to reach \$140 billion this year, far surpassing last year's record trade deficit of \$123 billion. Over the last 5 years farm exports, on the other hand, contributed a positive \$112 billion to the balance of trade. Agricultural exports are a bright light in an otherwise dark trade picture.

Of course to farmers exports are even more important, accounting for 28 percent of farm income. Approximately 1 of every 3 crop acres—112 million—are used to produce agricultural commodities for export. By the year 2000, 50 percent of the crop acreage in the United States may be harvested for export.

Export embargoes, unstable fiscal and monetary policies, and an overvalued dollar have dealt repeated and brutal blows to agricultural exports. The strong dollar has been particularly burdensome to grain farmers, especially considering, for example, that nearly 2 of each 3 bushels of wheat produced by American farmers must find an overseas market.

The value of the U.S. dollar has increased over 100 percent compared to the franc since 1979, and over 750 percent compared to the peso. Using

August 1981 exchange rates as the base and a price of \$3.25 per bushel for wheat in western Nebraska, the effective price of U.S. wheat is \$4.36 in The Netherlands, \$5.40 in Great Britain, and \$5.78 per bushel in Spain. This is before any transportation costs are added to get the wheat from the farm to the ports and overseas.

The dollar is so strong that European Economic Community wheat export subsidies have been reduced from \$1.77 per bushel in 1982 to only 40 cents per bushel today.

Our competitors are shielded by the dollar's own subsidizing effect. The strength of the dollar is responsible for \$5 to \$6 billion of the \$9 billion drop in farm exports between 1981 and 1983.

The dollar's strength has eroded our market share and has encouraged a flood of imports into the United States. It makes imports cheaper while our foreign customers must pay more for our exports. Again, a good example is wheat. The U.S. market share for wheat is around 38 percent. This compares to 48 percent in 1981. In July 1980, a Japanese buyer would have had to pay 860 yen for a bushel of U.S. wheat. Three years later it would cost a U.S. purchaser the same price, but to a Japanese buyer, the price increased to 916 yen per bushel.

The European Community has captured 14 percent of the world wheat market, and is threatening to expand its share. One study indicates that a 1 percent change in the value of the dollar in relation to special drawing rights [SDR's] will inversely affect wheat exports by 1.9 percent.

Not only does the relative value of the dollar make foreign wheat more price attractive to the buyer, but it also translates into a higher domestic price for the producer in a foreign country. This stimulates production, and given the marketing system of other countries, this stimulated production is placed on the world market at a level that will clear their granaries.

The high value of the dollar has hurt the livestock industry as well. Canada's pork exports are up 10 times from their 1981 level, and 1.5 million head are expected to cross the border this year.

Positive action must be taken to ensure agricultural exports do not continue their current slide. As a start I introduced the Agricultural Export Expansion Act on March 7. This legislation would assist in the export of U.S. agricultural commodities and improve farm income through the exemption of those farm commodities sold through export promotion programs from cargo preference requirements. This is vitally important to the success of our export programs. Shipping costs on U.S. bottoms are 100 to

300 percent higher than non-U.S. vessels, and a recent U.S. district court ruling has placed this burden on the American farmer, thus effectively killed the congressionally authorized blended credit and other USDA commercial export programs.

This is only a beginning. The 1985 farm bill must have the strongest export title ever enacted in long-term farm legislation. This country is the breadbasket of the world and we must work to keep it that way. ●

● Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity which has been arranged by the gentleman from Missouri to discuss one of the more important issues facing American agriculture today, both in terms of farm operators and agribusinesses.

During the decade of the 1970's, the market for agricultural exports from the United States seemed limitless. American farmers were told by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to plant fence row to fence row, and to base their future plans on continued growth in the export market.

As a lifelong soil conservationist, I was appalled by the total disregard for our agriculture resource base associated with Secretary Butz' policy. When I look out across the thousands of acres of soybeans growing today on some of the steepest farmland in west Tennessee, I see topsoil washing away down the Mississippi River at levels 10 to 20 times the acceptable rate for soil loss. These highly erodible acres were sod-busted from pastureland and timberland and brought into new cropland production as a direct result of Secretary Butz' evangelical call to the American farmer to expand his production and export his way to financial health.

For a while this policy seemed to work. Millions of acres of new cropland—much of it highly fragile—were brought into production in the 1970's, and the volume and the value of U.S. farm exports continued to increase every year. The value of U.S. agricultural exports increased almost sixfold from 1970 to 1980. Agricultural exports reached their peak value in 1981 at nearly \$44 billion, and the volume of U.S. agricultural exports peaked at almost 164 million metric tons in 1980, 2½ times the 1970 level.

For more than 10 years American farm policy was based chiefly on this never-ending export prosperity. Then the bubble burst.

From 1981 to 1983, the value of U.S. agricultural exports fell by more than \$9 billion, and the volume of agricultural exports fell by more than 19 million metric tons. Worldwide economic recession, the enormous debt problems of the developing countries, and the rapid appreciation of the U.S. dollar have been major contributors to the declining demand for U.S. agricultural

exports. In addition to these factors, there also have been an increased worldwide production of major agricultural commodities, the unfair and anticompetitive agricultural and trade policies of foreign countries, and several U.S. embargoes of sales of farm commodities.

Unfortunately, not much can be done in the 1985 general farm bill to address the real problems which have crippled our exports. In my opinion, these problems can only be addressed in the larger context of our overall economic and foreign relations policies.

In any event, I do intend to do all I can in this year's farm bill to enact a long-term land retirement conservation reserve. Such a program would take out of production some of the most erodible land which was sod-busted in the 1970's, and which today is contributing excessively to the total annual erosion rate. In addition, I intend to work for a strong antisod-busting program to discourage additional fragile land from being brought into production in the future unless proper conservation systems are applied.

We may not be able to change the past, but we must certainly learn from it. Overreliance on export markets was a foolish policy 10 years ago, and we shouldn't allow ourselves to be sucked into that false promise again.

Instead, I believe we should face up to a few facts. As long as real interest rates in this country remain at record rates and the rest of the world's economy remains stagnant, American exports, especially agriculture exports, will not be the cure-all to our economic ills. As long as American farmers receive market prices for their commodities which are lower than the cost of production, I fail to understand how they can make a profit by selling more overseas at a larger loss.

In my opinion we need to take a serious look at our agriculture policy as we have known it for the past decade. I believe we have reached the point where we need to decide whether American agriculture should continue chasing the elusive export rainbow. As distasteful as it may be to some people, I think it's time we returned to a policy of strong supply controls to get our surpluses down and our production more in line with demand for our farm products. ●

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

#### THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE-INJURY COMPENSATION ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MADIGAN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

● Mr. MADIGAN. Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act of 1985. We have heard much talk about vaccine safety, availability and affordability over the past few years. The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, of which I am the ranking minority member, has held two hearings on these issues within the past 6 months. I am introducing this legislation today to get the ball rolling and force all of us in Congress to address this crucial situation in a timely fashion.

This legislation is based on three major principles: First, the childhood immunization program in this country is one of our most important health efforts; second, the future availability of some vaccines is in severe jeopardy; and third, those children injured by vaccines deserve fast and equitable compensation.

First, the use of vaccines in children has had a dramatic impact on diseases which one claimed thousands and thousands of lives each year. Widespread use of DPT vaccine has brought about reductions of greater than 99 percent in the incidence of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus when compared with the prevaccine era.

Second, the future availability of certain childhood vaccines is now in severe jeopardy. Aside from the health departments in Michigan and Massachusetts, there is only one remaining distributor of DPT in the United States. This is a drop from three distributors in less than a year. As a direct consequence of that drop in distribution capacity, we are currently experiencing a shortage of this vaccine.

At hearings conducted by the Health and Environment Subcommittee in September and December 1984, manufacturers testified that the major reason they are dropping out of the vaccine market is that the number and size of liability claims is increasing astronomically. The remaining distributor of DPT must renew its liability insurance by midyear. Its ability to renew that insurance is in jeopardy unless its insurers can predict potential liability with some certainty.

Finally, approximately one dose of DPT vaccine in 310,000 will cause a severe adverse reaction. Other vaccines also cause problems in some recipients. These children have a right to prompt compensation.

The bill I am introducing today will address all of these concerns by estab-



lishing, at very little government expense, a fast, reliable, no-fault compensation system for those injured by vaccines. It will assure continued availability by establishing liability ceilings which enable insurers to predict the potential liability associated with manufacturing and administering a vaccine. The bill will also encourage the development of safer vaccines by hopefully keeping existing companies in the business, bringing others back in, and establishing an advisory commission on childhood vaccines and a program to provide incentives for safer vaccines. Finally, this legislation will bring greater awareness of the benefits and potential risks of vaccines by requiring mandatory dissemination of parent information.

A section-by-section summary of the bill and outline of the major points are available for you today. I thought I would just briefly address some of the key provisions.

First, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services must compile a list of experts for eleven regions of the country to serve on hearing panels. A victim must then file a claim with the Secretary who will arrange for the convening of a three-person hearing panel. Respondents, including both manufacturers and health care providers, would be asked to make an irrevocable election to participate in the hearing and be bound by an award. The parties would choose their hearing panel from the list of experts, and the panel would determine if the injury was caused by a vaccine and, if so, calculate the damages. Respondents would pay all costs.

A hearing panel would enter a binding award for actual and projected out-of-pocket expenses, including costs of medical and custodial care and special education and therapy; actual and projected loss of earnings; pain and suffering; and reasonable attorneys' fees. Compensation would be capped at \$1 million per claim, with \$100,000 of this being available for pain and suffering. Claimants who accepted the hearing panel decision could receive immediate compensation from respondents.

If a claimant rejects the hearing panel decision for any reason, he/she is free to file a normal civil action for damages, but the statutory ceiling of \$1 million would still apply. If any respondent refuses to participate in the administrative hearings, the claimant can file a civil action and no cap on awards would apply.

I know that many of you are aware of the bill developed last year by the Parents' Group and the American Academy of Pediatricians, as well as a new, revised version which I understand will soon be ready. I commend them for their work, but I feel that this legislation is superior to that in-

troduced during the last Congress for a variety of reasons:

First, the Federal expense is very minimal as respondents pay all awards directly. This is particularly important at a time when deficits are at historical highs.

Second, it does not restrict awards to individuals who have suffered one of a limited number of symptoms.

Third, it is administratively simple—there would be no need to levy surcharges to finance a government compensation pool.

Fourth, it encourages manufacturers and providers to minimize risk by making them individually, directly responsible for their actions.

And, finally, it makes the maximum liability that manufacturers and health professionals may be exposed to more predictable and, therefore, more insurable.

I understand the risks associated with vaccines. At the same time, our childhood immunization program in this country saves many thousands of children's lives each year. If manufacturers and distributors are not able to get insurance, there is a possibility that manufacture and distribution may have to cease until an alternative can be implemented. I would like to preempt that type of crisis by authorizing a system that is fair to the manufacturers as well as the recipients of vaccines.

I am not wedded to every provision of this bill. I look forward to continued talks with the chairman of the Health and the Environment Subcommittee and other interested parties as we work with this legislation to develop a thoughtful, bipartisan markup vehicle. Only in that way can we assure quick action on this important issue.

One last note—this legislation is designed to address the childhood vaccine injury problem specifically and exclusively. There is no relation between this legislation and legislation that would establish a uniform product liability standard. There is a unique public interest in assuring the availability of vaccines that is not applicable to any other product sold in interstate commerce. Childhood vaccines, for all intents and purposes, are mandatory and there is therefore no consumer choice allowed. I will strongly and quickly disavow any claim that this legislation is designed to be a forerunner to a uniform product liability bill. That issue is separate; vaccines are different.

#### NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE-INJURY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1985 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

##### SECTION 1—SHORT TITLE

Section 1 is the "short title" provision, stating that the Act may be cited as the "National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act of 1985."

#### SECTION 2—FINDINGS

The Act rests on a number of Congressional findings relating to the Federal Government's involvement in childhood vaccination programs, the value of those programs, the occurrence of injuries associated with vaccinations, the pendency of large numbers of tort claims relating to those injuries, and the threat to the continued supply of certain vaccines caused by this litigation.

#### SECTION 3—NATIONAL VACCINE-INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM

This section contains a new title, to be added as Title XXI of the Public Health Service Act, that would establish a National Vaccine-Injury Compensation Program. The sections to be added to the Public Health Service Act are discussed below.

*Section 2101.*—This section establishes the basic requirement that administrative remedies under the Program be exhausted before a civil action for damages for vaccine-related injuries can be filed in any court. It also provides that, with the exception of appeals filed under section 2108(b) and actions to recover awards paid under section 2111(b), no new federal court jurisdiction is being established under either section 1331 or 1337 of title 28, United States Code, which govern "federal question" cases and cases arising under statutes regulating commerce.

*Section 2101.*—Lists of persons willing to serve as members of hearing panels would be published by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. These lists, which are to be published within 90 days after the date of enactment and after appropriate consultation with interested persons, would include persons the Secretary deems qualified to make the determinations required by the Act. The lists would be divided into regional groups and would contain a sufficient number of persons in each region to provide for the staffing of the predicted number of panels. Compensation for hearing panel members would be paid through assessments levied, pro rata, on respondents at the conclusion of each proceeding.

*Section 2103.*—This section sets forth the basic procedural requirements relating to the filing and initial processing of claims. No action for damages for a vaccine-related injury can be filed against any person unless that person is first named as a respondent in a claim filed pursuant to the Act, and unless that claim is filed within the time periods specified in section 2112 (ordinarily, two years after the first manifestation of a vaccine-related injury).

The content of claims and procedures for filing them are to be governed by regulations to be issued by the Secretary, although certain basic requirements are set forth in the Act. This section, in conjunction with the related definition contained in section 2114(1)(B), requires that all claimants and all respondents who are seeking compensation, or from whom compensation is sought, with respect to a vaccine-related injury alleged to have resulted from the vaccination of a single individual must be joined as parties in a single claim. After service of this claim, and after the joinder of any additional respondents, each side in the proceeding would select a hearing panel member from the lists compiled by the Secretary under section 2101. These two members would meet and select a third member. If selections are not made as required, the Secretary would make them. The section also provides procedures for the replacement of hearing panel members who

become unable to continue to serve and for removal of members for personal bias and prejudice.

**Section 2104.**—Before hearing panel members are selected, respondents would have the opportunity to file a consent, in the form specified by the Secretary, waiving any right they might have to a trial by a judge or jury and agreeing to be bound by the decision of the hearing panel. Such consents would remain in effect unless and until revoked on 90 days advance written notice. Hearing panels would be convened, and the hearing process would proceed as provided in the Act, as to all respondents who filed the required consent. Those respondents who did not file such a consent would be subject to immediate tort suit in a State or Federal Court, and the award of damages in such a suit would not be subject to the limitations prescribed by section 2110(b) and 2107.

**Section 2105.**—Claims are to be processed through informal procedures designed to elicit all relevant information in a cost-effective manner. Decisions of the panel would be by majority vote and would be in writing.

**Section 2106.**—The hearing panel would decide, based on the evidence presented to it and the experience and expertise of its members, whether any injuries alleged in the claim met the statutory definition of vaccine-related injuries, i.e., whether they were caused by a covered vaccine or by the manner in which it was administered. The panel would have the power to dismiss the proceedings against a respondent if that respondent established, by the preponderance of the evidence, that it did not participate in the manufacture, distribution, sale, or administration of the dose or doses of vaccine that are alleged to have caused the claimant's injury. If the panel found that the alleged injuries were vaccine-related, it would render a decision in favor of the claimant and against any respondents that had not been dismissed as parties. It would then proceed to determine the amount of damages suffered by the claimant.

**Section 2107.**—Damages could be awarded for actual and projected reasonable, unreimbursed expenses of medical care and other related costs; for loss of earnings and projected earnings; for non-economic, general damages arising from pain, suffering, and emotional distress; and for reasonable attorneys' fees. The total award with respect to all injuries claimed to have resulted from the administration of a covered vaccine to a single individual could not exceed \$1,000,000, and no more than \$100,000 of this total could be for non-economic, general damages arising from pain, suffering, and emotional distress. No punitive or exemplary damages could be awarded. Unless a notice of objection or an appeal is filed under section 2108, the award would be entered jointly and severally against all participating respondents not previously dismissed as parties to the proceeding.

**Section 2108.**—Decisions of the hearing panel would generally not be subject to appeal and would be final and binding. Nevertheless, the claimant would retain the right to reject a decision for any reason by filing a notice of objection. If no notice of objection is filed, respondents would have a limited right of appeal, and the award could be set aside if it were found to have been procured by corruption or fraud, that the panel exceeded its authority, or that a party was denied a fair hearing. If neither a notice of objection nor an appeal were filed within

the applicable time periods, the award would become final and would be enforceable in a State or Federal Court as a final judgment.

**Section 2109.**—If a claimant rejected an award he could thereafter maintain an action for damages in a State or Federal court against any participating respondent. The standards of liability applicable to the hearing panel proceeding would not apply, and substantive and procedural issues would be governed by otherwise applicable State or Federal law, except that the applicable limitations period would be modified by section 2112(c), which generally provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the hearing panel proceedings. At a trial of the claimant's tort suit, the decision of the hearing panel would be admissible in evidence unless it were excluded on grounds identical to those applicable to a respondent's appeal under section 2108. Upon admission of the decision into evidence, it would be presumed to be correct, and a party who contends otherwise would bear the burden of proof. No eligible hearing panel member could be called to testify with respect to the performance of any duty under the Act, although a hearing panel member could testify with respect to any issue of fact raised on a motion to exclude a decision of the hearing panel on such grounds as fraud or denial of a fair hearing.

**Section 2110.**—Money judgments in a tort suit would be subject to the same limitations applicable before a hearing panel, except that with respect to persons who did not file consents pursuant to section 2104(a), or who waived compliance with the procedures prescribed by the Act, monetary damages could be awarded to the full extent provided by otherwise applicable State or Federal law.

**Section 2111.**—After a participating respondent has paid a vaccine-injury claim, the respondent would be authorized to bring a civil action seeking to recover all or part of the payment made. In such an action, liability would be reallocated on the basis of comparative fault, except that if the court should find that the claimant's injury was not caused by the fault of any party, liability would be assessed in equal shares against the manufacturers of the vaccine administered which are parties to the action. Actions for contribution or indemnification could be filed on behalf of persons who had not filed a consent pursuant to Section 2104(a) or who waived compliance with the procedures specified by the Act only to the extent permitted by otherwise applicable law apart from this section, and no such action could be filed against either a participating respondent or against someone whom the claimant had not named as a respondent.

**Section 2112.**—Except during the first two years after enactment, claims filed more than two years after the first manifestation of a vaccine-related injury would be barred. Claims on behalf of minors or incompetent persons would have to be filed by their parents or guardians within the same limitations period applicable to other claims. During the first two years after the date of enactment, claims could be filed notwithstanding the otherwise applicable two-year limitation period unless, on the date the claim was filed, the applicable statute of limitations would prohibit the filing of an action for damages with respect to the subject matter of the claim. Applicable statutes of limitations would also be tolled during the pendency of proceedings under the Act.

**Section 2113.**—The Act would apply to all claims for injuries first manifested after March 27, 1985, and to those claims for vaccine-related injuries first manifested before that date as to which no action for damages had yet been filed. If such an action were pending, the Act would apply only if all parties so stipulated.

**Section 2114.**—This section contains definitions of certain terms used throughout the Act.

#### SECTION 4—ADVISORY COMMISSION

An Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines would be appointed to advise the Secretary on (1) the implementation of the Program, (2) actions to encourage the availability of an adequate supply of safe and effective vaccines, (3) available ways to obtain and use credible data on the frequency and severity of adverse reactions, and (4) research priorities. The Commission would have eleven members including health professionals, parents of injured children, attorneys, manufacturers, and government officials (who would serve as ex officio, non-voting members).

#### SECTION 5—PARENT INFORMATION

The Secretary would, within one year, develop parent information materials for distribution by health care providers to the parents or legal guardians of any child receiving a vaccine. The materials would include information on (1) the frequency, severity, and potential long-term effects of the disease to be prevented by the vaccine; (2) reactions to the vaccine that should be brought to the attention of the health care provider; (3) precautionary measures; (4) early warning signs or symptoms; (5) reporting procedures; (6) contraindications; (7) a summary of relevant State and Federal laws; and (8) other relevant information. Health care providers would be required to provide these materials to parents or legal guardians prior to the administration of a vaccine.

#### SECTION 6—INCENTIVES FOR SAFER CHILDHOOD VACCINES

The Secretary would be required to encourage the development or refinement of vaccines that result in fewer major adverse reactions, and to make or assure improvements in licensing, manufacturing, testing, labeling, warnings, distribution, storage, and administration of vaccines to reduce the risks of major adverse reactions. Reports to Congress would be required every two years.

#### HOUSING FOR THE HANDICAPPED ACT OF 1985

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. McKINNEY] is recognized for 30 minutes.

● Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Housing for the Handicapped Act of 1985, a measure which will assist the plight of the mentally ill homeless of this Nation.

This legislation is largely a response to the policy of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill. For a number of years I have been stating that during the past 20 years, the noble philosophy of deinstitutionalization has resulted, in part, in a plethora of desti-



tute, ill-equipped, chronic mentally ill individuals being dumped on the streets of our Nation's communities. While the original intent of deinstitutionalization—that is, care of the chronic mentally ill in the community rather than “warehousing” in an institution—was laudable and one that I support, it remains a fact that the community support structures are lacking resources to care for this population.

In essence, deinstitutionalization has been achieved far more easily than the complementary development of community-based service networks and residential opportunities appropriate to the needs of the chronically mentally ill. As a result, many deinstitutionalized chronically mentally ill persons are found on the grates in American cities and have been unable to gain access to supportive and habilitative services and, more importantly, shelter.

Mr. Speaker, with this as background, I have been reviewing existing Federal programs to find a mechanism to further the goal of deinstitutionalization. I found such a program under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959. Most of us know this as section 202 housing for the elderly. However, this program has also been providing housing for the handicapped, that is, physically handicapped, developmentally disabled, and chronically mentally ill. The housing for the handicapped component of the section 202 program is one of the best kept secrets of our federally assisted housing programs.

The Housing for the Handicapped Act of 1985 would improve the direct loan program under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 to ensure that the existing program meets the special housing and related service needs of physically handicapped, developmentally disabled, and chronically mentally ill persons. The primary goal of this legislation is to enhance the present statute based on recommendations from previous congressionally mandated demonstration studies as well as the Department of Housing and Urban Development's own 9-year experience in providing housing for nonelderly handicapped persons.

Unlike other legislative proposals presently being considered, this proposal calls for no new funding or duplicative demonstration programs. This legislation is a far more practical and reasonable approach which would improve an existing program for the handicapped and would assist in providing shelter and treatment for mentally ill persons who comprise a significant segment of our homeless population.

I urge my colleagues to incorporate this legislation in the housing authorization bill that is being developed and which I hope the House will adopt. To further acquaint my colleagues with

the purpose of my bill I am inserting a summary of the provisions and the bill itself for the RECORD:

#### SUMMARY OF THE HOUSING FOR THE HANDICAPPED ACT OF 1985

##### PURPOSE

The purpose of this Act is to improve the direct loan program under Section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 to ensure that the existing program meets the special housing and related service needs of nonelderly handicapped persons.

##### BACKGROUND

The Section 202 program was first enacted as part of the Housing Act of 1959 to provide direct Federal long-term loans for the construction of housing for the elderly or handicapped. The program was intended to serve elderly persons whose income was above public housing levels but still insufficient to obtain adequate housing in the private market. The Section 202 program was amended by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to change the method of determining the interest rate (which had been set at a 3 percent statutory maximum in 1965) and to permit the use of Section 8 housing assistance payments for projects constructed or substantially rehabilitated under the program. The original Section 202 program was restricted to elderly persons and families and later expanded to include physically handicapped people. The HCD Act of 1974, deleted the word “physically” from the term “physically handicapped” in response to the urgings of advocacy groups concerned for the eligibility of persons with developmental disabilities. The Housing and Community Development Amendments Act of 1978 provided further expansion of handicapped to include the chronically mentally ill. The 1978 Conference Report required the Secretary to promptly “develop criteria and standards for housing for the chronically mentally ill so that such persons can become active participants in the Section 202 program.”

HUD contracted this task out to an independent consulting firm. The consulting firm developed the standards and criteria and HUD has not sanctioned the standards and criteria, but rather has made the document available to sponsors of housing for the handicapped as background information only.

Presently, in addition to serving the special housing needs of the elderly, the Section 202 program serves the developmentally disabled, physically handicapped, and chronically mentally ill. Since the 1974 Act through 1984, over \$6 billion has been reserved representing almost 3,000 projects and 166,000 units. Of this amount, approximately 10 percent of the funding goes to the handicapped; primarily those with developmental disabilities.

##### WHY THERE IS A NEED FOR THIS LEGISLATION

Although projects for the handicapped have been somewhat successful in accessing program funding, once selected projects for the handicapped in comparison with projects for the elderly, have a poor track record of progressing through the HUD processing system up to the point of start of construction. On the average, based on actual program experience, projects for the handicapped take generally 2½ to 3 years to start construction from the time funds are reserved for the project. Projects for the elderly, on the other hand, average a little under the HUD regulatory requirement of 18 months.

The processing problem is aggravated by other procedural difficulties in developing small community-based projects for the handicapped. The other difficulties are primarily attributable to ambiguities in program policy and processing requirements. These ambiguities stem from the fact that Section 202 was originally created as a multifamily rental housing program, not a program to provide small-scale single family type housing for the handicapped.

This fact was the overall finding of the independent consulting firm chosen to evaluate the HUD/HHS Demonstration Program for the chronically mentally ill. Although this demonstration was geared to housing for the chronically mentally ill, the findings are also applicable to the other two disability groups served under the Section 202 program.

##### WHAT THIS PROPOSAL ACHIEVES THAT OTHER SIMILAR PROPOSALS DO NOT

On May 30, 1984, H.R. 5752 was introduced, entitled “Homeless Persons Housing and Supportive Services Act of 1984”. This same bill was included in Section 411 (entitled Second Stage Housing for the Homeless and Displaced) of H.R. 1, the Housing Act of 1985. These provisions provide \$100 million in FY 1986 for a Second Stage Housing Demonstration program for the homeless and displaced. The legislation would require HUD to administer a demonstration program to determine the feasibility of assisting nonprofit organizations in providing housing and supportive services for the intended residents. While the Section 411 provision of H.R. 1 does not specifically state it, it appears that this proposal deals with the chronically mentally ill who form a large portion of the homeless population.

In view of the HUD/HHS Demonstration Program, this proposal calling for yet another demonstration is unnecessary and duplicative. The additional \$100,000,000 funding is a poor use of scarce Federal resources. The information desired from the proposed demonstration has already been derived from the experience of sponsors who are currently operating small group homes for the chronically mentally ill under the 202 Program.

This proposal is better able to improve an existing program for the handicapped and will assist in providing shelter and treatment for mentally ill persons who are homeless.

Testifying on March 7, 1985 before the Housing Subcommittee, the Consortium for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities (CCDD), a group representing a number of major national disability organizations representing persons with handicaps whose housing needs are addressed in part by various Federal programs, stated that:

“The time has come to face the situation directly and proceed to design and implement a program based on housing needs of persons with handicaps. The information base that is required to effectively implement such a program exists; no further studies or demonstration programs are necessary.” (Emphasis added.)

##### KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATION

##### 1. General Provisions: (Housing for Handicapped Families)

A. Not less than 15 percent of such sums appropriated for the Section 202 Program shall be available for loans for the development of housing for handicapped families.

B. In allocating funds and processing applications for housing for handicapped fami-

lies, the Secretary shall adopt such distinct standards and procedures as the Secretary determines appropriate due to differences between housing for handicapped families and housing for the elderly.

C. The Secretary may, in a demonstration, determine the feasibility and desirability of reducing processing time and costs for housing for handicapped families by limiting project design to a small number of prototype design.

#### 2. Revised Subsidy Mechanism

The present fair market rents of the Section 8 program are particularly inappropriate for the development of group homes and other facilities for the handicapped since often there are inadequate market comparables.

It is proposed, therefore, to abandon the Section 8 Program and to provide a rental subsidy that is specifically designed to assist projects for handicapped families that are financed under the Section 202 Program.

The proposed subsidy would be based on HUD's determination of what it would cost to build a specific project, after applying standard HUD cost containment policies with respect to design and amenities. Since only a few thousand units are involved and since HUD as the maker of a 202 loan now looks very closely at costs, the additional fine tuning involved in this proposal should not impose significant additional burdens on HUD. The result should be a subsidy that is more reflective of the actual cost and would not require time-consuming requests for waivers. It would also allow projects to go forward that are presently falling by the wayside.

#### 3. Tenant Rent Contribution: (Fixed Subsidy and Minimum Rent)

Another feature of the Section 8 Program that has encouraged waste is that the subsidy is open-ended while the tenant rent contribution is fixed. Thus rent increases that were not really needed were imposed because the subsidy must expand to meet higher rent levels. The lack of any absolute, predictable ceiling on the rental subsidy over a twenty-year period has been one of the main concerns with Section 8. The bill fixes on aggregate twenty-year limit on the amount of subsidy based solely on the amount of the initial rents. The maximum subsidy would equal 90 percent of the sum of the initial rents times twenty. By contrast, the aggregate subsidy under Section 8 is 100 percent of the sum of the initial rents plus an indefinite amount through amendments of the subsidy contract whenever needed. Many Section 8 projects currently need amendment authority.

In order to provide a specific ceiling to the subsidy, and one that would be lower than prevailing under Section 8, the bill would introduce flexibility in the required tenant rent contribution. Not only would this provision permit a limit to the commitment of federal dollars, but it would encourage restraint in the costs of operating the project over the years. A minimum rent contribution of 25 percent of gross income would be required. Currently, under Section 8, tenants pay exactly 30 percent of adjusted income. In terms of gross income, current tenants pay rents equivalent to a wide range of percentages of income, generally from 20 percent to 29 percent. The administration of various adjustments to income has proven to be burdensome and contentious and can become greatly distorted when applied to many handicapped persons. In view of the gross income standard and the risks of

higher than minimum rent contributions that would be imposed by the bill, the minimum percentage is set at 25 percent, rather than at 30 percent. It should be noted also that the minimum rent as a percentage of gross income currently in effect under Section 8 is only 10 percent. The owner would propose and HUD would approve as reasonable all tenant rent contributions.

#### 4. Definitions

A. Housing for handicapped families: housing and related facilities to be occupied by handicapped families who are primarily nonelderly handicapped families.

B. Nonelderly handicapped families: elderly or handicapped families, the head of which (and spouse, if any) is less than 62 years of age at the time of initial occupancy of a project assisted under this program.

#### 5. Exemption: Davis-Bacon Wage Rates

In keeping with the overall goal of enhancing the Section 202 statute to better serve housing for the handicapped on a cost effective basis, this bill would provide an exemption to the application of Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements for all nonelderly handicapped projects developed under Section 202. In a 1983 CBO study, CBO found that "Derived by various techniques, estimates of the additional federal costs attributable to Davis-Bacon wage determinations have ranged from \$75 million a year to nearly \$1 billion.

Presently, the United States Housing Act of 1937, exempts Section 8 projects of fewer than nine (9) units from paying Davis-Bacon wages. The new Housing Development Grant Program contains an exemption for fewer than twelve (12) units. The present Section 202 statute provides no such exemption.

#### 6. Supportive Services for Elderly and Handicapped Families

##### A. Service Benefit Plan—

This section provides a statutory base to provide incentives for states and local financial resources to support projects developed for handicapped families.

The bill requires applicants proposing housing for handicapped families to submit a "service benefit plan" describing the manner in which such services will be provided and the extent of state and local funds available to assist in the provision of such services.

##### B. Clarification of Occupancy Policy—

As the Section 202 program has become a dual purpose program (housing for the elderly and housing for the nonelderly handicapped) some advocacy groups argue that any program-eligible person has a right to occupancy in any 202 project, regardless of whether the project offers the supportive services deemed necessary by program requirements for the individual's particular handicap or age category. Clarification of this issue will relieve project sponsors from having to provide housing for individuals whose service requirements are outside the experience training or resources of the sponsor who was selected to serve a different client group.

This bill amends the Section 202 statute to clarify the authority of Section 202 owners to limit occupancy to the client group or groups the project sponsor was selected to serve.

#### H.R. 1774

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Housing for the Handicapped Act of 1985".

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress hereby finds that—

(1) housing for nonelderly handicapped families is assisted under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 and section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937;

(2) the housing programs under such sections are designed and implemented primarily to assist rental housing for elderly and nonelderly families and are often inappropriate for dealing with the specialized needs of the physically impaired, the developmentally disabled, and the chronically mentally ill;

(3) the development of housing for nonelderly handicapped families under such programs is often more expensive than necessary, thereby reducing the number of such families that can be assisted with available funds;

(4) the program under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 can continue to provide direct loans to finance group residences and independent apartments for nonelderly handicapped families, but can be made more efficient and less costly by the adoption of standards and procedures applicable only to housing for such families;

(5) the use of the program under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 to assist rentals for housing for nonelderly handicapped families is time consuming and unnecessarily costly and, in some areas of the Nation, prevents the development of such housing;

(6) the use of the program under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 to assist rentals for housing for nonelderly handicapped families should be replaced by a more appropriate subsidy mechanism;

(7) both elderly and handicapped housing projects assisted under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 will benefit from an increased emphasis on supportive services and a greater use of State and local funds; and

(8) an improved program for nonelderly handicapped families will assist in providing shelter and treatment for mentally ill persons who are homeless.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to improve the direct loan program under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 to ensure that such program meets the special housing and related needs of nonelderly handicapped families.

#### SEC. 3. HOUSING FOR HANDICAPPED FAMILIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 202(h) of the Housing Act of 1959 is amended to read as follows:

"(h)(1) Of the amounts made available in appropriation Acts for loans under subsection (a)(4)(C) for any fiscal year commencing after September 30, 1985, not less than 15 percent shall be available for loans for the development of housing for handicapped families.

"(2) The Secretary shall take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that—

"(A) funds made available under this subsection will be used to support innovative methods of meeting the needs primarily of nonelderly handicapped families by providing a variety of housing options, ranging from small group homes to independent living complexes; and

"(B) housing for handicapped families assisted under this subsection will provide families occupying units in such housing with an assured range of services specified



in subsection (f), will provide such families with opportunities for optimal independent living and participation in normal daily activities, and will facilitate access by such families to the community at large and to suitable employment opportunities within such community.

"(3)(A) In allocating funds under this subsection, and in processing applications for loans under this section and assistance payments under paragraph (4), the Secretary shall adopt such distinct standards and procedures as the Secretary determines appropriate due to differences between housing for handicapped families and other housing assisted under this section.

"(B) The Secretary may, on a demonstration basis, determine the feasibility and desirability of reducing processing time and costs for housing for handicapped families by limiting project design to a small number of prototype designs.

"(4)(A) The Secretary shall, to the extent approved in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts with owners of housing for handicapped families receiving loans under, or meeting the requirements of, this section to make monthly payments to cover any part of the costs attributed to units occupied (or, as approved by the Secretary, held for occupancy) by lower income families that is not met from project income. The annual contract amount for any project shall not exceed 90 percent of the sum of the initial annual project rentals for all units and any initial utility and services allowances for such units, as approved by the Secretary. Any contract amounts not used by a project in any year shall remain available to the project until the expiration of the contract. The term of a contract entered into under this subparagraph shall be 240 months.

"(B) The Secretary shall approve initial project rentals for any project assisted under this subsection based on the determination of the Secretary of the total actual necessary and reasonable costs of developing and operating the project, taking into consideration the need to contain costs to the extent practicable and consistent with the purposes of the project and this section.

"(C) The Secretary shall require that, during the term of each contract entered into under subparagraph (A), all units in a project assisted under this subsection shall be made available for occupancy by lower income families, as such term is defined in section 3(b)(2) of the United States Housing Act of 1937. The rent payment required of a lower income family shall be approved by the Secretary and shall not be less than 25 percent of the gross income of the family, as defined by the Secretary.

"(D) The Secretary shall coordinate the processing of an application for a loan for housing for handicapped families under this section and the processing of an application for assistance payments under this paragraph for such housing.

"(E) The aggregate amount of budget authority that may be obligated for contracts for payments under this paragraph for fiscal year 1986 shall not exceed such sum as may be approved in appropriation Acts."

(b) DEFINITIONS.—Section 202(d) of the Housing Act of 1959 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(9) The term 'housing for handicapped families' means housing and related facilities to be occupied by handicapped families who are primarily nonelderly handicapped families.

"(10) The term 'nonelderly handicapped families' means elderly or handicapped fam-

ilies, the head of which (and spouse, if any) is less than 62 years of age at the time of initial occupancy of a project assisted under this section."

(c) EXEMPTION.—Section 202(c)(3) of the Housing Act of 1959 is amended by inserting ", other than housing for handicapped families," after "section".

#### SEC. 4. SUPPORTIVE SERVICES FOR ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED FAMILIES.

Section 202(f) of the Housing Act of 1959 is amended—

(1) by inserting "(1)" after the subsection designation; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(2) Each applicant for a loan under this section for housing and related facilities shall submit with the application a service benefit plan describing—

"(A) the category or categories of families such housing and facilities are intended to serve;

"(B) the range of necessary services to be provided to the families occupying such housing;

"(C) the manner in which such services will be provided to such families; and

"(D) the extent of State and local funds available to assist in the provision of such services.

"(3) The sponsor of housing and related facilities assisted under this section may limit occupancy of such housing and use of such facilities to—

"(A) the category or categories of families described in the service benefit plan submitted under paragraph (2); or

"(B) the category or categories of families described in the application for assistance under this section, in the case of an application submitted before October 1, 1985."

#### SEC. 5. TERMINATION OF SECTION 8 ASSISTANCE.

Housing for handicapped families assisted under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 using only authority approved in appropriation Acts for fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1985, shall not receive assistance under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937.

#### SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.

"(a) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The provisions of, and amendments made by, this Act shall become effective on October 1, 1985.

"(b) APPLICABILITY.—Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of, and amendments made by, this Act shall not apply with respect to projects with loans or loan reservations under section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 using authority approved in appropriation Acts for fiscal years beginning before October 1, 1985.●

#### MAJORITY LEADER OFFERS SALUTE TO JOSEPH B. SWANNER FOR LONG, DISTINGUISHED SERVICE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT] is recognized for 15 minutes.

● Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, today I want to offer a salute to one of the most conscientious and dedicated Federal administrators it has ever been my privilege to know—Mr. Joseph Bailey Swanner of Brownwood and Austin, TX.

A few weeks ago Joe Swanner retired as Regional Director of the Economic

Development Administration in Austin, climaxing a 35-year career with the U.S. Government.

To me, Joe Swanner personified all that a top-level Federal administrator should be. He believes devoutly that the Government exists only to serve the people, not the other way around. He likes to use the tools of bureaucracy to get things done, not to keep things from happening.

Over the years Joe Swanner has served our country in many ways. In World War II he was a young seaman in the U.S. merchant marine. Later, in 1950, Joe began his civilian governmental service here as a staff member in the House of Representatives, helping prepare the daily Journal.

From 1953 to 1959 he was a legislative assistant to Congressman O.C. Fisher of Texas, assisting the Congressman's constituents, preparing testimony and statements, and monitoring and evaluating legislation.

From 1960 to 1963 Joe was chief file clerk of the House, and between 1964 and 1966 he was director of the Office of Congressional Relations of the Small Business Administration.

In 1966 he became special assistant to the Administrator of the Economic Development Administration. Two years later he became Deputy Regional Director for the EDA in Austin and then, in 1973, he was promoted to Regional Director. In this position he administered and managed EDA programs in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

To this job Joe Swanner brought his characteristic vigor and dedication. He never lost sight of the fact that his job was not to shuffle paper but to help people. He scoured Federal regulations for ways to accomplish worthwhile projects, not to find ways to enhance his own career or the fortunes of his agency.

Today thousands of Americans in the Southwest—including many in Fort Worth's revitalized North Side—live better lives because of jobs created by EDA projects promoted and brought to fruition by Joe Swanner.

During his years of dedicated and selfless work, Joe has won many honors and citations, including the prestigious U.S. Department of Commerce Special Achievement Award.

And now, as Joe B. Swanner leaves the Government he has served so well for so long, his countless friends in the administrative agencies and on Capitol Hill will want to offer him a sincere, "Well done," and to wish him well in all his future endeavors.●

● Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to express my deepest appreciation to Mr. Joe Swanner, who has been an outstanding public servant for 35 years, and who has earned a most rewarding

retirement from the Federal Government.

It isn't often that one finds such an individual working within the Federal Government who is so dedicated to resolving problems—to ascertaining exactly what the requirements are, and then setting about determining not if, but how the problem can best be resolved or the program can best be implemented.

It was always a good feeling to know that if a problem arose under the jurisdiction of the EDA, I could pick up the phone and call Joe Swanner with the knowledge that my request would receive fullest and prompt attention.

Through his retirement, the Federal Government has lost a valued employee and Members of Congress from Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas have lost a trusted friend, who was always there to help their constituencies whenever he could.

I wish Joe Swanner every continued success in whatever way he chooses to spend his retirement. He has my warmest regards and sincere best wishes for a rewarding future.●

● Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate a big, gregarious Texan named Joe Swanner on the occasion of his retirement from Federal service. Joe was a fixture in this House for years, both as an employee on the floor as well as an aide to Congressman O.C. Fisher.

Joe has proved that you can overcome Potomac fever because he has gone home again, back to his beloved Texas after a total of 35 years of Federal service.

I remember Joe well, and recall his doggedness in always trying to find a way to get the job done. His work in the fifties on the Journal and later, as the chief file clerk for the House is typical of so many of the unsung people who labor long and hard in the background to make our jobs easier.

I wish Joe all the best in his retirement.

● Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, every now and then we find an employee of the Federal Government who is more than just a name in an agency. We find an individual who not only performs his or her tasks, but performs them with gusto. Joseph Bailey Swanner, is just such a person.

Mr. Swanner, after 35 years of Federal executive service, has retired. For the last 12 years, he was regional director of the Economic Development Administration's southwest region with offices in Austin, TX. Few Members of Congress in Texas—especially me—will ever forget the million helping hands Joe gave us in his attempt to aid our constituents.

Mr. Swanner was deputy regional director for EDA from 1968 through 1973 before assuming the regional directorship. From 1966 to 1968, he was

special assistant to the Administrator of the EDA. With great pride, Joe recounts his beginning career steps in the U.S. House on the staff of Representative O.C. Fisher of Texas during the 1950's. His career in Government is long and brilliant.

This man gave new meaning to the word "commitment." We hear so much about the negative qualities of some Federal employees—but surely the detractors don't have Joe in mind. This gentleman was responsible for some stunning developments in my south Texas area—economic improvements that are still contributing to the lifeblood of our south Texas economy.

It was with Joe Swanner's help that the Military Highway Water Supply Corp. was born—and it is now pumping water to thousands of people who had never enjoyed indoor plumbing until Joe saw to it that EDA would lend a hand. The McAllen, TX, Foreign Trade Zone bears the hand and mark of Joe Swanner. This FTZ has been one of the single greatest boons to Hidalgo County in many a decade. The Port of Brownsville, the shrimp turning basin, U.S. Highway 281—all these projects would still be drawn in chalk on a blackboard if Joe Swanner had not been in his chair.

Always I found myself sitting with great pride before the Committee on Public Works to tell my colleagues that EDA in Texas not only worked, it succeeded. Joe Swanner's stewardship of EDA's southwestern region enabled my south Texas area to enjoy the building of a infrastructure that still holds the economy together—still vibrant and still contributing.

After so many years a fellow becomes accustomed to working with people who are truly committed to their jobs: A phone call from me to Joe Swanner always had one guarantee to it: no matter what the problem or question, I could count on 1,000 percent from Joe. He is the kind of man who lends pride and dignity to public service—he was genuinely a civil partner and he will be sorely missed. We wish him the best that the world can bring him in retirement. He's gone from the EDA—but his many works remain as a testament to his leadership.●

● Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished majority leader is to be commended for calling to our attention the retirement of our dear friend, Joe Swanner. I want to be first in line to join this well-deserved tribute to a gentleman of the first order.

Joe Swanner just retired from the Federal Government with his last assignment as regional director of the Economic Development Administration for the southwestern region. He enjoyed a long and successful career both as a congressional assistant and a key administrator in the Federal service.

I know how proud Joe Swanner is of his staff days here in the House. He can trace his House work all the way back to 1950, and his respect and admiration for the House is very strong. That's why Joe Swanner was a successful Federal employee. He understood the relationship of Congress to the executive branch, and rather than playing an adversarial role, he sought a strong working relationship between the two branches.

Joe Swanner was present at the beginning of EDA. He helped create it, and he helped to develop it into one of the most successful and productive Government programs ever written for the purpose of providing jobs for the American people. The Economic Development Administration is his legacy, and it is truly an outstanding legacy.

I know for a fact that Joe Swanner eyed every request for EDA assistance under his jurisdiction as a request for money out of his own pocket. If a project didn't appear to have merit, Joe Swanner wouldn't cut corners. In short, he always had the courage and conviction to say "no" to anyone if he felt an EDA project would not give maximum bang for the buck. We need a lot more public employees like Joe Swanner.

Of course, the Office of Management and Budget has slated EDA for termination. I hope this doesn't take place. For 20 years this small agency has helped to revitalize rural America, and it's done it with a modest budget and a small, dedicated staff. A major reason for its success is Joe Swanner.

So, Mr. Speaker, I salute Joe Swanner on his retirement. It's well deserved. He is a great Texan and a patriotic American, and I'm proud of him.●

● Mr. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure that I add my name to the list of those standing today to express their thanks to a fellow Texan, Joseph B. Swanner, for his 35 years in the service of the U.S. Government.

The more senior of my colleagues have been aware of Joe's dedication since he first began working on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1950. Most Members—both past and present—from Southwestern States have had the pleasure of working with Joe on EDA projects since he began his career there in the late 1960's.

Our wishes for a pleasurable retirement and for continued success in whatever challenges he may encounter go hand in hand with our congratulations on a job well done.●

#### INTRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gen-



tleman from New Jersey [Mr. HOWARD] is recognized for 30 minutes. ● Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Speaker, today I am reintroducing the National Infrastructure Act, a bill that I consider vital to maintaining and improving the quality of life in this country for the rest of the century.

As in the last Congress, I am again joining with the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], the vice chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, in introducing this legislation. It was Mr. HAMILTON's work in the JEC that laid the groundwork for this bill and has formed the structure for this debate.

The Joint Economic Committee's study, "Hard Choices: A Report on the Increasing Gap Between America's Infrastructure Needs and Our Ability To Pay for Them," estimated a \$1 trillion bill for highways, roads, mass transit systems, water supply, and wastewater treatment systems for the rest of the century. But the study also found that we will be \$450 billion short of meeting that goal based on current funding.

There should be no doubt that there is a pressing need for action on the Nation's infrastructure. The reports of need come from the older, deteriorating urban areas, from the newer suburban areas and from the parts of the Nation that are in the midst of growth.

There are numerous examples of the enormous need for additional funds:

The Environmental Protection Agency has submitted a 1984 needs survey estimating the need for funds for construction of sewage treatment plants in the rest of the century at more than \$108 billion.

The County and Municipal Government Study Commission in New Jersey estimates the annual unmet capital investment needs at \$264 million.

The Federal Highway System estimates that it will cost \$495.7 billion to remove all deficiencies in the Nation's highway system.

The city of New York is on a 200-year cycle in repairing its streets but that looks good compared to the 800-year cycle in Elizabeth, NJ.

These are needs that cannot be tolerated. There is no question the American people must pay for these necessary repairs in one form or another unless we are prepared for commerce and industry to come to a complete halt in the not-too-distant future. The demands of leadership require that we in the Federal Government must play a major role in finding a solution to this problem.

There will not be one solution that takes care of the entire problem. However, we must begin the debate now on how we can effectively deal with the infrastructure problem. Every day waste increases the job ahead of us and simply increases our total cost.

For that reason, I hope to make the 99th Congress the Congress of the infrastructure. I had introduced the National Infrastructure Act in the last Congress for discussion purposes and I hope the dialog will be intensified this year.

We are faced with a problem of huge scale that cannot be approached through the traditional Federal grant mechanism. It is time for us to develop new, innovative approaches that minimize the role of the Federal bureaucracy and do not intrude the Federal Government into State and local decisionmaking.

The National Infrastructure Act, with a simple mechanism that requires no Federal strings and emphasizes local decisionmaking, provides one answer to the problem. It is a new approach that would enable us to close almost one-fourth of the funding gap that has been estimated for the rest of the century.

The act creates a National Infrastructure Fund in the Department of the Treasury that will distribute funds to the States on the basis of population. It does not require any complex formula that could pit States against each other.

The Fund will receive \$3 billion annually through an advance entitlement for a period of 10 years. It will then be distributed to the States which must establish revolving loan funds. The States are required to distribute a minimum of 30 percent of the money to local governments.

The States and the local governments will have the authority to decide whether the money will be spent on roads, bridges, mass transit systems, wastewater treatment or water supply systems. They will also have the option of deciding whether the funds will be used for construction or for rehabilitation.

The money is to be repaid to a sinking fund within the National Infrastructure Fund over a 20-year period at no interest. At the end of the 30-year period, States will have an additional \$25 billion to continue their infrastructure efforts.

This approach limits the cost to the Federal Government, it allows local decisionmaking and it provides funds for our infrastructure work. It is the type of program that this Congress must consider if Government is going to continue to provide the basic necessities.

I have been extremely gratified by the response that has been received from both public officials and the private sector since I introduced the bill. It is my intention that hearings be held in all parts of this Nation to receive input on the bill in the coming months. We have tentatively scheduled the first hearing for next month in Fort Worth, TX.

I am also pleased to have the support of all six subcommittee chairmen on the Committee on Public Works and Transportation as cosponsors of this legislation. I look forward to working with them as well as all the members of the committee in developing legislation that meets the needs of this Nation.

It is important that we take action on this pressing problem, possibly later in the year.

Without action, we will be faced with an ever increasing problem that will not go away. We must not allow our infrastructure to deteriorate when we have the means to prevent it.

#### NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT—SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

##### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

Section 1 provides that this Act may be cited as the "National Infrastructure Act".

##### SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND POLICY

This section addresses the findings and policies regarding the Nation's infrastructure.

Subsection (a) states that the Congress finds that—

- (1) by the year 2000, the gap between anticipated revenues and infrastructure needs will be \$450 billion;
- (2) public capital investment at all levels of government have declined in recent years by more than 50%;
- (3) infrastructure needs affect all regions of the country;
- (4) delay in meeting infrastructure needs further compounds the costs; and
- (5) a sound infrastructure system is essential to a healthy national economy.

Subsection (b) states the policy of the United States that—

- (1) the declining trend in public capital investment should be reversed;
- (2) infrastructure investment should be based on a long-range and sustained plan; managing infrastructure projects; and
- (4) a Federal instruction program should be established to assist state and local governments.

##### SECTION 3. NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Subsections (a), (b), (c). These subsections establish a National Infrastructure Fund [NIF] within the Treasury of the United States to provide funds for interest-free repayable grants to states. Guaranteed appropriations to the Fund will be made at a rate of \$3 billion per fiscal year for ten years beginning in fiscal year 1986.

Subsection (d) establishes as part of the NIF a separate account to be known as the "Sinking Fund Account," to receive funds repaid by the states. Repayment will begin in the second year of each loan and will be completed at the end of twenty years. The Secretary of the Treasury will invest these funds in interest-bearing obligations of the United States. Rate of repayment will be determined by the Secretary considering the interest to be earned on such obligations. The Secretary shall report to the Congress at the end of each fiscal year on the financial condition of the Account, and on its expected condition during the succeeding five fiscal years.

##### SECTION 4. REPAYABLE GRANTS

Subsection (a). This section provides the criteria under which the \$3 billion will be distributed to the qualifying states. Funds

will be allocated using the same ratio as the state population bears to the total population of the states for each fiscal year.

Subsection (b). Provides that funds will be available to each state on October 1 of each fiscal year.

Subsection (c). Grants shall be repaid as instructed under subsections (d) and (e) of this section.

Subsection (d). States shall make annual payments in the amounts determined by the Secretary to repay the grants by the end of a 20-year period. This determination will consider interest income earned on the obligations secured for the Sinking Fund Account under section 3(d) of this Act.

Subsection (e). Adjustments will be made in the payment schedule to ensure that the aggregate amount of payments received and the interest earned is equal to the amount of each grant. Any deficit in the amount will be paid by the states, and any excess will be returned to the states. Upon completion of repayment of each twenty-year loan, the Secretary shall transfer the funds to the general funds of the Treasury.

#### SECTION 5. QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAYABLE GRANTS

This section defines the qualifications of the states for repayable grants. This Act requires that there be an agreement between the Secretary of the Treasury and the states that includes the following provisions:

(1) The states must establish an infrastructure revolving fund within the Treasury of the states;

(2) The infrastructure funds will be used by the states within a reasonable period, as deemed acceptable by the Secretary, to make interest-free loans to state and local government departments, agencies and instrumentalities;

(3) These loans will be made in accordance with state laws and procedures regulating loans to governmental entities from state funds. These loans will be repaid in annual payments starting in the second year of each loan with final payment as soon as practicable, but within the life of the project or the end of the 20-year period beginning when the loan is made, whichever is sooner. These loans will be used only for construction and improvement of highways, streets, bridges, and water supply and distribution systems; and acquisition, construction and improvement of mass transportation facilities and equipment; and wastewater treatment facilities. Loans are only for projects which otherwise would not be carried out within a 24-month period initiated at the time of the loan. Loans may not be utilized to provide the non-Federal share of the cost of any project carried out under any other provision of Federal law, nor will they be used to pay the cost of operation and maintenance of any project. Loans will be repaid with user fees and dedicated taxes to the extent practicable.

(4) The state will not use amounts from the infrastructure revolving fund to repay loans made under paragraph 2 of section 5 of this Act.

(5) At least 30% of the funds allocated to a state will be used to make interest-free loans to local government departments, agencies and instrumentalities.

(6) Repayment of the grant by the states will be in accordance with section 4 of this Act.

(7) The states shall adhere to accounting, audit and fiscal procedures guidelines designated by the Secretary after consulting with the Comptroller General of the United States.

(8) After reasonable notice, the state shall make available to the Secretary and the Comptroller General such records necessary to review compliance and operation under this Act.

(9) The state will comply with the requirements of sections 6 and 7 of this Act.

#### SECTION 6. AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND REVIEWS

Subsection (a). This section provides that each state shall have an annual independent audit of the financial statements of the state to ensure compliance with this Act under the government auditing standards as issued by the Comptroller General.

Subsection (b) allows that audits being performed in compliance with other laws of the United States may be substituted for the required audit under this Act for a fiscal year.

Subsection (c). A state may submit a written waiver of the audit requirement if the financial statements of the state are annually audited by independent auditors under state law and if the state certifies that the audit adheres to the government auditing standards, and that the audit applies to the fiscal year of the waiver.

Subsection (d). The Secretary may waive these auditing requirements for a state for a fiscal year under the following provisions, when the state demonstrates progress in complying with these regulations, and:

(1) the financial statements are not auditable; or

(2) the audit is conducted, but is not independent or does not adhere to the issued auditing standards.

Subsection (e). An opinion on an audit shall be provided to the Secretary as required and the audit will be made available by the state within 30 days for public inspection.

Subsection (f). The Secretary will set specific time limits to perform audits and reviews, or investigations of possible violations of this Act.

Subsection (g). The Comptroller General shall review the activities of the Secretary and the states necessary for Congress to evaluate compliance and operations under this Act.

#### SECTION 7. PUBLIC HEARINGS

Subsection (a). This section requires that the states hold at least one public hearing prior to issuing an interest-free loan under this Act. This hearing shall encourage public participation providing opportunities for written and oral questioning relative to the proposed loan.

Subsection (b). Adequate notice shall be provided by the state of all hearings relative to this Act, including, but not limited to newspaper notice.

#### SECTION 8. REPORTS

Subsection (a). Before June 2 of each fiscal year the Secretary is directed to report to Congress on:

(1) the status and operation of the fund during the prior fiscal year; and

(2) the administration of this Act, including a report on the distribution of funds to the states and any legislative recommendations for improving the program.

Subsection (b). Each state government receiving funding shall submit a report at the end of each fiscal year as prescribed by the Secretary. This report shall state an account of the funds received in terms of the amounts and purposes, and the differences between the planned and actual budget.

#### SECTION 9. BUDGET TREATMENT

This section provides that the amount of repayable grants made to the states under this Act shall not be included in the budget of the U.S. Government and shall be exempt from statutes governing budget outlays.

#### SECTION 10. POPULATION INFORMATION

This section establishes the criteria for determining the state populations to be used in this Act. The Secretary of Commerce shall provide adjusted population figures based on the 1980 census, to more accurately reflect current populations.

#### SECTION 11. DEFINITIONS

This section provides the definitions for the terms "construction" and "state", as used in this Act.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, one useful byproduct of our national economic afflictions has been increased attention to the issue of productivity. Unfortunately, the discussion has not focused upon one important component of economic efficiency: The condition of our infrastructure.

While we have stressed the development of a fifth generation of computers, we have neglected the preservation of the current generation's transportation and water systems. Years of declining investment in our basic life-support systems have undermined—and will continue to increasingly undermine—our Nation's productive and commercial capacity. Between 1971 and 1981, spending by all levels of government on highways, bridges, mass transit, water, and sewer dropped from 1.5 percent of GNP to 0.78 percent.

The longer we delay restoring our transportation and water systems, the harder and more expensive the task will become. But the issue is larger than paying for public works projects. The ability to move people and goods quickly and to provide an adequate supply of clean water is essential for future economic growth.

Fearing that we could face a crisis of growing proportions, the Joint Economic Committee commissioned an advisory panel under the direction of its former chairman, Henry Reuss, to study the condition of our infrastructure and to make recommendations on how to finance its repair and construction. The study was based on a survey of 23 States, and its conclusions represent the best available data.

The advisory panel discovered a severe problem. Although the country's regions have differing requirements, all have widespread needs. While the Northeast and Midwest encounter growing deterioration of facilities built decades ago, the South and West cannot keep up with new demands for expansion.

The advisory panel estimated that to meet tomorrow's demands, the United States must increase planned spending by \$450 billion through the year 2000. It is estimated that to finance repair and reconstruction of highways and



bridges, we will need \$720 billion through the end of the century. Of that, only \$455 billion will be available under existing programs, leaving a shortfall of \$265 billion. For water supply and distribution, the spending gap is \$41 billion; for wastewater collection and treatment, \$49 billion; and for mass transit, \$88 billion.

The advisory panel found that, while the financial requirements are large, they are also manageable. Although the \$450 billion needed for infrastructure spending in the next decade and a half is a large sum, it is within our means. The Joint Economic Committee's estimates are less alarming than some, which have put the cost of needed investment in the trillions.

We cannot ignore these needs. If we do, we will endanger the health of our economy. The public takes its transportation and water systems for granted. We had better not.

What can we do? The Joint Economic Committee has made several recommendations. These include establishing a capital budget to help define our resources and needs, reviewing obsolete technical standards which impair intelligent investment, and, where appropriate, granting the States greater latitude to determine how to spend scarce Federal infrastructure dollars.

But, most important, Congress, we believe, should establish a national infrastructure fund, which would help the States address the deterioration the JEC advisory committee, as well as others, have so conclusively documented.

That is why I am pleased to join Congressman HOWARD and other members of the Public Works and Transportation Committee in introducing the National Infrastructure Act to create such a fund. This bill, which Senator HART will also introduce, rests on five assumptions.

First, infrastructure renewal and development is of clear national importance. Each State, as our study has shown, will have unmet needs in the next 15 years.

Second, because of the budget crisis, the Federal Government is unable to respond to the emergency by simply increasing spending, as it has done in the past.

Third, we must establish a new long-term, sustained commitment to building and repairing public works which recognizes the advantages of our federal system of government.

Fourth, infrastructure renewal represents an investment in the future. It is not wasted money, particularly when, as we are proposing, Federal loans are repaid.

Finally, as I have already noted, a competitive national economy depends upon a sound infrastructure.

The national infrastructure fund, which we are proposing, would be fi-

nanced by the U.S. Treasury at the rate of \$3 billion a year for 10 years. It will be a small office in the Treasury Department, whose sole function would be to make 20-year, interest-free loans available to the States and to make certain that they are repaid. It will allocate funds to the States according to a formula based on population, though that could be modified.

The States, in turn, will set up infrastructure banks or revolving funds which will lend the money to finance infrastructure construction and repair. This money will be paid back to the State fund through taxes and/or user fees in equal, annual increments, thereby permitting the original Federal loan to finance more infrastructure construction and/or repair. We have calculated that \$30 billion in loans will create about \$76 billion in new infrastructure spending over the 30-year period the program lasts.

The States will be required to spend the loans only on roads, bridges, mass transit, water supply and distribution systems, and sewerage systems. These, we consider, the core, life-support systems of our economy. Each State will determine how to allocate its Federal funds. Obviously, New Mexico's priorities will differ from New York's, but each will decide separately how to invest its capital. The States will be required, however, to set aside at least 30 percent of its loans for municipal and county governments to invest.

The States will not be permitted to substitute the funds for projects which otherwise would have been carried out. Nor will they be permitted to provide the non-Federal share of the cost of any project from the loan. The national infrastructure fund is designed to supplement existing programs.

After 1 year, the States will be required to pay a percentage of their loan, determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, into a "sinking fund" in the national infrastructure fund. There, the deposits will earn enough interest to repay the original "repayable grant." This will limit the impact of the program somewhat, but it will ensure repayment. At current interest rates, we estimate those combined payments will average \$65 million per year.

After the States have completed repaying their last loan, 30 years after the program begins, a permanent pool of infrastructure capital equal to the interest income earned by the sinking fund will remain. We calculate that that will be around \$26 billion. This money will continue to be recycled to finance additional infrastructure projects.

The Comptroller General and the Secretary of the Treasury will be empowered to review compliance, conduct audits, and to issue reports to Con-

gress on the status and operation of the program.

As I noted earlier, we regard infrastructure expenditures as an investment in the future. The projects funded will have a real and tangible value. They should not, therefore, be regarded as operating expenses. Rather, they represent an investment for which, as any good business recognizes, it is proper to borrow. We have consequently proposed that the moneys appropriated for the national infrastructure fund, which will be repaid, be considered off-budget in a separate capital account.

This proposal has three overriding attractions. It provides a steady, dependable stream of capital to the States so that managers can plan for future needs. It leaves selection and direction of projects with State and local governments, though the projects would be restricted to infrastructure needs whose impact on the national economy is greatest: Roads, bridges, mass transit, sewerage, and water supply and distribution systems. Finally, because the funds would be repaid, the cost to the Treasury will be contained.

In conclusion, I want to address a question we have been asked many times since we first introduced the National Infrastructure Act last June. How, when the Federal budget deficit is so large, can we propose that Washington undertake a new spending program, no matter how necessary, meritorious, or fiscally prudent?

The answer, I believe, is clear. We must increase our investment in infrastructure because failure to do so will hurt us in the future. Without a sound infrastructure, economic growth becomes more difficult. Without strong growth, all our other social and economic goals, including a balanced budget, will be harder to achieve.

In short, the cost of continuing to neglect our national infrastructure needs is truly something we cannot afford.

Others have asked if it would not be more appropriate for the States to meet the challenge of revitalizing our infrastructure, rather than the Federal Government. They note that, after all, most States have budget surpluses and that infrastructure spending has historically been a State responsibility. They also point out that the State share of total spending on public works has declined from 70 percent in 1959 to 52 percent in 1983.

Unfortunately, the nationwide task of infrastructure renewal is too large and too important to leave to the States alone. So great are the needs for repair and expansion that all levels of government must participate in order to keep our national economy strong.

Our proposal will raise only a fraction—about one-sixth—of the total revenue the Joint Economic Committee study indicated we will need by the year 2000. The States, and the cities, therefore, will have no choice but to increase spending, though today, unfortunately, too few have concrete plans to do so.

By requiring the States to establish infrastructure banks, or revolving funds, our bill in fact creates a catalyst which will stimulate the process of infrastructure renewal. It recognizes that Washington cannot today simply increase its grants for development. Rather, we wish to utilize the virtues of our federalist system of government, with its shared responsibility for the tasks of government. By creating cooperation between Washington and the States, the proposal addressed the problem in what, I believe, is a new and potentially very productive way. At the same time, the bill underlines the Federal Government's two century commitment to the building and security of this Nation.

We must increase investment in infrastructure. Because our economy depends on it, we have no alternative. Failure to increase essential public works spending will only crimp our economy's competitiveness in the future, something we cannot afford.●

#### INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND OUR DOMESTIC ECONOMY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a few moments to address the House on the issue of trade.

I would first say that I think every Member of Congress and every American needs to recognize that from this year forward, and possibly a few years before this, no longer can we talk about addressing the domestic deficit, our \$200 billion annual deficit, our \$1.4 trillion national debt, without talking about our problems in the world and the international trade deficit.

For years I have been talking around my district in my State about the fact that this is becoming a global and, indeed, when we are facing a \$200 billion deficit, now we are talking about \$100 billion deficit with regard to international trade and the two will have to be addressed together, not one or the other, but the two together. I think that is going to take a change in attitude in this Nation, in the very fibers of our bureaucratic system.

Approaches and concerns that we have as Americans are going to have to change somewhat or we will not be able to compete and we will not be able to solve these problems. Let me give some examples. In recent studies,

some time ago when I visited Japan, I noticed that the Japanese bureaucracy, the Japanese Government, considered themselves not as antagonists of their businessmen but as an entity there to help their business people.

I was told by many businessmen in Japan when they go to talk to their government agency the attitude is not that "We have laws on the books to stop you from doing this or prevent you from doing that," but, in essence, to say, "Here are our laws and here is your approach. How can we work together to solve this so that you can have an appropriate business, create jobs, export, if you will, and therefore help your nation?" We do not have a good deal of that attitude in this Nation today, and we do not have the attitude that this is a global economy. We have been working for some 18 months in this body on the Export Administration Act simply saying that we would like to make it easier for American businessmen to export their products overseas.

Many of our laws, when it comes to international laws, are antiquated. We have the example of the Embassy official who bought a little "talk speak and spell," a little toy computer that talked and spells words, and he was told he could not take it out of the country, just a few years ago, because it was militarily critical, because it had an imbedded microprocessor.

Then we have the situation where the quartz watches that most of us wear, that electronic watch, was on the restricted list in this Nation for years, for years because our laws were outdated to the point where it said that we could not ship that watch because it had a chip in it and that chip was on a special list that was restricted. Never mind the fact that almost every industrialized nation on the face of the Earth was shipping and making those chips, our laws were such that we could not ship that. It took an Executive order of the President.

These are the kinds of approaches that I think are going to have to change and our laws will have to be changed in order to put us in a competitive position in the world market.

I might also add that we have representatives, by way of our embassies, all over the world acting on behalf of the United States who could help and assist us in our international trade problems.

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I would tell the story that happened to me just a few weeks ago in my home district. A businessman indicated to me that he had gone to a country to seek a contract with two other nationals. Each agreed to visit their own embassy in the morning, meet for lunch and then call on their principal to see if they could sell this product. A

three-nation agreement trying to sell a product.

He went to the American Embassy and said he was treated rather rudely, told that they did not have the time and was sent on his way. His two colleagues, each from other nations, were given reams of information, calls were made to be helpful; they were given all kinds of assistance—one embassy even offered to send personnel to help introduce.

His comment to me was he was embarrassed to even tell his colleagues the treatment he had, let alone the situation. We have tried to address that just yesterday in the State Department authorization bill, saying in effect that our Embassies and our Embassy personnel should be directed by the Secretary of State to do everything they can to assist American business interests.

What we are talking about essentially is the loss of tens of thousands of American jobs; a multibillion-dollar trade deficit that as I said when I started out, must be solved in conjunction with the solution to our domestic deficit.

If we do not solve the international trade imbalance, we will not solve the domestic deficit problem, and I think the same is true in reverse. Both have to be attacked; they have to be attacked on all fronts. Bureaucratic thinking, governmental thinking, congressional approaches, legislative approaches, Executive orders from the White House, changes in all of our laws and our attitudes around the world.

I think finally we have to enforce some of the antidumping laws we have on the books. One need only mention the Houdillie case, where millions of dollars were spent by a private company to prove that there was indeed infractions on our laws, and eventually nothing was done about it.

So the point is we do have some laws on the books; they also need to be enforced, we just want to compete, as the saying goes, "on a level playing field." It is important not only to me and my colleagues here, but literally to every single American, because everytime another country gets a contract or makes a sale that American businessmen or businesswomen could make, it is a job in this country.

#### CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1239

Mr. WHITTEN submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 1239) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, for emergency famine relief and recovery in Africa, and for other purposes:



## CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. NO. 99-29)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1239) "making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, for emergency famine relief and recovery in Africa, and for other purposes," having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 4, 5, 7, 10, and 12.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 3, and 11, and agree to the same.

## Amendment Numbered 1:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$400,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, and 14.

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JOHN C. STENNIS,  
DANIEL K. INOUE,

## Managers on the Part of the Senate.

## JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1239) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, for emergency famine relief and recovery in Africa, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the House and Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report.

The conference agreement has not included H.R. 1189 as an amendment. The conferees do expect H.R. 1189 to be considered during April 1985, and the Department of Agriculture, in the meantime, is to proceed with applications and actions to be ready to use the existing guarantee authority during the month of April.

## TITLE I

## CHAPTER I

## AFRICAN FAMINE RELIEF

## PUBLIC LAW 480

Amendment No. 1: Provides \$400,000,000 for title II of Public Law 480 instead of \$600,000,000 as proposed by the House and \$285,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 2: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

*of which \$384,000,000 is hereby appropriated to be available through December 31, 1985, and \$16,000,000 shall be derived from unobligated balances in the Commodity Credit Corporation*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement appropriates \$384,000,000 for title II of Public Law 480 to remain available through December 31, 1985, and provides for the use of \$16,000,000 in unobligated Commodity Credit Corporation balances. The House bill provided for an appropriation of \$480,000,000 and the Senate amendment provided for an appropriation of \$269,000,000 and a transfer of \$16,000,000 in unobligated balances.

It is the intention of the conferees that the commodities provided in this Act be delivered to Africa no later than December 31, 1985.

Amendment No. 3: Deletes House language providing \$120,000,000 (of which \$90,000,000 was made available by Public Law 98-332) for competitive sales to Africa from Commodity Credit Corporation stocks.

Amendment No. 4: Deletes Senate language and restores House language which provides that not to exceed \$100,000,000 is available for inland transportation under certain terms and conditions.

## CHAPTER II

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

## International disaster assistance

Amendment No. 5: The conferees agreed to delete language proposed by the Senate. This language indicated that "such sums as may be necessary" were available and established a ceiling at the House appropriated amount. The conferees felt that funds should be available through a specific appropriation, as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 6: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

*, to be available only for such purpose and to remain available until March 31, 1986: Provided, That the Committee on Appropriations of each House of Congress is notified five days in advance of the obligation of any funds made available under this paragraph, unless the emergency is life threatening and immediate action is necessary*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agreed to inclusion of the Senate language which requires a five day notification to the Committee on Appropriations before funds being provided for International Disaster Assistance may be obligated. This action is not to be taken as a precedent for future action on the regular International Disaster Assistance account. The conferees included this language because the authorization legislation has expanded the purposes for which these funds may be used, in essence creating an account which is part disaster assistance, part development assistance, and part Economic Support Fund.

The conferees have recommended additional language which will allow a waiver of this requirement if the situation is life threatening and requires an immediate response. The conferees expect that this

waiver provision will be used only when absolutely necessary. In addition, the administration must immediately report to the Committee on Appropriations of each House of Congress if the five day notification is waived. This report shall contain the justification for waiving the notification requirement and a detailed report on the use of such funds.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES EMERGENCY REFUGEE AND  
MIGRATION ASSISTANCE FUND

Amendment No. 7: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which required a five day notification prior to using emergency refugee and migration assistance funds. The purposes and scope of this particular account, unlike the International Disaster Assistance account, have not changed, and, therefore, the conferees agree that additional notification requirements are unnecessary.

## MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 8: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

*notwithstanding any other provision of law,*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agreed to delete language proposed by the Senate. This language indicated that "such sums as may be necessary" were available and established a ceiling at the House appropriated amount. The conferees felt that funds should be available through a specific appropriation, as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 9: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

*, to be available only for such purpose and to remain available until March 31, 1986*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees have agreed to delete the Senate language requiring a five day notification prior to obligation of funds under this account. The conferees are aware that these funds will be subject to the normal notification process.

## TITLE II

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT  
EMERGENCY RESERVE FOR AFRICAN FAMINE  
RELIEF

Amendment No. 10: Deletes Senate language which provided that funds under the Emergency Reserve would be available only to the extent an official budget request is transmitted to the Congress.

## TITLE III

## GENERAL PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 11: Inserts technical center head change as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 12: Restores House language and deletes Senate language waiving sections 10 and 15 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act. The conferees agree that since the authorization for this bill has

been passed, the proposed Senate waiver is no longer required.

Amendment No. 13: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which inserts language providing that the Administrator of the Agency for International Development shall have responsibility for determining the emergency food and disaster assistance needs for funds appropriated in this Act.

The conferees expect that the amendment will in no way alter the way the Public Law 480 program is currently administered by the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development.

Amendment No. 14: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

**DISPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES UNDER SECTION 416 OF THE AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1949**

To prevent the waste of commodities acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation through price support operations, the Secretary of Agriculture shall make available, through Private Voluntary Organizations for donation to African nations requiring emergency food assistance, for calendar year 1985, not more than two hundred thousand metric tons of agricultural commodities: Provided, That 50 percentum of the commodities made available under this sentence shall be in the form of wheat or wheat products: Provided further, That none of the commodities made available for donation under this sentence shall be made available until the Secretary of Agriculture has certified to the appropriate committees of the Congress that the commodities shall not be distributed through or otherwise be allowed to come under the possession or control of the Government of Ethiopia. The Corporation shall pay, with respect to the commodities donated under the foregoing sentence, transporting, handling, and other charges, including the cost of overseas delivery. Such donations shall be in addition to the level of assistance programmed under any other authority.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement provides for the distribution of equal amounts of wheat and dairy products. The conferees will expect the Department to distribute 200,000 metric tons of commodities under this agreement during calendar year 1985.

The conferees agree that the language in the second proviso should not raise any obstacle to the rapid and effective distribution of commodities made available to the people of Ethiopia. The language of the conference agreement will prevent the Government of Ethiopia from gaining control of donated foodstuffs through seizure of commodities donated by the American people.

The conference agreement further supports the Senate floor debate on the amendment. The legislative history established by that debate would allow the participation of the Ethiopian government, in cooperation with UN agencies and United States Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), in the transportation and distribution of commodities provided under the amendment.

**CONFERENCE TOTAL—WITH COMPARISONS**

The total new budget (obligational) authority for the fiscal year 1985 recommended by the Committee of Conference, with comparisons to the fiscal year 1985 budget estimates, and the House and Senate bills for 1985 follow:

Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1985 .....	\$235,000,000
House bill, fiscal year 1985 .....	880,000,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1985 .....	669,000,000
Conference agreement, fiscal year 1985 .....	784,000,000
Conference agreement compared with:	
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1985 .....	+549,000,000
House bill, fiscal year 1985 .....	-96,000,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1985 .....	+115,000,000

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*Managers on the Part of the Senate.*

**SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED**

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. MICA, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HENRY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. MOORE, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. MADIGAN, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. MCKINNEY, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. BOULTER, for 5 minutes, March 28.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SKELTON) to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. SHARP, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WRIGHT, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. HOWARD, for 30 minutes, today.

Mrs. KENNELLY, for 5 minutes, March 28.

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. HUTTO) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LELAND, for 60 minutes, April 3.

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. EMERSON.

Mr. FRANK, to include extraneous material in debate on House Joint Resolution 181 in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida, to include extraneous material while in the Committee of the Whole.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HENRY) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mrs. JOHNSON.

Mr. FAWELL.

Mr. GREEN.

Mr. HILLIS.

Mr. WEBER.

Mr. PARRIS.

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska in two instances.

Mr. KRAMER.

Mr. KASICH.

Mr. PURSELL.

Mrs. SCHNEIDER in two instances.

Mr. O'BRIEN.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

Mr. DORNAN of California in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SKELTON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. KOLTER in two instances.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota in two instances.

Mr. HAMILTON.

Mr. FLORIO.

Mr. NOWAK.

Mr. MRAZEK.

Mr. UDALL in two instances.

Mr. MAZZOLI.

Mr. LIPINSKI.

Mr. DYMALLY.

Mr. STARK.

Ms. MIKULSKI.

Mr. SCHUMER.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR.

Mrs. BOXER.

Mr. FEIGHAN.

Ms. OAKAR.

Mr. NICHOLS.

Mr. ASPIN.

Mr. GORDON.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. WRIGHT.

Mr. STOKES.

Mr. TRAFICANT.

Mr. EDGAR.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.

Mr. RANGEL in three instances.

Mr. GAYDOS.

Mr. SOLARZ in two instances.

Mr. LANTOS.

**ADJOURNMENT**

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 12 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until to-



morrow, Thursday, March 28, 1985, at 11 a.m.

### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

887. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notice of the proposed sale of defense articles in excess of \$50 million to Saudi Arabia, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 133b (96 Stat. 1288); to the Committee on Armed Services.

888. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notice of the proposed sale of defense articles in excess of \$50 million to Pakistan, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 133b (96 Stat. 1288); to the Committee on Armed Services.

889. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a notice of intent to offer to sell certain defense articles and services to Pakistan, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

890. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a notice of intent to offer to sell certain defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

891. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a report of political contributions by Vernon A. Walters to be Ambassador to the United Nations, pursuant to Public Law 96-465, section 304(b)(2); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

892. A letter from the Inspector General, Department of State, transmitting a report of the results of the confidential audit of the Department's emergency expenditures, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2671(c) (the act of Aug. 1, 1956, chapter 841, section 4(c) (97 Stat. 1024)); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

893. A letter from the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, transmitting a report on the leasing and production of coal lands under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, and the Attorney General's report on competition in the coal and energy industries, pursuant to the act of February 25, 1920, chapter 85, section 8B (90 Stat. 1089); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

894. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, Department of the Interior, transmitting a report on the state of domestic mining, minerals, and mineral reclamation industries, including a statement of the trend in utilization and depletion of these resources, pursuant to Public Law 91-631, section 2; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

895. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for certain maritime programs of the Department of Transportation; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

896. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to eliminate the requirement for decennial census of drainage; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

897. A letter from the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Environmental Protection Agency's

legislative proposal for reauthorization of the Clean Water Act; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

898. A letter from the Administrator, Veterans' Administration, transmitting a report on the disposition of cases granted relief from administrative error, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 210(c)(3)(B); to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

899. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Energy, transmitting the 1985 annual report on the high-level radioactive waste management demonstration project at the Western New York Service Center, West Valley, NY, pursuant to Public Law 96-368, section 4; jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Science and Technology.

900. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report entitled: "State Rather Than Federal Policies Provided The Framework for Managing Block Grants"; jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means.

### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. WHITTEN: Committee of conference. Conference report on H.R. 1239 (Rept. No. 99-29). Ordered to be printed.

### PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BATES (for himself, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. DELLUMS, and Mr. MILLER of California):

H.R. 1759. A bill to provide that the polls in the continental United States for Presidential general elections shall close at 10:30 p.m., eastern standard time; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. BEREUTER:

H.R. 1760. A bill to amend the Commodity Credit Corporation Act regarding the export of agricultural commodities, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mrs. BOXER:

H.R. 1761. A bill to permit persons who will be 18 years of age on the date of a Federal election to vote in the related primary election; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. BURTON of Indiana:

H.R. 1762. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to exempt bonds for solid waste disposal facilities from the volume limitation on the issuance of private activity bonds; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. COURTER:

H.R. 1763. A bill to amend the Mutual Security Act of 1954 to add the minority leader of the House of Representatives to the list of those who can provide authorization for Members and staff of the House to obtain local currency for foreign travel ex-

penses; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DAVIS:

H.R. 1764. A bill to provide that pay for certain types of Federal civilian powerplant employees be determined in the same manner as that in which pay is determined for employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers performing similar functions; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DONNELLY (for himself, Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii, Mr. MATSUI, and Mr. ATKINS):

H.R. 1765. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow contributions to tax-exempt social welfare organizations to be deducted for gift and estate tax purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota:

H.R. 1766. A bill to promote the export agricultural commodities owned or acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation by facilitating the use of barter for materials produced in foreign countries, to develop markets for U.S. agricultural commodities, to protect the assets of the Commodity Credit Corporation, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Agriculture and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DYSON (for himself, Mrs. BYRON, Mrs. HOLT, Mr. BLILEY, and Mrs. BENTLEY):

H.R. 1767. A bill to amend the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 to provide that an amendment made by such act relating to Federal guarantees of industrial development bonds shall not apply to obligations issued for certain solid waste disposal facilities for which substantial sums and effort have already been expended; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FASCELL (for himself, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. MICA, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. FEIGHAN, and Mr. GILMAN):

H.R. 1768. A bill relating to international narcotics control; jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary.

By Mr. GREGG (for himself, Mr. ROSE, and Mr. CHAPPIE):

H.R. 1769. A bill to amend section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 to provide for a 2-year moratorium on the encryption of satellite cable programming to allow for the development of marketing systems under the recent amendments made to such section, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mrs. KENNELLY (for herself, Mr. GRADISON, Mr. MATSUI, and Mrs. HOLT):

H.R. 1770. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide incentives for the establishment of statewide insurance pools to provide health insurance to high-risk individuals; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KRAMER (for himself, Mr. BROWN of Colorado, Mr. SCHAEFER, and Mr. STRANG):

H.R. 1771. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive plan for the cleanup of contaminated sites, structures, equipment, and natural resources at or near the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver, CO; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. LIVINGSTON:

H.R. 1772. A bill to limit the use of foreign icebreakers in U.S. waters; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. LUNGREN:

H.R. 1773. A bill to require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a portion of certain Treasury obligations in the form of obligations indexed for inflation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McKINNEY:

H.R. 1774. A bill to amend section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 to ensure that the direct loan program under such section meets the special housing and related needs of nonelderly handicapped families; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. MOORE:

H.R. 1775. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to revise and extend the taxes used to finance the Superfund Program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HOWARD (for himself, Mr.

HAMILTON, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. ROE, Mr. MINETA, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. APPELGATE, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. BOSCO, Mr. MOODY, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. WISE, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. VISCLOSKEY, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. LANTOS, and Mr. MATSUI):

H.R. 1776. A bill to establish a national infrastructure fund to provide funds for interest-free loans to State and local governments for construction and improvement of highways, bridges, water supply and distribution systems, mass transportation facilities and equipment, and wastewater treatment facilities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr. ROBERTS:

H.R. 1777. A bill entitled: the "Farmland Conservation Acreage Reserve Act of 1985"; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. WALGREN:

H.R. 1778. A bill to suspend for 3 years the duty on 1,5 naphthalene diisocyanate; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WALGREN (for himself, Mr.

BROYHILL, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. REGULA, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. ECKART of Ohio, Mr. LUKE, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. KOLTER, and Mr. DIOGUARDI):

H.R. 1779. A bill to clarify the application of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 to encourage cogeneration activities by registered gas utility holding companies; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. MADIGAN (for himself, and Mr. BROYHILL):

H.R. 1780. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish a National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Program; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. GEJDENSON:

H.J. Res. 216. Joint resolution authorizing the President to designate the third week of June 1985 as "National Veterans' Health Care Awareness Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. ROE:

H.J. Res. 217. Joint resolution designating April 26, 1985, as "National Nursing Home Residents Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma:

H. Res. 115. Resolution to amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to restrict the consideration of supplemental appropriation bills by the Committee on Appropriations; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mrs. SCHNEIDER (for herself, Mr.

UDALL, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. BARNES, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BOSCO, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. CARPER, Mr. CONTE, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. COYNE, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. DICKS, Mr. DYMAALLY, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FOGLETTA, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. GORDON, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mrs. JOHNSON, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. McKINNEY, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOODY, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. NEAL, Mr. PEASE, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. REID, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. ROTH, Mr. RUDD, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. SHAW, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. TALLON, Mr. TORRES, Mr. VENTO, Mr. VOLKMER, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. WEAVER, and Mr. ZSCHAU):

H. Res. 116. Resolution expressing the sense of the House with respect to an exchange of travel between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

## MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

54. By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Illinois, relative to grain; to the Committee on Agriculture.

55. Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Kansas, relative to taxation of aircraft; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. COLEMAN of Texas:

H.R. 1781. A bill for the relief of Lori Annette Burr; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GRAY of Illinois:

H.R. 1782. A bill for the relief of Madhav Prasad Sharma; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUTTO:

H.R. 1783. A bill for the relief of Mary E. Stokes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 43: Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HOYER, and Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.

H.R. 50: Mr. TOWNS, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. CROCKETT, and Mr. WAXMAN.

H.R. 281: Mr. BATES, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr.

EDGAR, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. WILSON, Mr. MOODY, Mr. ROE, and Mr. FORD of Michigan.

H.R. 360: Mr. SOLOMON.

H.R. 587: Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. DAUB, Mr. LELAND, Mr. LUJAN, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. DICKS, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. COELHO, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. RUDD, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. ANDREWS, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. FROST, Mr. BUS-TAMANTE, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. FIELDS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. GROTEBERG, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. PORTER, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. McKINNEY, Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. CONTE, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. HENDON, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. GREEN, Mr. NEAL, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SEIBERLING, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. WHEAT, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. CROCKETT, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. DYSON, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mr. WEISS, Mr. ROSE, Mr. YATRON, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, Mr. WEBER, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. HOWARD, Mrs. SHARP, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. SISISKY, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. WYLLIE, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. KOLBE, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. MOODY, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. FUSTER, and Mr. WEAVER.

H.R. 600: Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. PURSELL, and Mr. GALLO.

H.R. 709: Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma.

H.R. 749: Mr. COELHO and Mr. YATES.

H.R. 951: Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii and Mr. CROCKETT.

H.R. 1000: Mr. EVANS of Iowa and Mr. STENHOLM.

H.R. 1068: Mr. WOLFE.

H.R. 1082: Mr. LIVINGSTON.

H.R. 1142: Mr. SILJANDER.

H.R. 1190: Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. FUQUA, Mr. WILSON, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. BENTLEY, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. PERKINS, and Mr. STOKES.

H.R. 1195: Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. OLIN, Mr. NIELSON of Utah, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. BATES, and Mr. MOODY.

H.R. 1245: Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. ADDABBO, and Mr. SEIBERLING.

H.R. 1319: Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BEDELL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. LEVINE of California, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. STOKES, Mr. VENTO, Mr. CARPER, Mr. WEISS, Mr. GUARINI, and Mr. BERMAN.

H.R. 1335: Mr. WIRTH, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. NEAL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. CONYERS, Mrs. COLLINS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. TORRES, and Mr. RANGEL.

H.R. 1338: Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. FRANK, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. OWENS, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. LUNDINE, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. ANDREWS, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. RICHARDSON, and Mr. JEFFORDS.

H.R. 1359: Mr. HAYES.



H.R. 1361: Mr. WHITLEY, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. COATS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. VENTO, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. HILER.

H.R. 1371: Mrs. SCHROEDER and Mr. LEHMAN of California.

H.R. 1399: Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. MOODY, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. APPELATE, Mr. DYSON, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. WHEAT, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. HAYES, Mr. WHITLEY, Mr. ECKART of Ohio, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. SLATTERY, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. LIPINSKI, and Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.

H.R. 1421: Mr. PERKINS and Mr. McMILLAN.

H.R. 1550: Mr. HEFNER.

H.R. 1613: Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. COELHO, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. HENDON, Mr. LELAND, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. OWENS, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. VENTO, and Mr. FAUNTROY.

H.J. Res. 27: Mr. KOLBE and Mr. PACKARD.

H.J. Res. 58: Mr. CHAPPELL.

H.J. Res. 146: Mr. ROGERS, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. FISH, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. MOODY, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. COYNE, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. WILSON, Mr. COOPER, and Mr. DWYER of New Jersey.

H.J. Res. 183: Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. O'BRIEN, Mr. RODINO, Mr. FUSTER, Mr.

CONTE, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. LELAND, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WEISS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. BEILSON, Mr. SABO, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. ROE, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. DYSON, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. OWENS, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. BARNES, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. REID, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. CROCKETT, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. FROST, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. GREEN, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. WORTLEY, and Mr. BRYANT.

H.J. Res. 188: Mr. HENDON, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. STRANG, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. McMILLAN, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Ms. KENNELLY, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. CONTE, Mr. MCKERNAN, Mr. KRAMER, Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. SMITH of Iowa, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. MANTON, Mr. FOWLER, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. SHAW, Mr. SCHAEFER, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. SKEEN, and Mr. LAFALCE.

H. Con. Res. 26: Mr. LUNDINE.

H. Con. Res. 32: Mr. BROWN of Colorado and Mr. WEBER.

H. Con. Res. 64: Mrs. BOXER, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. CONYERS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. LUNDINE, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, and Mr. DURBIN.

H. Con. Res. 67: Mr. FISH.

H. Con. Res. 77: Mr. SKELTON, Mr. CONYERS, Mrs. COLLINS, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. FIELDS, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. DiOGUARDI, and Mr. WOLPE.

H. Con. Res. 99: Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. HORTON, Mr. LELAND, Mr. OWENS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. ROE,

Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, and Mr. MATSUI.

H. Res. 42: Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. WHITEHURST, Mr. HENRY, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. MCCOLLUM, and Mr. KOLBE.

H. Res. 82: Mr. CROCKETT and Mr. LOWRY of Washington.

H. Res. 91: Mr. LUJAN, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. HENRY, Mr. CONTE, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. OWENS, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. WEISS, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. GROTEBERG, Mr. GARCIA, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. ROE, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. DYSON, Mr. DANIEL, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. FISH, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. DeWINE, Mr. MCCOLLUM, and Mr. SCHEUER.

#### DELETIONS OF SPONSORS FROM PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were deleted from public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 885: Mr. SIKORSKI.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

70. The SPEAKER presented a petition of A. Hamilton, Melbourne, Australia, relative to trade; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.